This Article explores the role of private ordering in the regulation of mandatory tender offers, focusing on three issues: the recent “experiments” of the Italian legislature introducing greater contractual freedom on mandatory bids as a proxy for the tendency toward optional rules; a critical discussion of a scholarly proposal to further enhance this freedom in Europe; and an explanation of our proposal, intended as a sketch for future research, on how to reform the mandatory bid rule in a way that might be more beneficial to minority investors, at least in some jurisdictions.

The Biases of an "Unbiased" Optional Takeovers Regime: The Mandatory Bid Threshold as a Reverse Drawbridge

VENTORUZZO, MARCO
2015

Abstract

This Article explores the role of private ordering in the regulation of mandatory tender offers, focusing on three issues: the recent “experiments” of the Italian legislature introducing greater contractual freedom on mandatory bids as a proxy for the tendency toward optional rules; a critical discussion of a scholarly proposal to further enhance this freedom in Europe; and an explanation of our proposal, intended as a sketch for future research, on how to reform the mandatory bid rule in a way that might be more beneficial to minority investors, at least in some jurisdictions.
Fedderke, Johannes W.; Ventoruzzo, Marco
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/3985578
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact