This Article explores the role of private ordering in the regulation of mandatory tender offers, focusing on three issues: the recent “experiments” of the Italian legislature introducing greater contractual freedom on mandatory bids as a proxy for the tendency toward optional rules; a critical discussion of a scholarly proposal to further enhance this freedom in Europe; and an explanation of our proposal, intended as a sketch for future research, on how to reform the mandatory bid rule in a way that might be more beneficial to minority investors, at least in some jurisdictions.
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Titolo: | The Biases of an "Unbiased" Optional Takeovers Regime: The Mandatory Bid Threshold as a Reverse Drawbridge | |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2015 | |
Autori: | ||
Autori: | Fedderke, Johannes W.; Ventoruzzo, Marco | |
Abstract: | This Article explores the role of private ordering in the regulation of mandatory tender offers, focusing on three issues: the recent “experiments” of the Italian legislature introducing greater contractual freedom on mandatory bids as a proxy for the tendency toward optional rules; a critical discussion of a scholarly proposal to further enhance this freedom in Europe; and an explanation of our proposal, intended as a sketch for future research, on how to reform the mandatory bid rule in a way that might be more beneficial to minority investors, at least in some jurisdictions. | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 86 - Working Paper |