We develop a model to understand the trade???offs faced by the host country in the decision to implement an amnesty when a restrictive immigration policy is in place. We show that a legalization can be optimal if ex-ante the government has been too selective. Furthermore, it is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants, the smaller is their pool, and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 supports the predictions of our theoretical model.

What drives immigration amnesties?

CASARICO, ALESSANDRA;
2012

Abstract

We develop a model to understand the trade???offs faced by the host country in the decision to implement an amnesty when a restrictive immigration policy is in place. We show that a legalization can be optimal if ex-ante the government has been too selective. Furthermore, it is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants, the smaller is their pool, and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 supports the predictions of our theoretical model.
Casarico, Alessandra; G., Facchini; T., Frattini
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11565/3966520
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