We examine a model of limited communication in which the seller is selling a single good to two potential buyers. In each of the finite number of periods the seller asks one of the two buyers a binary question. After the final answer, the allocation and the transfers are executed. The model sheds light on the communication protocols that arise in welfare maximizing mechanisms.
Asking questions
KOS, NENAD
2013
Abstract
We examine a model of limited communication in which the seller is selling a single good to two potential buyers. In each of the finite number of periods the seller asks one of the two buyers a binary question. After the final answer, the allocation and the transfers are executed. The model sheds light on the communication protocols that arise in welfare maximizing mechanisms.
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