This paper analyses the incentives to participate in an international climate agreement, and the eventual stability of the resulting climate coalition, using the integrated assessment model WITCH. Coalition stability is assessed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the aggregation of social welfare, and the severity of climate damages.
Incentives andstability of international climate coalitions: An integrated assessment
BOSETTI, VALENTINA;
2013
Abstract
This paper analyses the incentives to participate in an international climate agreement, and the eventual stability of the resulting climate coalition, using the integrated assessment model WITCH. Coalition stability is assessed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the aggregation of social welfare, and the severity of climate damages.
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