Battigalli-Siniscalchi (J.Econ.Theory, 2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as "rationality and common strong belief of rationality" (RCSBR). Here, we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we show that RCSBR is characterized by a solution concept we call Extensive Form Best Response Sets (EFBRS's). It turns out that the EFBRS concept is equivalent to a concept already proposed in the literature, namely Directed Rationalizability (Bttigalli-Siniscalchi, Advances Theor. Econ., 2003, Art. 1). We conclude by applying the EFBRS concept to games of interest.
Forward Induction Reasoning Revisited
BATTIGALLI, PIERPAOLO;
2012
Abstract
Battigalli-Siniscalchi (J.Econ.Theory, 2002) formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning as "rationality and common strong belief of rationality" (RCSBR). Here, we study the behavioral implications of RCSBR across all type structures. Formally, we show that RCSBR is characterized by a solution concept we call Extensive Form Best Response Sets (EFBRS's). It turns out that the EFBRS concept is equivalent to a concept already proposed in the literature, namely Directed Rationalizability (Bttigalli-Siniscalchi, Advances Theor. Econ., 2003, Art. 1). We conclude by applying the EFBRS concept to games of interest.File in questo prodotto:
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