We jointly model optimal time-consistent tax evasion, taxation, and auditing in a representative-agent neoclassical economy, focusing on Markov equilibria. We calibrate and solve the model numerically, obtaining precise quantitative predictions. Finally, we evaluate the ability of the model to match selected OECD data.
Time-consistent tax evasion
MAFFEZZOLI, MARCO
2009
Abstract
We jointly model optimal time-consistent tax evasion, taxation, and auditing in a representative-agent neoclassical economy, focusing on Markov equilibria. We calibrate and solve the model numerically, obtaining precise quantitative predictions. Finally, we evaluate the ability of the model to match selected OECD data.
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