In this paper, we look at the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze voter coordination through the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition–proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections. We completely characterize these equilibria in the 3 candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case.
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Titolo: | Strong and Coalition-Proof Political Equilibria under Plurality and Runoff Rule |
Data di pubblicazione: | 2007 |
Autori: | |
Autori: | Messner, Matthias; M., Polborn |
Rivista: | INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY |
Abstract: | In this paper, we look at the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze voter coordination through the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition–proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections. We completely characterize these equilibria in the 3 candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case. |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 01 - Article in academic journal / Articolo su rivista Scientifica |
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