Governance and organisation design: a negotiation and network analytic approach

The paper proposes a negotiation analytic approach, pluralistic yet precise, to the design of corporate governance and organizational mechanisms. The framework combines theoretical and methodological elements from organizational economics and design, negotiation and network analysis. The approach is applied to a data base of preferences expressed by two samples of relevant actors (CEOs and managers working in 315 firms – domestic or subsidiaries – located in Italy) over a wide array of governance and organizational mechanisms; contributing both in method and in the substantive identification of solutions. The method is network analytic, oriented to detecting which policies on the various mechanisms are complementary. The framework hypothesizes, and the results indicate, that the governance game is less adversarial than suggested by ‘shareholder views’, but also less generically cooperative than suggested by ‘stakeholder views’; and develops policy implications by identifying on which matters preferences converge or diverge, among themselves and with respect to the solutions applied in practice.