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Author(s): Maria Abascal and Delia Baldassarri

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Love Thy Neighbor? Ethnoracial Diversity and Trust Reexamined¹

Maria Abascal
Princeton University

Delia Baldassarri
New York University

According to recent research, ethnoracial diversity negatively affects trust and social capital. This article challenges the current conception and measurement of “diversity” and invites scholars to rethink “social capital” in complex societies. It reproduces the analysis of Putnam and shows that the association between diversity and self-reported trust is a compositional artifact attributable to residential sorting: nonwhites report lower trust and are overrepresented in heterogeneous communities. The association between diversity and trust is better explained by differences between communities and their residents in terms of race/ethnicity, residential stability, and economic conditions; these classic indicators of inequality, not diversity, strongly and consistently predict self-reported trust. Diversity indexes also obscure the distinction between in-group and out-group contact. For whites, heterogeneity means more out-group neighbors; for nonwhites, heterogeneity means more in-group neighbors. Therefore, separate analyses were conducted by ethnoracial groups. Only for whites does living among out-group members—not in diverse communities per se—negatively predict trust.

The increasingly multiethnic nature of modern societies has spurred academic and policy interest in the consequences of diversity. Recently, one

¹ For their invaluable comments, we are grateful to Paul DiMaggio, Denia Garcia, Michael McQuarrie, Germán Rodríguez, the *AJS* reviewers, and the participants of Prince-

prominent line of scholarship has linked ethnoracial diversity to undesirable collective outcomes, most notably, low levels of trust, civic engagement, and social capital (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000*b*; Delhey and Newton 2005; Leigh 2006; Putnam 2007; Gustavsson and Jordahl 2008; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008). These findings have important policy implications, in part because they resonate with public anxieties about immigration, residential integration, and affirmative action.²

This article questions the recent preoccupation with diversity, especially as diversity has been conceived and measured. We show that the association between diversity and trust is an artifact of nonwhites' lower levels of trust combined with their overrepresentation in diverse communities. Variations self-reported trust and cooperation are better explained by ethnoracial, residential, and socioeconomic differences at the individual and community levels. Researchers have conflated these aspects because they heavily overlap in the real world: in the United States, for example, heterogeneous communities are generally less affluent, more nonwhite, and less stable than homogeneous ones. We also investigate how the alleged effects of diversity operate across ethnoracial groups. Specifically, we ask whether the members of all groups are equally averse to diversity. Our findings indicate that only whites report lower levels of trust when they live among out-group members.

Putnam (2007) is the most widely cited paper to emerge from the recent body of work on the negative consequences of diversity.³ This study also uses the largest available sample of U.S. communities. Here, we reexamine the empirical bases of Putnam's conclusions using his measures and data set. We improve on previous research in several ways. First, we analytically distinguish compositional effects, which are due to the differential sorting of people into communities, from the contextual effect of ethnoracial heterogeneity. Second, we effectively control for social and economic confounders at both the individual and community levels. Third, we supplement one popular index of diversity with indicators of individual race/

ton's Center for the Study of Social Organization Workshop and the 2012 Alp-Pop conference. Names are listed alphabetically; both authors contributed equally to this work. Direct correspondence to Maria Abascal, 107 Wallace Hall, Princeton, New Jersey 08544. E-mail: mabascal@princeton.edu and delia.b@nyu.edu

² In the case of *Fisher v. University of Texas*, e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to reconsider race-based affirmative action in university admissions. At stake was the legal rationale for affirmative action, according to which educational institutions have a vested interest in pursuing ethnoracial diversity because diversity promotes positive outcomes. Among the evidence marshaled against this rationale was research that blames diversity for "social isolation, alienation, and anomie" (Abigail Thernstrom, Stephan Thernstrom, Althea K. Nagai, and Russell Nieli, amici curiae brief in support of petitioners, in *Fisher v. University of Texas*, U.S. doc. no. 11-345 [2012], p. 13).

³ Putnam's pessimistic conclusions have also garnered considerable attention outside academia (Jonas 2007; Leo 2007; Martin 2007; Richwine 2009).

ethnicity and community composition in order to understand relations between specific groups. Finally, we extend research on intergroup relations beyond the black-white paradigm to include Hispanics and Asians.

In the *pars destruens*, this article shows that the observed association between diversity and self-reported trust is the result of a compositional effect. Nonwhites and immigrants report being less trusting than whites, and they live in relatively heterogeneous communities; these differences fully account for lower levels of trust in heterogeneous communities. Our aim, however, is not simply to challenge the findings of one paper—however emblematic of a broader research trend—but to question the tendency to blame diversity for the negative consequences of residential mobility, segregation, bias, and socioeconomic deprivation. In the *pars construens*, this article (1) takes stock of the determinants of self-reported trust, comparing the predictive power of ethnoracial differences, residential stability, and economic well-being, and (2) moves beyond synthetic indicators of diversity to revive the analytic distinction between in-group and out-group contact.

Regarding our first contribution, we find that preexisting differences in self-reported trust across ethnoracial groups, along with individual and contextual indicators of residential stability and economic well-being, are the strongest predictors of trust and cooperation. Regarding the second contribution, we find that living among nonwhites—not in diverse communities per se—negatively predicts trust among whites. No other ethnoracial group exhibits a similar association between out-group contact and trust. This finding suggests that the alleged effects of ethnic diversity might be more accurately attributed to bias; the collective preoccupation with diversity may have placed undue blame on nonwhites and immigrants, overlooking long-standing bias on the part of the dominant group.

We believe some of the empirical shortcomings of current research stem from a peculiar conception of social capital as an aggregate property that has beneficial consequences for the collectivity as a whole. As we argue at length in the conclusion, researchers should assess—rather than assume—whether and how prosocial attitudes and behaviors extend beyond one's immediate social circles and in-group members. In more general terms, this article sets the stage for a more ambitious research agenda that investigates the building blocks of solidarity in contemporary societies characterized by differentiation and complex interdependencies (Durkheim [1893] 1984; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Portes and Vickstrom 2011; Yamagishi 2011; Baldassarri 2015), while moving away from a communitarian conception of social capital (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama 1995; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000*b*; Herreros Vázquez 2000; Putnam 2000; Skocpol 2003) based on mechanical solidarity stemming from similarity and homogeneity.

HETEROGENEITY AND COLLECTIVE OUTCOMES

Historically, research on the effects of intergroup contact has drawn on two social psychological theories of prejudice: the contact hypothesis and conflict/threat theory. According to the contact hypothesis, contact with members of other groups disconfirms generalizations and reduces prejudice (Allport 1954). According to conflict/threat theory, prejudice is the result of competition for scarce resources, and spatial and social proximity instead intensify competition (Sherif et al. [1961] 1988).⁴

Although contact and conflict theories have been pitted against each other in countless literature reviews, conflict theory is more accurately viewed as an extension of the contact hypothesis under less than ideal conditions. Even early contact theorists acknowledged that contact only reduces prejudice under specific conditions—like equal status and repeated, intimate interactions—that are seldom met in the real world (for a review, see Pettigrew [1998]). Relations between ethnoracial groups, for example, are often characterized by historical and institutionalized inequality.

Experimental evidence bears out the claim that exposure to out-group members can foster unfavorable stereotypes (for a review, see Brown [2000]). Sociologists have expanded realistic conflict theory beyond prejudice in order to understand multiple individual and collective outcomes. Outcomes of interest include perceptions of relative group size (Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz 2005), support for government-led desegregation (Bobo 1983; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989), punitive attitudes (King and Wheelock 2007), instances of collective violence against subordinate groups (Olzak and Shanahan 2003), and support for liberal welfare policies (Tuch and Hughes 1996). Sociological studies in particular focus on the reaction of dominant group members, such as U.S. whites, to contact with subordinate group members.

Global integration and international migration have renewed academic interest in the effects of diversity and intergroup contact. However, recent work on diversity differs from earlier research in three critical ways. First, many recent studies, mainly conducted by political scientists, economists, and sociologists, generally rely on observational data, often collected at the ecological level, instead of experimental or individual-level data. Second, researchers use summary indexes of heterogeneity to proxy for intergroup contact. Third, they treat indicators of social capital, rather than prejudice and discrimination, as the primary outcomes of interest.

⁴ Social identity theorists have extended conflict theory in important ways, most notably, by specifying symbolic resources, like social status, as the possible objects of competition (Tajfel and Turner [1986] 2004).

The Communitarian Conception of Social Capital

Social capital, a widely (and wildly) used concept, can be usefully defined as “the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures” (Portes 1998, p. 6). Traditionally, the concept of social capital has been deployed to identify benefits that accrue to individuals or groups by virtue of their position within social structures and is often measured using social network metrics (Bourdieu 1980; Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; Burt 2000; Lin, Cook, and Burt 2001).

A more recent approach emerging from political science emphasizes the benefits of social capital for broader collectivities. Drawing on classical theories of democracy and civil society (Tocqueville [1835–40] 2003; Foley and Edwards 1996), scholars have argued that a rich associational life is conducive to various forms of civic engagement and thereby fosters positive outcomes for the community as a whole (Putnam 1993, 2000; Fukuyama 1995). Within this framework, social capital is often conceived as a property of collectivities (i.e., communities, regions, states) and measured at the aggregate level, using generic survey questions about trust (e.g., “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”) or proxies of civic and political engagement (e.g., associational membership, political participation).⁵ The accompanying definitions of social capital are fittingly diffuse, encompassing “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action” (Putnam 1993, p. 167).

Working from this communitarian conception of social capital that emphasizes its role in the provision of public goods (and often regards it as a public good itself), researchers have turned their sights to the potentially negative effects of ethnoracial diversity. If social capital is indeed “collective” (Costa and Kahn 2003) or “aggregate” in nature (Coffé and Geys 2006), it makes sense to ask whether the communal stock of social capital is threatened by the growth of ethnoracial heterogeneity.

Review of Diversity and Social Capital

From the level of the neighborhood to the nation, several studies have identified a negative association between ethnoracial diversity and measures of social capital. On the basis of responses to the generalized trust question on the General Social Survey, Alesina and La Ferrara conclude that community racial heterogeneity “induces people to trust less” (2000a,

⁵ Portes (1998) criticizes this line of work for tautologically equating social capital (cause) with the benefits it helps secure (consequence).

p. 16; see also Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). In another paper based on the same data, the authors further contend that racial heterogeneity discourages participation in voluntary organizations (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000*b*). Costa and Kahn (2003) similarly find that residents of more diverse U.S. metropolitan areas are less likely to volunteer or belong to civic organizations. In his widely cited paper, Putnam (2007) examines the relationship between several measures of trust and ethnoracial heterogeneity across U.S. communities. He concludes that the residents of diverse neighborhoods “hunker down”: “Trust (even of one’s own race) is lower, altruism and community cooperation rarer, friends fewer” (p. 137). According to Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), these communities pay a high price for their residents’ low levels of social capital: more heterogeneous U.S. communities spend less per capita on productive public goods like roads and education and more on police and intergovernmental transfers. They are also plagued by higher debt.

A substantial body of work reaches similar conclusions on the basis of data from countries other than the United States. Andrews (2009) finds that heterogeneous localities in England are characterized by lower levels of social cohesion, Coffé and Geys (2006) find that heterogeneous municipalities in Flanders are characterized by lower social capital, and Leigh (2006) finds that residents of heterogeneous Australian neighborhoods are less trusting of people in their communities.⁶

Several studies have identified similar relationships between heterogeneity and social capital across multiple countries. Using cross-national data from the World Values Survey, Delhey and Newton (2005) and Anderson and Paskeviciute (2006) identify a negative association between ethnic heterogeneity and average generalized trust. Both papers interpret this as evidence of a causal relationship; as Anderson and Paskeviciute write, “Heterogeneity clearly diminishes trust across the board” (p. 796). The purported consequences of lower levels of trust are dire. On the basis of cross-national associations between heterogeneity and macroeconomic indicators, Easterly and Levine (1997) and Posner (2004) contend that heterogeneity is partly to blame for what Easterly and Levine term “Africa’s growth tragedy” (1997, p. 1203). In a related vein, Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) argue that heterogeneity is the reason the United States has a limited welfare state compared to other developed countries.

These studies are overwhelmingly characterized by three methodological choices. First, and without exception, they rely on indexes of heterogeneity that measure the probability that two randomly chosen individuals belong to the same ethnic group. Second, many of these studies do not account for

⁶In Coffé and Geys (2006), social capital is an index constructed from organizations per capita, electoral turnout, and crime rate.

differences in the ethnoracial composition of the communities in question (see, e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 1999, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000*a*, 2000*b*, 2002; Costa and Kahn 2003; Posner 2004; Delhey and Newton 2005; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Coffé and Geys 2006; Leigh 2006; Putnam 2007; Andrews 2009).⁷ Third, many of these studies carry out ecological analyses, whether the unit is the city, county, state, or even country (see, e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 1999; Posner 2004; Delhey and Newton 2005; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Coffé and Geys 2006; Putnam 2007; Andrews 2009).⁸

As we discuss in the next section, these methodological choices and theoretical assumptions have important implications. In fact, numerous studies relying on different assumptions and choices have failed to substantiate the negative association between diversity and desirable individual and group outcomes.

In a study of Chicago neighborhoods, for example, Sampson (2012) reports that residents of diverse neighborhoods are no less likely to return lost letters or administer CPR to strangers (see also Iwashyna, Christakis, and Becker 1999). Similarly, Guest et al. (2006) find no difference between the residents of heterogeneous and homogeneous Seattle neighborhoods in their interactions with neighbors and their participation in neighborhood organizations. In experimental settings, subjects are often equally likely to exhibit altruistic (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Gil-White 2004; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Whitt and Wilson 2007), trusting, and trustworthy behavior (Willinger et al. 2003; Bouckaert and Dhaene 2004) toward in-group and out-group members; these patterns hold across varied contexts, including Western Europe, Uganda, Israel, and Mongolia. These studies rely on behavioral indicators; even using attitudinal measures similar to Putnam's, however, some studies find no relationship between diversity and trust across European countries, Swedish counties, or British neighborhoods (Gustavsson and Jordahl 2008; Gesthuizen, Van Der Meer, and Scheepers 2009; Hooghe et al. 2009; Sturgis et al. 2011).

This second set of studies relies on other methodological choices. First, some forgo heterogeneity indexes altogether for indicators of community ethnoracial composition (Guest et al. 2006; see also Stolle et al. 2008; Rahn et al. 2009) or experimental manipulations of in-group versus out-group contact (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Willinger et al. 2003; Bouckaert and Dhaene 2004; Gil-White 2004; Whitt and Wilson 2007). Others complement a heterogeneity index with indicators of ethnoracial composition and migration (Gustavsson and Jordahl 2008; Gesthuizen et al. 2009; Hooghe

⁷ Putnam controls for community ethnoracial composition in some analyses but not others. We discuss Putnam's methodology in greater detail under "Data and Methods" below.

⁸ Putnam conducts both individual- and aggregate-level analyses.

et al. 2009; Sturgis et al. 2011; Sampson 2012). Most important, almost without exception, these studies use individual- and community-level factors to predict individual-level outcomes, rather than aggregate ones.⁹

Unfortunately, these studies do not pose a direct challenge to those that identify a negative association between heterogeneity and social capital. In addition to the differences we have discussed, these studies also examine different outcomes. Experimental and behavioral measures of prosocial behavior populate many of those studies that do not find a negative association between diversity and social capital, while the first set of studies mainly relies on responses to attitudinal trust questions. In general, there are reasons to doubt attitudinal, self-reported measures of trust. There is evidence indicating that attitudinal measures of trust do not predict actual trusting behavior in real-world or experimental settings (Glaeser et al. 2000; Karlan 2005; Sapienza, Toldra-Simats, and Zingales 2013). Moreover, attitudinal measures of trust might be particularly misleading when assessing levels of trust across different ethnoracial groups. For instance, studies consistently find that blacks report significantly lower levels of attitudinal trust than whites. By contrast, in trust games that require individuals to make consequential economic decisions, both blacks and whites trust in-group members more than out-group members, and blacks are as trusting and even more trustworthy than whites. As it turns out, the generalized trust question is only predictive of whites' behavior (Simpson, McGrimmon, and Irwin 2007).¹⁰

The use of self-reported trust measures is widespread and has spawned an extensive body of academic research along with several policy briefs (Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000; Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2001). Therefore, and despite our own reservations with these measures, we adopt them in this study in order to demonstrate that the negative association between ethnoracial diversity and self-reported trust is an artifact of misguided analytic choices. Although a few nationwide studies of Europe have already failed to substantiate the negative association between diversity and self-reported trust, their authors have been quick to conclude that American exceptionalism is to blame for the apparent disagreement (Hooghe et al. 2009; Sturgis et al. 2011). Instead, we will argue that the United States is no exception. We make our case by reexamining the empirical bases of Putnam's widely publicized and influential conclusions using his measures and

⁹The exception is Sampson (2012); Sampson nevertheless takes care to control for a wide range of important neighborhood characteristics, including concentrated poverty and segregation.

¹⁰Simpson et al. (2007) account for the apparent conflict between attitudinal and behavioral results as follows: the generalized trust question asks about trust in "most people"; for whites, "most people" refers to in-group members, while for blacks it refers to out-group members.

data set (2007). In addition to Putnam's measures of social capital, we also adopt his—and others'—measure of diversity. Diversity measures are plagued with their own set of problems that are similarly rooted in unstated theoretical premises. It is this set of issues to which we now turn.

Heterogeneity Indexes as Proxies for Intergroup Contact

In order to capture intergroup contact in macro settings—in a neighborhood or country, for example—researchers have adopted one of several indexes of heterogeneity (see, e.g., Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000b; Costa and Kahn 2003; Delhey and Newton 2005; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Leigh 2006; Gustavsson and Jordahl 2008). Various referred to as indexes of diversity/heterogeneity/fragmentation/fractionalization, Simpson's Diversity Index, and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), they essentially measure the same thing: the probability that two individuals who are randomly chosen from a closed population belong to the same group.¹¹ Recently, scholars have raised serious questions about these indexes.

First, diversity indexes are insensitive to variations in the ethnic composition of an area: "Take two hypothetical countries, the first with two groups of equal size and the second with three groups containing two-thirds, one-sixth, and one-sixth of the population, respectively. In both countries, the fractionalization index calculated with the standard Herfindahl formula would be 0.5. Yet the dynamics of the inter-group competition in each country would almost certainly be different" (Posner 2004, p. 851). Second, they obscure the nature and history of specific ethnic cleavages. Scholars of race and ethnicity contend that symbolic and material inequalities are part and parcel of racial/ethnic relations (Bonilla-Silva 1997); heterogeneity indexes fly in the face of this insight by treating ethnoracial groups interchangeably, like pieces on a checkers board. To understand why this is important in the context of our research, refer to figure 1. Both of these hypothetical communities would receive exactly the same heterogeneity score, equating a neighborhood that is 80% whites and 20% blacks with a neighborhood that is 20% whites and 80% blacks. In the United States, empirical evidence would suggest that these communities probably share very little in common except for their heterogeneity scores.

Third, diversity indexes obscure the analytic distinction between in-group and out-group contact at the heart of social psychological theories of intergroup relations. Figure 2 illustrates the average racial/ethnic composition of tracts that fall above or below the median heterogeneity score

¹¹ These indexes are easily converted into one another because they require the same inputs: the number of groups in a closed population and the proportion of the population belonging to each group (Haughton and Mukerjee 1995).




FIG. 1.—Two neighborhoods with the same heterogeneity score

(HHI = 0.28).¹² The average homogeneous tract in the United States is 84% white; the average heterogeneous tract is only 54% white. Therefore, for a white American, living in a relatively heterogeneous neighborhood is associated with less in-group contact, while for a black American, living in a heterogeneous neighborhood is associated with more in-group contact.

In sum, heterogeneity indexes flatten fundamentally hierarchical relationships between ethnoracial groups, and they are, we argue, largely to blame for the fact that contemporary research on diversity and social capital “systematically understates the racial dimensions of [society]” (Hero 2007, p. 70). To address the shortcomings of the heterogeneity index, we proceed in two ways: first, we tease apart the effects of living in a diverse area from those of living among in-group versus out-group members, and second, we model trust separately for different ethnoracial groups.¹³

¹²In a tract at the median value, the probability that any two randomly selected individuals belong to different groups is 28%. In so-called heterogeneous tracts, this probability is greater than 28%; in a homogeneous tract, it is less.

¹³Diversity indexes are also insensitive to the spatial distribution of groups; as such, they are imperfect and potentially misleading proxies of actual intergroup interaction. Relying in part on Putnam’s own community sample, e.g., Uslaner (2011) finds that residential integration and intergroup contact (measured using respondents’ friendship networks and the composition of their civic groups) cancel out the negative association between diversity and trust.




FIG. 2.—Ethnoracial composition of average homogeneous and heterogeneous tracts in the United States (2000 U.S. census, weighted by tract population). Homogeneity/heterogeneity defined at the median value.

Observational Data and Social, Economic, and Demographic Confounders

To complicate matters further, ethnoracial diversity in the United States is strongly correlated with potentially confounding characteristics of communities and the people who live in them. Observational studies have an advantage over laboratory experiments in terms of their external validity and broader sociological relevance. Unlike laboratory experiments of in-group and out-group contact, however, observational studies struggle to distinguish the effects of diversity from those of other contextual characteristics.

Differences between homogeneous and heterogeneous communities and their residents come in three varieties: ethnoracial and compositional characteristics, economic conditions, and residential stability. First, nonwhites and immigrants live in relatively heterogeneous communities, while U.S.-born whites live in relatively homogeneous communities. Second, heterogeneous communities are less affluent than homogeneous communities. Third and finally, heterogeneous communities are less established and more mobile than homogeneous ones. In the United States, diverse neighborhoods are typically neighborhoods undergoing transition, whether through white flight or gentrification (Wilson and Taub 2006), and stably diverse neighborhoods are the exception rather than the rule (Nyden et al. 1998).

Table 1 shows the extent to which the average homogeneous tract represented in Putnam's data set differs from the average heterogeneous tract

TABLE 1
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HOMOGENEOUS AND HETEROGENEOUS TRACTS REPRESENTED IN THE 2000 SCCBS

	HOMOGENEOUS TRACTS			HETEROGENEOUS TRACTS			<i>t</i>
	MIN	MAX	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Ethnoracial characteristic:							
White	0	1	.84	.37	.57	.50	53.68***
Black	0	1	.07	.26	.17	.38	-27.03***
Hispanic	0	1	.03	.18	.13	.34	-32.80***
Asian	0	1	.01	.09	.04	.20	-19.62***
Other	0	1	.03	.17	.04	.20	-6.76***
U.S. citizen	0	1	.98	.15	.92	.28	24.42***
% whites (ct)	0	99.42	86.96	22.79	53.35	24.01	122.59***
% U.S. citizens (ct)	36.70	100	97.90	3.92	89.43	9.51	100.92***
Residential stability:							
Owens home	0	1	.78	.41	.59	.49	35.87***
Decades in community	1	4	3.74	1.46	3.38	1.48	21.32***
% living in county 5+ years (ct)	14.40	100	82.33	9.65	81.83	11.10	4.18***
% renters (ct)	0	99.77	23.05	16.32	43.26	21.80	-90.05***
Economic condition:							
Household income >\$30,000	0	1	.72	.45	.68	.47	6.01***
Employed	0	1	.67	.47	.72	.45	-8.78***
Unemployed	0	1	.04	.19	.05	.22	-5.29***
Stays home	0	1	.29	.45	.23	.42	11.76***
Education	1	7	3.64	1.82	3.69	1.87	-2.55*
Economic satisfaction	0	2	1.13	.64	1.06	.64	9.47***
% families in poverty (ct)	0	82.00	6.48	7.33	11.73	9.92	-51.59***
Gini coefficient (ct)	.06	.62	.36	.05	.38	.06	-30.38***
Median household income (ct)	0	200,001	48,232	19,106	44,276	20,592	17.01***

NOTE.—Based on unweighted full sample (*N* = 29,733). ct = census tract. SCCBS = Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey.

* *P* < .05.

** *P* < .01.

*** *P* < .001.

along important dimensions. Heterogeneity/homogeneity is again defined at the median value. As just one example, 78% of the residents of the average homogeneous tract own their home; by contrast, only 59% of the residents of the average heterogeneous tract own their home. These differences pose a serious challenge to the bulk of recent research on heterogeneity and social capital that overlooks systematic variation between heterogeneous and homogeneous communities and their residents. The oversight is exacerbated by a shared reliance on ecological associations that mask the sorting of poor, mobile nonwhites into relatively heterogeneous communities and wealthy, stable whites into homogeneous communities.

Taken together, these shortcomings converge on one overarching critique of contemporary research on this topic: researchers have paid more attention to the statistical relationship between diversity and measures of social capital than to their substantive relationship (Sturgis et al. 2011). In this article we aim to show that the association between diversity and trust is spurious: we hypothesize that ethnoracial, residential, and economic differences—rather than diversity—affect levels of trust, as the ample sociological literature on this topic suggests.

Ethnoracial differences.—Immigrants and nonwhites consistently report lower levels of trust than U.S.-born whites (Abramson 1983; Emig, Hesse, and Fischer 1996; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000*b*; Michelson 2003). Scholars disagree about whether these differences reflect experiences with discrimination (Demaris and Yang 1994) or are merely artifacts of the wording of the trust question (Simpson et al. 2007). Regardless, blacks also have smaller social networks than whites, and they are less able to mobilize their ties to secure resources (Fischer 1982; Marsden 1987; Tigges, Brown, and Green 1998; Newman 1999; Smith 2005). Finally, among whites, blacks, and Hispanics, proximity to in-group members predicts reported sense of community (Wong 2010), while proximity to out-group members predicts racial hostility, especially from whites toward nonwhites (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Glaser 1994; Taylor 1998; Harris 2001).

Residential stability.—Residential instability has been linked to multiple individual behavioral problems, including substance abuse, juvenile delinquency and crime, child physical abuse, and infant mortality (for a review, see Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn 2000). Neighborhood turnover also undermines collective efficacy, or informal social control, which in turn is associated with crime (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Sampson 2012). In a related vein, home ownership and neighborhood tenure are associated with intergenerational social closure—or the extent to which the adults and children in a community are linked—and reciprocal exchanges between families (Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999). Not surprisingly, tenure is associated with residents' reported sense of attachment to and identification with their communities (Tobey, Wetherell, and Brigham 1990; Wong 2010).

Economic conditions.—Poor people possess fewer social ties than rich people, and when faced with uncertainty and threat, low-status individuals activate proportionally smaller subsections of their networks (Horvat, Weininger, and Lareau 2003; Smith, Menon, and Thompson 2012). Like individual economic conditions, contextual economic conditions—especially concentrated poverty—also affect individual and group outcomes (Wilson 1987). In fact, neighborhood affluence accounts for much of the individual variation in trust and social ties (Letki 2007; Small 2007; Laurence 2011). Additionally, neighborhood poverty negatively predicts both informal social control as well as formal, collective action (Sampson et al. 2005; Sampson 2012). Even among individuals who inhabit similar network structures, moreover, those who live in poor communities are less likely to mobilize their support ties after a natural disaster (Hurlbert, Haines, and Beggs 2000).

DATA AND METHODS

Putnam's (2000) Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS) represents a natural starting point for reassessing the relationship between ethnic diversity and self-reported trust in the United States. The SCCBS contains multiple attitudinal measures of trust and civic engagement. Additionally, the sample size is substantial: with nearly 30,000 respondents, the SCCBS contains both a nationally representative sample and subsamples of 41 U.S. communities. The data set provides an excellent opportunity to extend work on intergroup relations beyond the black/white dichotomy to include immigrants and other ethnoracial groups—like Hispanics and Asians—and also to move beyond summary indexes of diversity.¹⁴

The SCCBS comprises two samples: 3,003 respondents are from a nationally representative survey funded by the Ford Foundation, and the remaining 26,730 respondents are from 41 community subsamples. The communities were neither selected randomly nor chosen according to a theoretically informed design. Instead, they form part of an opportunity sample determined by these communities' own capacity to raise local funds. Moreover, the organizations that sponsored the study individually decided "what specific area(s) were to be surveyed, how many interviews to conduct, and if specific areas or ethnic groups were to be over-sampled" (Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 2001, p. 4). Descriptive statistics (table A1) reveal some differences between the community and the nationally repre-

¹⁴ While we acknowledge that the categories "Latino" and "Asian"—like other ethnoracial categories—are socially constructed and include individuals from diverse backgrounds, analyzing differences across these pan-ethnic groups is already a significant improvement over earlier work. Moreover, while these labels may not match Asians' or Latinos' self-perceptions, they generally match the categorizations used by native whites and blacks.

sentative samples with respect to the respondents' sociodemographic characteristics and the census tracts and counties in which they live.

These differences, combined with the nonprobabilistic sampling design of the community sample, motivated us to carry out separate analyses across samples. We start from the nationally representative sample, and we replicate the analyses among the full sample of 29,733 cases examined by Putnam in his multivariate analysis.¹⁵ We demonstrate that results are not significantly different across samples. Because of its large size, we also use the full sample to carry out separate analyses for each ethnoracial group. SCCBS data are merged with census data on tracts and counties. To capture the ethnoracial and socioeconomic context in which individuals are embedded, we use contextual data on census tracts whenever possible, because these are generally the smallest unit of analysis at which most ecological information is available.

We carry out our analyses in two stages. In the first section, we reexamine Putnam's findings using a more appropriate analytic strategy. Here, we compare the predictive power of heterogeneity with indicators of ethnoracial differences, residential stability, and economic conditions. In the second section, we discuss the limits of the HHI and document the extent to which community diversity overlaps with differences in terms of race/ethnicity, residential stability, and socioeconomic well-being. We also explore whether ethnoracial groups respond differently to diversity by running separate models for each group.

To appreciate our analytic choices, it is important first to understand how Putnam reaches the conclusion that "people living in ethnically diverse settings appear to 'hunker down'—that is, to pull in like a turtle" (2007, p. 149). This conclusion is based on both bivariate, aggregate associations and a multivariate, individual-level regression. Putnam first presents a series of suggestive plots to illustrate the bivariate association between community diversity and average trust. On the basis of these graphs, Putnam lays out his major argument: residents of more diverse communities are less trusting of neighbors, members of other racial/ethnic groups, and members of their own racial/ethnic group. Community diversity is measured using the HHI for the average census tract in each community.¹⁶ Although visually effective, this aggregate analysis may simply capture the residential sorting of people with

¹⁵ The "full" sample ($N = 29,733$) refers to the combination of the nationally representative sample ($N = 3,003$) and the community sample ($N = 26,730$).

¹⁶ Because communities range in size from a city or county to an entire state, such as Delaware or Indiana, Putnam uses the average diversity of a census tract in the sampled community. Thus, e.g., every respondent from the Delaware sample is contained in one observation with the same tract diversity, regardless of the tract in which he or she actually lives.

different, preexisting levels of trust. The fact that community diversity is associated with lower levels of average trust does not prove that living in ethnically diverse communities makes people less trusting. We address this issue by carrying out our analyses at the individual level, while controlling for contextual variation through multilevel, varying intercept models.

Further along, Putnam acknowledges that the bivariate associations might be due to systematic differences between heterogeneous and homogeneous communities. He handles these objections by presenting a single multivariate analysis of individual trust in neighbors among the full sample of respondents, neglecting to consider other available indicators of trust. In this model, Putnam controls for a wide range of individual and community characteristics, including, notably, many of the predictors we contend are partly responsible for the association between diversity and trust, such as individual race/ethnicity, citizenship status, individual and tract stability, and individual and tract economic well-being. Albeit small, the parameter estimate for tract homogeneity turns out to be statistically significant in this linear regression model.¹⁷

From this evidence, Putnam concludes that, at least in the short run, “there is a tradeoff between diversity and social capital” (2007, p. 164). On the basis of our analysis, in which we systematically consider multiple trust measures, distinguish between the nationally representative and full samples, and account for the nested structure of the data, we contend that, even in the short run, the data do not support Putnam’s provocative claim.

Five self-reported *measures of trust/cooperation* make up our outcomes of interest; they include generalized trust, trust in neighbors, in-group trust, out-group trust, and perceptions of neighborhood cooperation.¹⁸ The wording of the generalized trust question is borrowed from the General Social Survey. The question reads, “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” with answers recorded on a three-point scale. The remaining trust questions are measured on four-point scales. Trust in neighbors asks, “Think about people in your neighborhood. Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust them a lot, some, only a little, or not at all?” The measures of in-group and out-group trust are constructed from the same set of four questions: “We’d like to know how much you trust different groups of people. First,

¹⁷ Putnam includes tract homogeneity—rather than heterogeneity—in his model. The HHIs of homogeneity and heterogeneity are linearly related, where $HHI_{\text{hetero}} = 1 - HHI_{\text{homo}}$. Following the interest in diversity, we present results for heterogeneity rather than homogeneity.

¹⁸ For the separate ethnoracial group models in analysis 2, we also predict trust in specific groups, for a total of nine outcome variables.

think about (White people/African-Americans or Blacks/Asian people/Hispanics or Latinos). Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust them a lot, some, only a little, or not at all?" Whether the question is considered indicative of in-group or out-group trust depends on the respondent's own ethn racial self-classification. For out-group trust, we take the average of these measures across the three relevant out-groups.¹⁹ Finally, the cooperation question, which is measured on a five-point scale, asks, "If public officials asked everyone to conserve water or electricity because of some emergency, how likely is it that people in your community would cooperate, would you say it is very likely, likely, neither/depends, unlikely, or very unlikely?"²⁰

Three of our measures—in-group trust, out-group trust, and trust in neighbors—are lifted directly from Putnam's bivariate graphs. We also analyze responses to the generalized trust question because this measure is central to Putnam's (2000) account of social capital and because it turns up in other studies of heterogeneity and trust (see, e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2000a, 2002). Additionally, we analyze responses to the neighborhood cooperation question. The cooperation question is the only one of our five measures that does not include the word "trust." Ironically, however, it is the only question that fulfills the basic requirements of a complete trust statement by specifying who is to be trusted to do what (Nannestad 2008). This attention to behavior sets the cooperation question apart from the other measures and, we believe, makes it a more meaningful measure of respondents' expectations of their neighbors.

The goal of our analysis is to perform an overarching assessment of the relationship between ethn racial diversity and commonly used social capital indicators. For this reason we report results from our analysis on a variety of indicators, although we do not have specific expectations about their different performance, and we do not comment on them separately unless necessary.²¹

Table A1 provides basic descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in this article, separating the nationally representative sample from the community sample. These variables closely follow those used by Putnam in his multivariate analysis (2007, p. 152, table 3). See the methodological appendix for further details.

Our independent variables fall into three groups: ethn racial variables, indicators of residential stability, and indicators of economic well-being. All three groups capture differences across both individual respondents and

¹⁹Or four out-groups, in the case of respondents who self-classified as "other." These respondents are also missing a measure of in-group trust.

²⁰The cooperation item was asked of half the respondents ($N = 14,870$).

²¹We also avoid speculating about the meaning of the similarities and differences between these measures because several of them appeared sequentially on the survey questionnaire, possibly inducing order effects.

communities, and we measure them using the standard battery of variables used in previous neighborhood effects research (Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn 2000). For example, *ethnoracial characteristics* include indicators of a respondent's racial/ethnic self-classification and his or her citizenship status, as well as the percentage of in-group members and U.S. citizens who reside in the respondent's tract. Measures of *residential stability* include whether the respondent owns his or her home and his or her length of residence in the community, as well as the percentage of residents in the census tract who rent and the percentage who have lived in the same county for at least five years. Indicators of *economic conditions* include the respondent's household income, employment status, educational attainment, and self-reported economic satisfaction, as well as the percentage of families in his or her tract living at or below the poverty line, the tract Gini coefficient, and the tract median household income. Finally, we also control for other characteristics of respondents and their communities, including age, gender, and U.S. region. For a detailed description of all of our variables, their measurement, and sources, refer to the methodological appendix.

The data are structured hierarchically, with individual respondents nested within census tracts and community subsamples. Simple linear regressions ignore this aspect of the data, producing standard errors that are too small. We therefore employ multilevel modeling techniques to predict individual responses as a function, in part, of unmodeled heterogeneity across tracts and subsamples. This estimation strategy yields information about the nature of the clustering itself.²² In our tables, we present this information as the standard deviations of the tract- and community-level intercepts. In general, the larger a standard deviation, the more a given outcome is expected to vary across geographic units.

ANALYSIS 1: THE SPURIOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVERSITY AND TRUST

Ideally, to fully support the claim that ethnic diversity reduces trust, one would randomly assign individuals to ethnoracially homogeneous or ethnoracially heterogeneous communities and observe changes in trust levels. Needless to say, the empirical evidence on which current scholarship is based does not resemble such ideal experimental conditions.²³

The infeasibility of such an experiment does not, however, justify drawing causal conclusions from observational, cross-sectional data, for two main

²² For more on the benefits of multilevel modeling, refer to Gelman and Hill (2007, pp. 6–8).

²³ Even if such an experiment were possible, its external validity could be challenged, since individuals in the real world self-select into neighborhoods on the basis of both personal and community characteristics (Massey and Hajnal 1995; Jargowsky 1996; Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004; Massey, Rothwell, and Domina 2009).

reasons. First, the bivariate association between diversity and trust might be driven by confounders—most notably, residential stability and economic conditions. Second, even if all confounding variables could be properly controlled in a regression, it remains to be seen whether different trust levels are in fact the result of exposure to a more or less diverse community or, instead, existed *ex ante*. This, we show in this section, is the major flaw in Putnam's reasoning.

Consider two schools in the Netherlands, one homogeneously Dutch, the other 50% Dutch and 50% Bolivian. If we considered average student height, we would most likely find a negative association between average height and heterogeneity across schools. Hardly anyone, however, would conclude that a diverse student body makes students shorter. According to Wikipedia.org, Dutch people are, on average, taller than Bolivians, and this explains the observed difference at the school level. Substitute height with trust, and—relying on similar evidence—scholars have been willing to accept the claim that “immigration and social diversity tend to reduce trust and social capital” (Putnam 2007, p. 137).

This claim, however, is imprecise. The bivariate associations Putnam finds do not support the claim that living in diverse communities makes people less trusting. Moving the analysis from the aggregate to the individual level helps clarify the nature of the relationship between ethnic diversity and self-reported trust. Table 2 presents results from a series of multilevel linear regressions in which the heterogeneity index is used to predict individual-level measures of social capital, namely, generalized trust, trust in neighbors, in-group trust, out-group trust, and cooperation. We estimate varying-intercept models in which respondents are nested within census tracts.

In line with Putnam's findings, we find that greater ethnic diversity predicts lower levels of trust and cooperation (models 0). This relationship, however, disappears once we control for ethnoracial differences between respondents and their communities, including individual race/ethnicity, citizenship status, and the concentration of whites and U.S. citizens in tracts (models 1). It is well known that whites report higher levels of trust than blacks, Latinos, and immigrants. In the full sample, for example, generalized trust among black and Hispanic respondents is, on average, half a point lower than among whites (on a three-point scale); trust in neighbors is two-thirds of a point lower than among whites (on a four-point scale; table 3). This pattern is similar across every other measure of trust/cooperation, including trust in neighbors, trust in in-group members, trust in out-group members, and trust in specific subgroups, and neighborhood cooperation. Notably, the group differences are less pronounced with respect to this latter measure.

Although basic ethnoracial indicators wash away the predictive capacity of the heterogeneity index, there exist other possibly confounding variables,

TABLE 2
SPURIOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ETHNORACIAL HETEROGENEITY AND SELF-REPORTED TRUST

	GENERALIZED		NEIGHBORS		IN-GROUP		OUT-GROUP		COOPERATION	
	Model 0	Model 1	Model 0	Model 1	Model 0	Model 1	Model 0	Model 1	Model 0	Model 1
Heterogeneity (ct)	-.53***	.02	-.91***	-.14	-.50***	-.06	-.46***	-.09	-.28*	.14
White (ref.)										
Black		-.46***		-.52***		-.21***		-.17***		-.07
Hispanic		-.38***		-.46***		-.19***		-.17***		-.18*
Asian28		.11		.14		.15		.03
Other		-.16		-.09		-.03		-.03		.12
U.S. citizen18*		.34***		.27***		.34***		-.10
% whites (ct)00		.00**		.00*		.00**		.00***
% U.S. citizens (ct)00		.01**		.00*		.00		.00
Constant	1.14***	.52*	3.48***	2.31***	3.29***	2.45***	3.17***	2.54***	4.34***	4.05***
$\sigma_{(1)}$00***	.00***	.20***	.15***	.06***	.00***	.13***	.09***	.00***	.00***
σ_e96**	.93***	.85***	.80***	.67***	.65***	.63***	.62***	.88***	.86***
Log likelihood	-4,007.84	-3,808.71	-3,668.99	-3,377.08	-2,512.81	-2,433.31	-2,164.48	-2,096.99	-1,899.62	-1,821.06
N	2,912	2,831	2,858	2,777	2,458	2,455	2,207	2,204	1,471	1,430

NOTE.—Multilevel (varying-intercept) linear regressions predicting five measures of trust. Respondents are nested within census tracts. All respondents, national sample. ct = census tract; $\sigma_{(1)}$ refers to the standard deviation between census tracts.

* $P < .05$.
 ** $P < .01$.
 *** $P < .001$.

TABLE 3
AVERAGE SELF-REPORTED TRUST BY ETHNORACIAL GROUP

	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians	Others	Noncitizens
Generalized [1,3]	2.21 (.94)	1.59 (.88)	1.65 (.89)	2.08 (.97)	1.90 (.95)	1.75 (.91)
Neighbors [1,4]	3.44 (.75)	2.74 (.93)	2.63 (.98)	3.08 (.78)	3.03 (.96)	2.65 (.94)
In-group [1,4]	3.27 (.63)	2.92 (.67)	2.88 (.81)	3.16 (.67)		2.83 (.80)
Out-group [1,4]	3.18 (.61)	2.85 (.65)	2.73 (.80)	3.05 (.61)	3.03 (.66)	2.65 (.78)
Whites [1,4]		2.90 (.72)	2.85 (.83)	3.17 (.64)	3.05 (.75)	2.85 (.81)
Blacks [1,4]	3.20 (.64)		2.62 (.94)	3.03 (.70)	3.05 (.71)	2.51 (.96)
Hispanics [1,4]	3.14 (.68)	2.81 (.73)		2.96 (.72)	3.00 (.77)	2.76 (.79)
Asians [1,4]	3.20 (.65)	2.81 (.74)	2.66 (.92)		3.03 (.76)	2.65 (.92)
Cooperation [1,5]	4.31 (.84)	4.11 (1.03)	4.06 (.93)	4.15 (.88)	4.13 (1.05)	4.10 (.83)
<i>N</i>	21,039	3,653	2,444	710	1,046	1,533

NOTE.—Full sample. Standard deviations in parentheses.

as Putnam himself acknowledges. As further evidence for our finding, we carry out a series of multilevel regressions on both the national sample and the full sample including all of the predictors Putnam uses in his multivariate analysis (Putnam 2007, p. 152, table 3). Specifically, we include both individual and contextual indicators of ethnoracial differences, residential stability, and economic well-being, as well as additional controls. We estimate varying-intercept models with respondents nested within census tracts for the national sample (table 4) and within census tracts and communities for the full sample (table 5). The more comprehensive analysis serves two purposes. First, it confirms our conclusion regarding the spurious association between heterogeneity and indicators of social capital. Second, it weighs the relative importance of determinants of trust and cooperation, including ethnoracial differences, indicators of residential stability, and measures of economic conditions.

First, consider the predictive power of the heterogeneity index. For the national sample, the conclusion is straightforward: as table 4 shows, the HHI does not significantly predict any of the five indicators of social capital. For the full sample (table 5) the HHI is not significant in four out of five models, the only exception being the model predicting trust in neighbors.²⁴

²⁴ Additionally, the heterogeneity index does not consistently predict trust toward specific groups, such as whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians (see tables A2 and A3).

Putnam (2007) only reports results from a multivariate model predicting trust in neighbors among the full sample and thus concludes that heterogeneity negatively predicts trust even holding individual and community characteristics constant. He does not model other measures of trust, including generalized trust, in-group trust, out-group trust, trust in specific racial/ethnic groups, or neighborhood cooperation, although these measures are available in his data set. He also neglects to present results for the nationally representative sample, although he assures readers that he “replicated the analysis on the ($N = 3,003$) national sample alone. The core results are fully confirmed, although the significance levels are obviously attenuated by the smaller sample size” (p. 158).

In light of the inconsistency between the national- and full-sample models of trust in neighbors, we took three steps to assess whether the heterogeneity coefficients in the full sample are compromised by idiosyncrasies in the community sample combined with its considerable size. First, we calculated F -ratios and Bayesian information criteria (BIC) for our models. The F -ratios represent the ratio of the variance explained by a variable over the residual variance, once all other variables are included in the model. For all models, the F -ratios indicate that the net statistical effect of heterogeneity is trivial compared with that of other variables, particularly those that capture racial/ethnic differences, residential stability, and economic conditions. Specifically, in a model predicting trust in neighbors among the full sample, the F -ratio for tract heterogeneity is 97.8% smaller than the ratio of the variance explained by individual race/ethnicity and 97.5% smaller than the ratio of the variance explained by home ownership. In fact, the BIC values indicate that the additional variance explained by tract heterogeneity does not justify its inclusion in the model.²⁵

Second, we matched respondents from the community sample to those from the nationally representative sample and reestimated the models using the matched cases from the community sample ($N \sim 3,000$). Specifically, we deployed one-to-one nearest neighbor matching without replacement, where the treatment was being in the national—versus community—sample; good balance was achieved for most variables. Using doubly robust estimation on the matched cases, we find that tract heterogeneity is not a significant predictor of any of the five trust measures.

Finally, we drew repeated random samples ($N = 3,000$) from the community sample and reestimated the models for these attenuated samples.

²⁵The BIC is a measure of relative goodness of fit that penalizes overfitting. Unlike the Akaike information criterion, which penalizes only according to the number of parameters, the BIC also takes sample size into account, and thus it is particularly appropriate as a test of the full sample. If the BIC is minimized in a model that includes variable X relative to a model that omits it, we can conclude that the additional variance explained by X outweighs the concomitant reduction in parsimony.

TABLE 4
 ETHNORACIAL, RESIDENTIAL, AND ECONOMIC PREDICTORS OF SELF-REPORTED TRUST: NATIONAL SAMPLE

	Generalized	Neighbors	In-Group	Out-Group	Cooperation
Heterogeneity (ct)	-.03	-.17	-.07	-.17	.25
Ethnoracial characteristics:					
White (ref.)					
Black	-.39***	-.34***	-.13**	-.11*	.09
Hispanic	-.27***	-.31***	-.04	-.04	-.09
Asian12	.05	.07	.05	.05
Other	-.17	-.08		-.05	.15
U.S. citizen05	.15	.04	.14*	-.29*
% whites (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00
% U.S. citizens (ct)01*	.00	.00	.00	.00
Residential stability:					
Owens home08	.27***	.02	.01	.15*
Decades in community02	.02	.01	-.01	.01
% living in county 5+ years (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00
% renters (ct)00	-.00***	-.00**	.00	.00
Economic conditions:					
Household income >\$30,00007	.07	.03	.05	.12*
Employed (ref.)					
Unemployed06	-.20*	-.06	-.09	-.23
Stays home	-.12	-.11	-.03	-.03	-.13
Education07***	.03***	.01	.03***	-.01
Economic satisfaction08**	.08**	.09***	.12***	.06
% families in poverty (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	-.01
Gini coefficient (ct)	-.68	.77	.67	.31	.69
Median household income (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00

Additional controls:					
Age	.00**	.01***	.01***	.00***	.01***
Female	-.03	.05	-.01	.00	.10
Interviewed in Spanish	-.07	-.10	-.38***	-.42***	.00
Monthly hours worked	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Commute time, hours	-.05	.09*	-.02	.01	-.15*
Northeast (ref.)					.00
Midwest	.01	.06	-.04	-.05	.06
South	-.10	.14**	-.07	-.07	.15
West	.07	.21***	-.02	.00	.13
Population density, residents/mile ² (ct)	.16	.10	.12	.13	.00
Average commute time, hours (ct)	-.20	-.21	-.55***	-.42**	-.01*
% 65+ years (ct)	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
% Bachelor's degree (ct)	.01**	.00	.00	.00	.00
Violent crimes per capita (cty)	-.842	2.66	2.55	2.17	-11.27
Nonviolent crimes per capita (cty)	-.61	-1.82**	-.95	-.41	-.31
Constant	.56	2.42***	2.92***	2.80***	3.59***
$\sigma_{(1)}$.00	.11	.04	.08	.13
σ_e	.90	.76	.63	.60	.83
Log likelihood	-3,359.90	-2,904.04	-2,133.17	-1,841.33	-1,607.73
N	2,555	2,509	2,228	2,021	1,291

NOTE.—Multilevel (varying-intercept) linear regressions. Respondents are nested in census tracts; $\sigma_{(1)}$ refers to the standard deviation between census tracts. ct = census tract, cty = county.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

TABLE 5
 ETHNORACIAL, RESIDENTIAL, AND ECONOMIC PREDICTORS OF SELF-REPORTED TRUST: FULL SAMPLE

	Generalized	Neighbors	In-Group	Out-Group	Cooperation
Heterogeneity (ct)	-.04	-.12**	-.03	-.05	-.07
Ethnoracial characteristics:					
White (ref.)					
Black	-.39***	-.32***	-.18***	-.17***	.09**
Hispanic	-.25***	-.29***	-.06**	-.10***	.02
Asian	-.17***	-.13***	.00	-.04	.01
Other	-.23***	-.23***		-.08***	-.03
U.S. citizen	-.03	.06*	.05*	.14***	-.08
% whites (ct)00	.00***	.00**	.00**	.00***
% U.S. citizens (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Residential stability:					
Owens home06***	.24***	.02	.01	.13***
Decades in community00	.02***	.01*	.00	-.01
% living in county 5+ years (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00*
% renters (ct)00	-.00***	.00	.00	.00
Economic conditions:					
Household income >\$30,00007***	.12***	.03**	.05***	.09***
Employed (ref.)					
Unemployed	-.16***	-.14***	-.11***	-.10***	-.05
Stays home	-.19***	-.09***	-.05**	-.06***	-.06
Education09***	.05***	.03***	.04***	.02***
Economic satisfaction13***	.10***	.09***	.10***	.10***
% families in poverty (ct)00	-.01***	.00	.00	-.01**
Gini coefficient (ct)	-.22	.11	-.19	-.02	.21
Median household income (ct)	-.00**	-.00**	.00	.00	.00

Additional controls:					
Age	.01***	.01***	.01***	.01***	.01***
Female	-.01	.05***	.02**	.05***	.12***
Interviewed in Spanish	-.08*	-.17***	-.27***	-.32***	.09
Monthly hours worked	-.00***	-.00*	-.00**	-.00**	.00
Commute time, hours	-.01	-.01	-.04**	-.03**	-.04
Northeast (ref.)					
Midwest	.02	.01	.00	-.03	.00
South	-.10***	.04	-.03	-.07***	.04
West	.03	.08***	-.01	-.01	.09*
Population density, residents/mile ² (ct)	-.15	-.25**	-.12	-.08	-.03
Average commute time, hours (ct)	-.11	-.04	-.11*	-.01	-.06
% 65+ years (ct)	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
% Bachelor's degree (ct)	.00***	.00***	.00	.00	.00
Violent crimes per capita (cty)	-5.73*	2.63	-4.90*	-3.44	-6.32
Nonviolent crimes per capita (cty)	-.42	-1.19***	-.13	-.08	-.52
Constant	.53**	2.39***	2.83***	2.61***	3.19***
$\sigma_{(1)}$.02	.05	.00	.00	.08
$\sigma_{(2)}$.04	.04	.03	.03	.08
σ_{ϵ}	.90	.73	.62	.61	.84
Log likelihood	-32,660.60	-27,178.67	-21,102.12	-19,172.54	-15,296.74
<i>N</i>	24,918	24,461	22,244	20,836	12,240

NOTE.—Multilevel (varying-intercept) linear regressions. Respondents are nested in census tracts and community subsamples; $\sigma_{(1)}$ refers to the standard deviation between census tracts, and $\sigma_{(2)}$ refers to the standard deviation between community subsamples. ct = census tract, cty = county.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

The mean *t*-ratio for models predicting trust in neighbors among 30 random samples of 3,000 cases was $-.76$ ($P = .50$). In fact, heterogeneity was a significant predictor ($P < .05$) in just four of 30 models, roughly as many models as we would expect if the association between heterogeneity and trust in neighbors were due to chance alone.

Our evidence suggests there is no meaningful relationship between ethnic diversity and measures of trust and cooperation. We confirm through further analyses that the difference between our conclusion and Putnam's is not an artifact of our modeling strategy but rather the result of a substantive difference in the way we conceptualize intergroup contact.²⁶ The most consequential difference is that our models take ethnoracial composition into account by controlling for the percentage white in each tract. Replicating the analyses among the nationally representative sample and for multiple trust measures further reinforces our findings. Meanwhile, the use of multilevel models, a different measure of household income, and additional controls for employment status, self-classification as "other," and tract median household income do not make a difference.

Putnam is correct to point out that American communities differ considerably in terms of self-reported trust and cooperation, but we need to look elsewhere for the source of these differences. Specifically, we should look to those economic and social factors that have consistently emerged from the literature on social capital. Figure 3 reports the marginal effects of ethnoracial characteristics, residential stability, and economic conditions for the models in table 4. For ordinal and continuous variables, we plot the standard deviation change in the dependent variable corresponding to a 1-SD change in the independent variable. For dichotomous variables (i.e., ethnoracial identity, citizenship, home ownership, household income >30,000, employment status), we plot the standard deviation change in the dependent variable corresponding to a categorical change in the independent variable.

Blacks and Hispanics report lower levels of generalized trust and trust in neighbors; in the case of blacks, distrust extends to both in-group and out-group members. Regarding residential stability, home ownership strongly and positively predicts trust in neighbors and neighborhood cooperation, while tract percentage renters negatively predicts trust in neighbors and in-group trust. Indicators of economic conditions, especially education and economic satisfaction, positively predict several measures of trust. In addition,

²⁶To assess which difference is responsible for the change in significance of the heterogeneity coefficient, first, we ran Putnam's model and individually added our modifications. Second, we ran our final model and incrementally removed modifications. In both cases, we reach the same conclusions.




FIG. 3.—Assessing the predictive capacity of ethnoracial, stability, and economic variables. Marginal effects of the variables of interest on five measures of trust calculated for the models reported in table 4. ct = census tract. Whiskers report 95% confidence intervals.

household income is strongly, positively associated with neighborhood cooperation, while unemployment is strongly, negatively associated with trust in neighbors. In short, we find that individual and contextual indicators of racial/ethnic differences, residential stability, and economic well-being are the strongest predictors of trust and cooperation, thus swinging the pendulum of the determinants of trust away from ethnic diversity and toward well-studied economic and social indicators.

These findings do not suggest that we should ignore the entanglement of socioeconomic characteristics and residential segregation captured by the heterogeneity index. From such entanglement emerges a sociological object, the local community in which people live, that is of profound substantive interest. In the next section we move beyond a summary index of heterogeneity, in order to cast light on specific intergroup relations across American communities.

ANALYSIS 2: APPLES AND ORANGES? HOMOGENEOUS AND HETEROGENEOUS COMMUNITIES

Homogeneous and heterogeneous communities differ in important ways. The majority of these differences are the result of extensive residential segregation in the United States, both in terms of class and race/ethnicity (for reviews, see Charles 2003; Massey and Fischer 2003). Segregation characterizes the residential patterns of even the most recent newcomers: in recent decades, Asians and Hispanics have experienced growing segregation from whites, although they continue to be less segregated from whites than are blacks (Charles 2003; see also Tienda and Fuentes 2014). In the United States, homogeneous communities are most often majority-white communities, while heterogeneous communities contain relatively more immigrants and nonwhites.

Figure 4 shows the distribution of white, black, and Hispanic SCCBS respondents with respect to the median household income and ethnoracial heterogeneity of their census tracts. White, black, and Hispanic respondents live in very different kinds of communities: whites live in the wealthiest and least diverse tracts, while blacks and Hispanics live in the poorest and most diverse tracts, respectively. In other words, heterogeneity indexes capture differences not simply in terms of ethnoracial diversity but along a whole set of dimensions related to social capital. The effectiveness of controlling for these differences in a regression framework is undermined by the systematic absence of observations across combinations of these variables: for example, whites in poor, diverse communities and blacks and Hispanics in rich, homogeneous ones. For this reason, in the section that follows, we conduct the analyses separately for each ethnoracial group. Doing so is equiva-




FIG. 4.—Median household income and HHI for the average census tract of white, black, and Hispanic respondents. Whiskers report 95% confidence intervals.

lent to including an ethnicity/immigration interaction for all coefficients. This approach more closely resembles that of racial-attitudes researchers who routinely specify both the in-group and target out-group in their work.

Separate models have an added advantage: they allow us to distinguish the statistical effect of living among in-group versus out-group members from that of living in diverse communities. Heterogeneity indexes discount the analytic distinction between in-group and out-group contact, which is so critical to social psychological theories of intergroup relations. Among whites, for example, living in a heterogeneous tract is strongly and negatively correlated with living among other whites ($r = -.83$). Whites in homogeneous tracts (defined at the median value) live, on average, where 92% of the residents are also white, while whites in heterogeneous tracts live, on average, where 64% of the residents are also white. For non-whites, this pattern is exactly reversed; for them, living in heterogeneous tracts is strongly and positively correlated with living among in-group members.

In the last set of analyses, we run separate models for whites, blacks, and Hispanics in order to assess whether the determinants of trust and coop-

eration differ across groups.²⁷ On the one hand, it is possible that diversity significantly predicts trust for some groups but not others, which would confirm Putnam's finding, at least among a specific subgroup. Alternatively, the presence of in-group members, rather than homogeneity, might predict trust. Finally, we consider indicators of immigrant status/legal inclusion, such as U.S. citizenship. Thus far we have relied on an aggregate index of out-group trust; here, we also model trust in specific ethnoracial groups in order to capture possible idiosyncrasies in intergroup dynamics. For instance, what factors predict whites' trust toward blacks, and are these similar to or different from the factors that predict whites' trust toward Hispanics and Asians?

Tables A4–A8 report full model results for the five groups. We model each measure of trust using the ethnoracial, residential, and economic measures from before. To reduce the noise in parameter estimates, we drop some controls that were not significant in previous models (tables 4 and 5).²⁸ In addition, in the models for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, we replace the indicator of tract percentage white with an indicator of tract percentage black, tract percentage Hispanic, and tract percentage Asian, respectively. As before, we run multilevel linear regressions.

Results reveal differences across ethnoracial groups with respect to the factors that best predict trust and cooperation. We summarize the major findings in figure 5, which reports results among whites, blacks, and Hispanics for four ethnoracial predictors of interest: the heterogeneity index, the percentage of tract residents that belong to the respondent's in-group, the citizenship status of the respondent, and the percentage of U.S. citizens in the respondent's tract. We plot the marginal effect of each variable for each of the eight dependent variables. For instance, the cluster in the top left-hand corner indicates that, among whites, tract heterogeneity is not significantly associated with generalized trust, trust in neighbors, in-group trust, out-group trust, trust in blacks, trust in Hispanics, trust in Asians, or cooperation.

Among Hispanics, citizenship status plays an important role. Specifically, being a citizen is significantly and positively associated with in-group trust, out-group trust, trust in blacks, and trust in Asians. The percentage of U.S. citizens in Hispanic respondents' tracts, meanwhile, is significantly and positively associated with generalized trust, out-group trust, trust in blacks, and trust in Asians.

²⁷ We also ran models for Asians and noncitizens, but the small sample sizes make it difficult to draw meaningful inferences. We report these findings in appendix tables A7 and A8.

²⁸ This is advisable, given the small sample size of ethnoracial subgroups. Likelihood ratio tests confirm that the omitted variables do not significantly affect model fit.




FIG. 5.—Statistical effects of ethnoraial variables on trust among whites, blacks, and Hispanics. Marginal effects of the variables of interest on eight measures of trust calculated for the models reported in tables A4, A5, and A6, respectively. ct = census tract. Whiskers report 95% confidence intervals.

Among whites, the proportion of in-group members is the most consistently significant predictor of trust. Specifically, the percentage of other whites living in white respondents' tracts is significantly and positively associated with trust in neighbors, in-group trust, out-group trust, trust in Hispanics, trust in Asians, and neighborhood cooperation. Neither blacks nor Hispanics exhibit a similar in-group effect; for them, trust is not positively related to the concentration of in-group members.²⁹ We tested the difference between coefficients across independent subgroup samples using pooled standard errors. In most cases, the results support our conclusion that different factors predict trust across whites, blacks, and Hispanics.

Do whites trust less when they live among a specific out-group or among all nonwhites? Separate models that account for the concentration of specific ethnoraical groups confirm that the concentration of blacks and, to a lesser extent, Hispanics—not Asians or others—predicts lower trust among whites. These results are consistent with attitudinal research on neighborhood preferences, which shows that whites are most averse to living among blacks, followed by Hispanics, and finally Asians (Charles 2006).

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Scholars are correct to point out that American communities and their residents vary widely in terms of trust levels. They are incorrect, however, to pin the blame on ethnoraical diversity. Nonwhites and immigrants are less trusting than native-born whites; they are also relatively concentrated in heterogeneous communities. Preexisting attitudinal differences combined with residential sorting account for the ecological association between diversity and trust on which Putnam (2007) and others base their claims.

In fact, diversity is a negligible predictor of trust compared with classic sociological indicators of inequality. Ethnoraical, residential, and economic differences between communities and their residents do the heavy lifting as far as explaining individual variation in self-reported trust and cooperation. For example, the statistical effect of being black on trust in neighbors is roughly 10 times that of a 1-SD increase in the HHI of heterogeneity; being Latino has a similarly outsized effect.

Finally, separate analyses by ethnoraical group indicate that different factors explain individual variation in trust and cooperation for members of each group. For example, blacks are particularly sensitive to tenure in the

²⁹We performed a similar analysis considering the percentage white rather than the percentage in-group, and the results generally remained nonsignificant, with only two exceptions: blacks who live among whites are slightly more trusting of other blacks and Asians, while Hispanics who live among whites are more likely to consider their neighbors cooperative.

community, while Latinos vary by citizenship status and the local concentration of U.S. citizens. All three groups—whites, blacks, and Latinos—respond to individual and tract-level differences in economic resources. Only for whites, living among out-group members predicts lower levels of trust. However, it is not ethnoracial diversity per se that makes whites apparently “hunker down” but rather the presence of nonwhites, particularly blacks and Hispanics.

Moving forward, researchers should take care to distinguish the effects of diversity from those of in-group and out-group contact. Where racial inequality overlaps with residential segregation, diversity indexes are a poor substitute for theoretically informed, group-specific analyses of intergroup contact.

CONCLUSIONS

A heated debate followed the publication of Coleman’s controversial 1975 study on the consequences of court-ordered desegregation and white flight from big cities.³⁰ That debate, like Coleman’s study, was framed in terms of intergroup contact between blacks and whites and the benefits that accrued to each group as a result. Nearly 40 years later, in the case of *Fisher v. University of Texas*, the U.S. Supreme Court once again heard arguments for and against deliberate racial integration, this time through race-based affirmative action in university admissions. At the heart of the discussion is whether schools have a vested interest in promoting diversity.

These debates represent two different perspectives on intergroup contact and its consequences. Whereas Coleman focused on the consequences of contact between specific racial groups (blacks and whites) and the residential decisions of one group (whites), more recent work emphasizes the effects of diversity on universally shared outcomes. The contrast between these two debates, we believe, is emblematic of a more general shift away from open discussions of race and toward a “color-blind” discourse (Bonilla-Silva 2003). Race and ethnicity scholars have pointed out the perils of the postracial illusion, but the trend has nevertheless taken root in academic work. The widespread use of diversity indexes that flatten fundamentally hierarchical relations between groups is one example. As our findings show, these indexes are no substitute for a substantive understanding of the nature of ethnoracial cleavages. As an analytic concept, “diversity” (i.e., “heterogeneity”) not only sidesteps issues of material and symbolic inequalities, it masks the distinction between in-group and out-group contact.

³⁰ Coleman’s 1975 study followed on the heels of the “Coleman Report” (Coleman 1966), which argued that black students benefit from schooling in racially mixed classrooms.

In a related vein, it is misleading to argue that diversity reduces trust among the general population. First, we cannot draw causal conclusions about the effects of diversity from cross-sectional data. Second, even if the alleged effect were to exist, separate analyses by ethnoracial group suggest that it would be limited to members of the dominant group who come in contact with members of subordinate groups. The first statement subtly places the blame for low social capital on the nonwhites and immigrants who are “diversifying” the nation; the second highlights the asymmetry that continues to characterize U.S. race relations. Although subtle, this distinction has important policy implications: if “diversity” is the problem, then social policies should aim to preserve or even promote homogeneity. If, instead, whites’ bias against nonwhites along with blacks’ and Latinos’ lower levels of trust are to blame, then policy makers should contemplate group-specific interventions.

Ours is not the first study to point out that the focus on an abstract notion of diversity overlooks patterned inequalities by race/ethnicity. In her study on the impact of New Deal policies, Fox finds that European immigrants were treated more generously than blacks and Mexicans, who were excluded from benefits, sometimes through deportation (2012).³¹ Apparently, not all diversity is created equal. Indeed, on the ground, ideas of diversity are deeply racialized (Bell and Hartmann 2007). Community studies show that while whites revere diversity in the abstract, they distance themselves symbolically and geographically from diversity when it entails contact with nonwhites (Wilson and Taub 2006; Brown-Saracino 2009). In an ethnography of four gentrifying communities, Brown-Saracino finds that newcomers differentially value diversity depending on the target out-group. For example, the residents of Andersonville, Chicago, celebrate their neighborhood’s Swedish past while displacing the substantial Middle Eastern population (2009). In sum, whites might engage in prodiversity “happy talk,” but they treat out-group contact with “caution and ambivalence on the ground” (Burke 2012, p. 97).

The public idealization of an abstract and race-less “diversity” has made its way into academic work, theoretically and operationally. As this work trickles into the public realm, the findings have important practical implications. In the case of *Fisher v. University of Texas*, for example, an extensive body of research was heavily cited as scientific evidence that diversity leads to undesirable outcomes, and, therefore, educational institu-

³¹ Fox acknowledges that her findings challenge studies—like Putnam (2007)—that claim there is a simple trade-off between diversity and solidarity, trust, and generosity. “If [diversity from] immigration hampers redistribution, as some of these scholars maintain, how do we explain the generous treatment of European immigrants and the high social spending in cities with large numbers of foreign-born whites?” (Fox 2012, p. 9).

tions have no vested interest in promoting it.³² How would the conversation have been different, we wonder, if instead of focusing on diversity researchers framed their findings in terms of whites' negative reaction to nonwhites, as our evidence suggests? Or if they emphasized that homogeneity and social capital may benefit some groups but not others (Portes 1998; Hero 2007; Uslaner 2011)?

Social Capital, a "Public Good" for Whom?

Why have scholars fallen for the claim that ethnoracial diversity is responsible for the alleged decline in trust? We suspect their communitarian conception of social capital has something to do with it. First, underlying many conceptions of social capital is a micromodel of human behavior in which repeated interaction within cohesive groups and close-knit networks facilitates the emergence of a shared culture and norms of trust and reciprocity and generally induces positive outcomes for the collectivity (Putnam 1993, 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000*b*; Herreros Vázquez 2000; Skocpol 2003). This conception draws on the notion of mechanical solidarity, based on social similarity and cultural homogeneity (Durkheim 1984; Portes and Vickstrom 2011). It follows that diversity is likely to have negative consequences, at least in the short run.³³ Second, the communitarian perspective is characterized by a focus on the benefits that accrue to the wider community, as opposed to individuals or in-group members; this focus goes hand in hand with a conceptualization of social capital as a property of entire collectives (i.e., communities, regions, states) that can be measured at the aggregate level. This approach has several shortcomings: first, it heightens the risk of confusing compositional effects for contextual ones; second, it obscures specific patterns of intergroup relations; third, it leads scholars to assume that the benefits of social capital extend to the broader collectivity, rather than investigating whether these benefits are restricted—in part or in whole—to certain segments of the population.

The sociological tradition provides useful analytic tools for overcoming these problems. First, we should not automatically assume that social capital benefits the collectivity as a whole. There is vast evidence that social ties

³² Putnam filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the respondents in *Fisher v. University of Texas*, responding to Thernstrom et al.'s in support of the petitioners (see n. 2), in which he argues that diversity has positive consequences in the medium to long term.

³³ It is no coincidence that in Putnam's account (2000), the United States was richest in social capital just before the liberalization of U.S. immigration policy and the civil rights movement, at a time when women and nonwhites could not participate in many realms of civic life and residential segregation was at a historic high (Skocpol 2003; Hero 2007).

benefit individuals and cohesion benefits in-group members. The existence and extent of positive network externalities, however, is questionable and contingent (Granovetter 1973; Bourdieu 1980; Coleman 1988; Portes 1998; Lin et al. 2001; DiMaggio and Garip 2012). Hence, we should treat this as an empirical question: Who benefits from social capital—the individual, his or her in-group, the broader society? Along these lines, we should investigate the relationship between social capital and the provision of public goods. After all, research indicates that repeated interaction and social networks are viable solutions to collective action problems (Axelrod 1985; Gould 1993; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Kim and Bearman 1997; Diani and McAdam 2003; Baldassarri 2015). This question takes on greater urgency in heterogeneous contexts, where overlapping (rather than crosscutting) social cleavages are often the norm (Blau 1974).³⁴

Second, given the complexity of modern societies, we would do well to move beyond a bucolic communitarian conceptualization of social capital that relies on mechanisms of mechanical solidarity rooted in similarity and homogeneity. We should instead set our sights on understanding the building blocks of organic solidarity, the social glue in societies characterized by complex interdependencies, complementarity, and individualization (Durkheim 1984; Portes and Vickstrom 2011). Undoubtedly, in small, homogeneous communities, close-knit networks often bring about high levels of cooperation through selection, sanctioning, reciprocal altruism, and costly signaling (Coleman 1988; Nolin 2012). As group size and complexity increase, however, this explanation alone cannot account for the widespread trust and cooperation people exhibit in everyday life (Elster 1989; Yamagishi 2011). In complex societies people rely on categorization schemas to generalize their interpersonal experiences to a broader class of individuals and to relate to others even in the absence of direct or indirect personal relationships (Tajfel and Turner 2004; Baldassarri and Grossman 2013). Namely, unfamiliar others are classified as in- or out-group members on the basis of perceived traits (e.g., ethnicity, gender, religion, or class) that are salient in a given social context. The strength and salience of group-specific identities then affects altruistic and cooperative behavior (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 1997). Whether and how individuals transcend these group identities and develop generalized trust, however, deserves further investigation.

Together, these considerations point to a research agenda structured around the following questions:

³⁴ According to Blau (1974, p. 615), “the macrosocial integration of the diverse groups in modern societies rests on the multiform heterogeneity resulting from many cross-cutting parameters.” If lines of social division are instead overlapping, social heterogeneity and differentiation might lead to division and conflict.

1. How do individuals transcend group boundaries and develop solidarity and trust toward a generalized other? Does in-group trust, of the type fostered in close-knit, homogeneous networks, translate into solidarity toward out-group members? Or does in-group cohesion constitute an impediment?

In two seminal studies of fairness across 15 societies, Henrich and colleagues (2006, 2010) find less prosocial behavior in small-scale societies based on kinship networks than in large-scale, market-integrated societies in which strangers regularly engage in mutually beneficial transactions. In cross-cultural comparisons, Yamagishi and colleagues repeatedly show that people in the United States, a society characterized by individualism, report systematically higher levels of generalized trust and cooperation than people in Japan, a typically collectivist society.³⁵ The intense group ties that typify Japanese society, they argue, prevent trust from developing beyond group boundaries (Yamagishi, Cook, and Watabe 1998; Yamagishi 2011): “the collectivist society produces security but destroys trust” (Yamagishi 2011, p. vii). Considering within-society variation, Ermisch and Gambetta (2010) demonstrate that strong family ties reduce trust toward strangers. Together, these studies advance an “emancipatory” theory of trust, in which the development of generalized trust has a role in “emancipating people from the confines of safe, but closed relationships” (Yamagishi et al. 1998, p. 165).

Unfortunately, scholarship on the collective benefits of social capital has for the most part ignored the possible trade-off between in-group trust and the capacity to develop trust toward out-group members. The closest these scholars have come to acknowledging this possibility is in drawing a distinction between “bonding” and “bridging” social capital, the former being “inward looking and [tending] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups,” while the latter encompasses “people across different social cleavages” (Putnam 2000, p. 22) and could “nourish wider cooperation” (Putnam 1993, p. 175). However, this distinction rarely informs research design (for exceptions, see Paxton 2002; Coffé and Geys 2007) and is systematically overlooked in discussing the broader implications of these studies. Moreover, these two forms are generally presented as complementary, or even mutually reinforcing, although the social network scholarship that originally inspired the bridging/bonding distinction clearly presents them as rival forces (see Granovetter 1973). In Granovetter’s characterization, there is a trade-off between strong and weak ties, and the macrolevel social structures (i.e., fragmented vs. cohesive communities) each brings about (pp. 1373–76). In a similar vein, Burt has extensively investigated closure and brokerage as alternative features of social structure, which are linked

³⁵ A collectivist society is defined “as a society in which group members cooperate at a much higher level with each other than with out-group members” (Yamagishi 2011, p. 1).

to different types of returns (2000, 2005). Regrettably, in idealizing social capital, scholars have lost sight of the tension between certain structural features, as well as the types of trust (in-group vs. generalized) they generate.

Considerations of structural features become even more important in the context of diverse societies, in which network configurations at the individual and organizational level intersect with socioeconomic cleavages. This leads to a second set of research questions that merit further attention.

2. How do patterns of social relationships and associational membership map onto social cleavages? Do social networks benefit the collectivity or do they exacerbate intergroup inequality?

A meaningful understanding of the relationship between diversity and trust cannot overlook the nature of group cleavages or assume that all forms of trust are equally beneficial to the collectivity. Whites living in homogeneous (better, homogeneously white) communities likely benefit from high levels of trust and cooperation, but it is not clear whether such benefits extend to nonwhites in their communities or to nonwhites in general. Previous literature has tangentially addressed this issue, insisting on the importance of ties that cut across social cleavages. However, a handful of crosscutting ties might not be enough.

In their brilliant review of the literature, DiMaggio and Garip (2012) call attention to the ways in which social networks may contribute to intergroup inequality. Through mechanisms of cumulative advantage, networks exacerbate individual-level differences across a variety of domains, from access to technology, to the labor market, education, and health. A universal feature of social networks, homophily—the tendency to associate with similar others—underlies the process by which advantages disproportionately accrue to social groups with greater initial resources. In the light of these findings, studies of social capital in heterogeneous societies should distinguish between benefits that accrue to specific groups from benefits that accrue to the broader collectivity. Far from producing public goods, social networks may increase social differences. The asymmetries in overall levels of trust that we have highlighted and the fact that whites in homogeneously white neighborhoods report higher levels of trust are consistent with this picture.

Finally, we believe it is necessary to develop a micromodel of human behavior that accounts for the forms of solidarity and cooperation we observe in contemporary, diverse societies.

3. What are the microlevel mechanisms through which social capital influences social and economic behavior? Why is cooperation potentially more difficult in heterogeneous contexts?

While most scholarship on social capital rests on the assumption that dense social networks and a vivid associational life nurture trust and norms of rec-

iprocity, the specific microlevel mechanisms that bring about positive collective outcomes are rarely specified and almost never tested (Portes 1998; Lin et al. 2001; Durlauf and Fafchamps 2005). We still know very little about the specific mechanisms that inform solidarity and cooperation. For example, are trust relationships based on norms of solidarity and reciprocity, or are they fostered by the threat of sanctioning (Gambetta 1988; Yamagishi 2011; Baldassarri 2015)? And are the mechanisms that bring about in-group trust the same ones that lead to cooperation in heterogeneous social settings? To answer these questions, we need to move beyond aggregate-level measures, along with vague attitudinal measures of trust and cooperation. Promising insights come from experimental studies using behavioral games—a methodology uniquely positioned to disentangle motivational mechanisms (Camerer 2003).

It is conceivable that exposure to ethnic out-group members disconfirms faulty generalizations and encourages people to behave altruistically across group boundaries. At the same time, homogeneous groups might still be better equipped to administer sanctioning and develop reciprocity, and thus be more capable of overcoming collective action problems. For instance, Habyarimana et al. (2007) find greater levels of cooperation in homogeneous groups, because individuals are more likely to sanction each other, not because they are more altruistic toward in-group members. More generally, we should ask whether people are less likely to cooperate with out-group members because they trust them less, because they have lower expectations of reciprocity, because they do not fear sanctioning, or because cooperation is more difficult (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Henrich et al. 2010).

Our study challenges the empirical findings of a vast and growing body of work on diversity and social capital. Previous findings rest on misguided methodological choices rooted in popular but problematic conceptualizations of diversity and social capital. The task at hand is to move past simplistic associations between “diversity” and “social capital” and toward a theoretically informed investigation into the building blocks of solidarity and cooperation in heterogeneous, contemporary societies.

APPENDIX

Methods

All individual-level variables are from the 2000 SCCBS. Unless otherwise stated, all community-level variables are measured at the level of the census tract; they are from the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census and were downloaded from AmericanFactfinder.org.

Ethnoracial variables.—The first set of variables captures respondents’ racial/ethnic self-classification. Following standard practice, “white” refers

to non-Hispanic whites, “black” refers to non-Hispanic blacks, “Asian” refers to non-Hispanic Asians, and “other” refers to non-Hispanic, self-classified others. The Hispanics category includes self-classified Hispanics from all racial backgrounds. As a proxy for immigrant background, we include a dummy for U.S. citizenship. We also include indicators of ethno-racial differences across communities, including the percentage of each census tract’s population that is Hispanic, white, black, or Asian. Following Putnam, we control for the percentage of U.S. citizens in census tracts.

Residential stability.—Four measures capture the residential stability of respondents and their communities. For respondents, we include a dummy for home ownership as well as a measure that captures how many decades they “have lived in [their] community.” The latter comprises four categories: (1) less than 10 years, (2) 10–20 years, (3) more than 20 years, and (4) “all my life.” We also include the percentage of each tract’s population that reported living in the same county since 1995. To obtain the percentage of tract residents who rent their homes, we multiplied the number of renter-occupied housing units by the average household size of renter-occupied units, divided the product by the total tract population, and multiplied by 100.

Economic well-being.—The 2000 SCCBS contains a nonstandard measure of household income, captured by a series of three questions. The first question asks whether the respondent’s household income falls above or below \$30,000. For those respondents who answered “less than \$30,000,” the next question asks whether their household income falls above or below \$20,000; for those respondents who answered “\$30,000 or more,” the next question asks whether their household income was “[more than] \$30,000 but less than \$50,000,” “[more than] \$50,000 but less than \$75,000,” “[more than] \$75,000 but less than \$100,000,” or “[more than] \$100,000.” Some respondents refused to answer any of the three income questions, while others refused to answer the second part after having specified whether their household income fell above or below \$30,000. Putnam includes a measure of “R’s household income (\$100,000).” However, nearly 12% of respondents in the national sample and over 14% of those in the community sample are missing the necessary information to construct this measure. In light of this, we rely on the household income measure for which there is the most complete information: a dummy for household income above or below \$30,000. In supplementary analyses (available on request), we confirm that our results are robust using a \$100,000 cutoff, like Putnam.

Additionally, we include measures of employment status, education, and economic satisfaction. Employment status is a three-category factor variable; the “unemployed” category includes respondents who report being either unemployed or temporarily laid off, and the “stays home” category includes respondents who report being retired, permanently disabled, homemakers, or students. Educational attainment is measured using a seven-

point scale ranging from “less than high school” to “graduate or professional degree.” Self-reported economic satisfaction is measured on a three-point scale, and the question is stated as follows: “We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, or not at all satisfied with your present financial situation?” Three tract-level variables capture contextual economic well-being. They include the percentage of families living at or below the federal poverty line, the Gini coefficient of income inequality, and median household income in 2000 USD. The Gini coefficient for household income is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 corresponds to greater inequality. It was constructed using binned household income data; each income category was midpoint coded, except for the final, open-ended category, which was coded \$250,000.

Additional controls.—We include a final set of individual and contextual controls. Individual controls include age (in years), gender (dummy, 1 = female), SCCBS interview conducted in Spanish (dummy, 1 = yes), monthly hours worked, and commute time (in hours). Tract-level variables include population density (residents per square mile), average commute time of employed population (in hours), percentage of residents 65 years and older, and percentage of residents with at least a bachelor’s degree. We also include two county-level measures from the Federal Bureau of Investigation: violent and nonviolent crimes known to police per capita. As Putnam notes, the county is the smallest geographic unit for which such rates are consistently reported. Finally, we include a factor variable for U.S. region. These include Northeast, Midwest, South, and Southwest; individual states are classified according to U.S. Census Bureau convention.

TABLE A1
UNWEIGHTED DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: SCCBS

	NATIONAL SAMPLE		COMMUNITY SAMPLE		<i>t</i>
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Trust:					
Generalized97	.96	1.08	.96	−5.84***
Neighbors	3.19	.90	3.26	.86	−4.25***
In-group	3.13	.69	3.19	.67	−4.45***
Out-group	3.02	.66	3.10	.66	−5.23***
Cooperation	4.25	.89	4.25	.89	−.03
Ethnoracial characteristics:					
Heterogeneity (ct)31	.20	.31	.21	.14
White61	.49	.72	.45	−12.34***
Black17	.37	.12	.32	7.51***
Hispanic16	.36	.07	.26	15.77***

TABLE A1 (Continued)

	NATIONAL SAMPLE		COMMUNITY SAMPLE		<i>t</i>
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	
Asian02	.12	.03	.16	-3.50***
Other03	.16	.04	.19	-3.31***
U.S. citizen93	.25	.95	.22	-3.81***
% whites (ct)	68.36	30.22	71.22	28.60	-5.11***
% U.S. citizens (ct)	93.60	9.16	93.89	8.21	-1.82
Residential stability:					
Owens home70	.46	.69	.46	.66
Decades in community	1.98	1.03	1.96	1.04	1.06
% living in county 5+ years (ct)	81.95	10.73	82.11	10.33	-.77
% renters (ct)	32.45	21.52	32.71	21.64	-.63
Economic conditions:					
Household income >\$30,00067	.47	.70	.46	-3.57***
Employed69	.46	.70	.46	-1.44
Unemployed05	.22	.04	.20	2.53*
Stays home26	.44	.26	.44	.28
Education	3.42	1.80	3.69	1.85	-7.81***
Economic satisfaction	1.07	.63	1.10	.64	-2.15*
% families in poverty (ct)	10.45	9.67	8.82	8.96	9.30***
Gini coefficient (ct)38	.06	.37	.05	6.56***
Median household income (ct)	43,350	19,118	46,682	19,988	-8.61***
Additional controls:					
Age	44.41	16.71	44.73	16.68	-1.00
Female60	.49	.59	.49	1.44
Interviewed in Spanish06	.23	.04	.19	5.01***
Monthly hours worked	122.22	97.31	123.07	97.06	-.45
Commute time, hours27	.40	.27	.41	-.18
Northeast19	.39	.14	.35	6.97***
Midwest22	.42	.31	.46	-9.86***
South38	.49	.28	.45	11.30***
West20	.40	.26	.44	-7.09***
Population density, residents/mile ² (ct)06	.16	.05	.07	7.52***
Average commute time, hours (ct)42	.12	.40	.09	11.51***
% 65+ years (ct)	13.03	7.20	12.47	6.22	4.48***
% bachelor's degree (ct)	23.54	16.65	28.13	18.58	-12.83***
Violent crimes per capita (cty)00	.00	.00	.00	2.22*
Nonviolent crimes per capita (cty)07	.04	.08	.03	-13.93***

NOTE.—SCCBS national ($N = 3,003$) and community ($N = 26,730$) samples. ct = census tract, cty = county.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

TABLE A2
TRUST IN SPECIFIC GROUPS: NATIONAL SAMPLE

	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians
Heterogeneity (ct)	-.04	-.17	-.22*	-.18
Ethnoracial characteristics:				
White (ref.)				
Black	-.13**	-.05	-.11*	-.18***
Hispanic	-.06	-.09	.09	-.11*
Asian12	.06	-.07	.12
Other	-.07	-.04	-.02	-.13
U.S. citizen06	.15*	.15*	.11
% whites (ct)00	.00	.00	0
% U.S. citizens (ct)00	.00	.00	0
Residential stability:				
Owns home	-.03	.01	.05	.02
Decades in community01	.01	-.01	-.01
% living in county 5+ years (ct)00	.00	.00	0
% renters (ct)00	-.00*	.00	0
Economic conditions:				
Household income >\$30,00004	.06	.02	.10**
Employed (ref.)				
Unemployed	-.10	-.01	-.10	-.1
Stays home	-.03	.01	-.07	.01
Education01	.02*	.05***	.04***
Economic satisfaction10***	.10***	.12***	.10***
% families in poverty (ct)	-.01*	-.01*	.00	0
Gini coefficient (ct)50	.54	.55	.3
Median household income (ct)00	.00	.00	0
Additional controls:				
Age01***	.00***	.00**	.00**
Female	-.01	.05	.02	-.03
Interviewed in Spanish	-.34***	-.51***	-.32***	-.49***
Monthly hours worked00	.00	.00	0
Commute time, hours	-.01	-.03	-.01	.03
Northeast (ref.)				
Midwest	-.03	-.08	-.01	-.03
South	-.03	-.08	-.08	-.06
West01	-.01	.03	.01
Population density, residents/ mile ² (ct)02	.21	.08	.13
Average commute time, hours (ct)	-.41**	-.54***	-.26	-.52**
% 65+ years (ct)00	.00	.00	0
% bachelor's degree (ct)00	.00	.00	0
Violent crimes per capita (cty)	6.55	1.41	-.35	.8
Nonviolent crimes per capita (cty)	-1.20*	-.74	-.63	-.25
Constant	2.82***	2.76***	2.79***	2.88***
$\sigma_{(1)}$06	.00	.00	.05
σ_e64	.66	.67	.67
Log likelihood	-2,217.585	-2,230.816	-2,199.748	-2,121.865
<i>N</i>	2,274	2,238	2,170	2,077

NOTE.—Multilevel (varying-intercept) linear regressions predicting self-reported trust in ethnoracial groups. Respondents are nested in census tracts; $\sigma_{(1)}$ refers to the standard deviation between census tracts. ct = census tract, cty = county.

- * $P < .05$.
- ** $P < .01$.
- *** $P < .001$.

TABLE A3
TRUST IN SPECIFIC GROUPS: FULL SAMPLE

	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians
Heterogeneity (ct)	-.04	-.05	-.04	.00
Ethnoracial characteristics:				
White (ref.)				
Black	-.20***	-.11***	-.17***	-.21***
Hispanic	-.12***	-.14***	.03	-.16***
Asian01	-.03	-.13***	.03
Other	-.15***	-.07**	-.09***	-.10***
U.S. citizen00	.20***	.11***	.09***
% whites (ct)00	.00*	.00	.00***
% U.S. citizens (ct)00	.00	.00	.00
Residential stability:				
Owns home01	.01	.02	.02*
Decades in community01	.01	-.01	.00
% living in county 5+ years (ct)00	-.00*	.00	.00
% renters (ct)00	.00	.00	.00
Economic conditions:				
Household income >\$30,00003*	.05***	.05***	.06***
Employed (ref.)				
Unemployed	-.12***	-.09***	-.07**	-.11***
Stays home	-.05**	-.06**	-.08**	-.06**
Education02***	.04***	.04***	.04***
Economic satisfaction10***	.09***	.10***	.09***
% families in poverty (ct)00	.00	.00	.00
Gini coefficient (ct)	-.17	-.08	.00	-.11
Median household income (ct)00	.00	.00	.00
Additional controls:				
Age01***	.00***	.00***	.00***
Female02*	.06***	.04***	.03***
Interviewed in Spanish	-.26***	-.45***	-.19***	-.39***
Monthly hours worked	-.00**	-.00**	-.00*	-.00***
Commute time, hours	-.03**	-.04***	-.03*	-.02
Northeast (ref.)				
Midwest00	-.05**	-.01	-.03
South	-.03	-.07***	-.07**	-.08***
West	-.02	-.02	.01	-.02
Population density, residents/ mile ² (ct)	-.12	-.11	-.06	-.13
Average commute time, hours (ct)	-.08	-.07	.02	-.01
% 65+ years (ct)00	.00	.00	.00
% bachelor's degree (ct)00	.00	.00*	.00
Violent crimes per capita (cty)	-3.15	-4.06	-2.99	-4.54*
Nonviolent crimes per capita (cty)	-.26	-.05	-.22	-.04
Constant	2.88***	2.66***	2.64***	2.66***
$\sigma_{(1)}$04	.00	.00	.00
$\sigma_{(2)}$03	.03	.04	.03
σ_e64	.65	.67	.66
Log likelihood	-22,278.35	-22,326.81	-22,520.51	-21,549.56
<i>N</i>	23,002	22,740	21,967	21,443

NOTE.—Multilevel (varying-intercept) linear regressions predicting self-reported trust in ethnoracial groups. Respondents are nested in census tracts and community subsamples; $\sigma_{(1)}$ refers to the standard deviation between census tracts, and $\sigma_{(2)}$ refers to the standard deviation between community subsamples. ct = census tract, cty = county.

- * $P < .05$.
- ** $P < .01$.
- *** $P < .001$.

TABLE A4
DETERMINANTS OF TRUST AMONG WHITES

	Generalized	Neighbors	In-Group	Out-Group	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians	Cooperation
Heterogeneity (ct)	-.09	-.10	.00	-.03	-.09	.03	-.02	-.06
Ethnoracial characteristics:								
U.S. citizen02	.08	-.03	.06	.04	.09	.00	.11
% whites (ct)00	.00***	.00**	.00**	.00	.00**	.00**	.00**
% U.S. citizens (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Residential stability:								
Owns home05**	.23***	.02	.02	.02	.01	.03*	.11***
Decades in community00	.02**	.01	.00	.01	-.01	.00	-.01
% living in county 5 + years (ct)	-.00*	-.00*	.00	.00	.00	.00	-.00*	.00
% renters (ct)00	-.00***	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Economic conditions:								
Household income >\$30,00007***	.12***	.02	.04**	.03*	.05**	.04**	.10***
Employed (ref.)								
Unemployed	-.10*	-.10***	-.08**	-.06*	-.05	-.06	-.07*	-.08
Stays home	-.11***	-.06***	.00	.00	.00	-.02	.00	-.07**
Education09***	.04***	.02***	.04***	.03***	.04***	.04***	.01*
Economic satisfaction14***	.10***	.10***	.10***	.10***	.10***	.09***	.09***

TABLE A4 (Continued)

	Generalized	Neighbors	In-Group	Out-Group	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians	Cooperation
% families in poverty (ct)	-.01***	-.01***	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	-.00*
Gini coefficient (ct)45*	.70***	-.11	.06	-.01	.14	-.04	.13
Median household income (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Additional controls:								
Age01***	.01***	.01***	.00***	.00***	.00***	.00***	.01***
Female03	.08***	.04***	.07***	.08***	.07***	.06***	.13***
Interviewed in Spanish07	.00	-.03	.00	.02	.03	-.05	-.01
South	-.15***	-.02	-.05**	-.07***	-.07***	-.09***	-.06***	-.02
Constant19	2.28***	2.72***	2.67***	2.81***	2.55***	2.79***	2.81***
$\sigma_{(1)}$07	.03	.00	.00	.00	.00	.02	.10
$\sigma_{(2)}$06	.04	.05	.04	.05	.05	.04	.08
σ_{ϵ}90	.69	.60	.59	.62	.65	.62	.80
Log likelihood	-24,150.02	-18,800.26	-15,321.64	-13,634.38	-15,550.94	-15,801.30	-14,934.08	-10,811.12
<i>N</i>	18,311	17,999	16,805	15,298	16,560	15,935	15,708	8,996

NOTE.—Multilevel (varying-intercept) linear regressions predicting self-reported trust in ethnoracial groups. Respondents are nested in census tracts and community subsamples; $\sigma_{(1)}$ refers to the standard deviation between census tracts, and $\sigma_{(2)}$ refers to the standard deviation between community subsamples. White, non-Hispanic respondents, full sample; ct = census tract.

* $P < .05$.
 ** $P < .01$.
 *** $P < .001$.

TABLE A5
DETERMINANTS OF TRUST AMONG BLACKS

	Generalized	Neighbors	In-Group	Out-Group	Whites	Hispanics	Asians	Cooperation
Heterogeneity (ct)03	.16	.04	-.01	-.01	-.09	.09	.01
Ethnoracial characteristics:								
U.S. citizen	-.19	-.16	.03	-.11	-.18	-.01	-.12	.00
% blacks (ct)00	.00	-.00*	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
% U.S. citizens (ct)01**	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Residential stability:								
Owns home07	.25***	.00	-.02	-.04	.00	-.03	.22***
Decades in community04*	.05**	.02	.01	.00	.00	.03	-.02
% living in county 5+ years (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
% renters (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Economic conditions:								
Household income >\$30,00001	.09*	.04	.03	.02	.06	.02	.05
Employed (ref.)								
Unemployed04	-.01	-.01	.01	.00	.01	.02	.15
Stays home	-.08	-.03	.03	-.04	.01	-.04	-.07	.07
Education08***	.07***	.03***	.03**	.00	.04***	.05***	.06***
Economic satisfaction09***	.08**	.06**	.08***	.08***	.09***	.07***	.07

TABLE A5 (Continued)

	Generalized	Neighbors	In-Group	Out-Group	Whites	Hispanics	Asians	Cooperation
% families in poverty (ct)00	-.01***	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Gini coefficient (ct)01	-.11	-.38	-.39	-.33	-.51	-.51	.24
Median household income (ct)00**	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Additional controls:								
Age00**	.01***	.00**	.00***	.01***	.00*	.00*	.01***
Female	-.03	-.03	.00	-.02	.00	-.03	-.05	.04
Interviewed in Spanish08	.17	-.16	.03	.10	.03	-.02	-.03
South	-.06	.07	.06*	.01	.05	-.03	.00	.09
Constant	-.54	1.66***	2.41***	2.68***	2.77***	2.92***	2.41***	3.39***
$\sigma_{(1)}$16	.16	.01	.00	.07	.00	.00	.00
$\sigma_{(2)}$01	.01	.03	.06	.05	.05	.04	.00
σ_{ϵ}84	.84	.65	.63	.69	.71	.71	.97
Log likelihood	-3,993.66	-3,874.72	-2,990.82	-2,547.15	-3,167.58	-3,075.01	-2,968.51	-2,075.31
<i>N</i>	3,146	3,069	3,022	2,659	3,004	2,845	2,738	1,495

NOTE.—Multilevel (varying-intercept) linear regressions predicting self-reported trust in ethnoracial groups. Respondents are nested in census tracts and community subsamples; $\sigma_{(1)}$ refers to the standard deviation between census tracts, and $\sigma_{(2)}$ refers to the standard deviation between community subsamples. Black, non-Hispanic respondents, full sample; ct = census tract.

* $P < .05$.
 ** $P < .01$.
 *** $P < .001$.

TABLE A6
DETERMINANTS OF TRUST AMONG HISPANICS

	Generalized	Neighbors	In-Group	Out-Group	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Cooperation
Heterogeneity (ct)	-.08	-.23*	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.10	-.08	.10
Ethnoracial characteristics:								
U.S. citizen	-.06	.09	.11*	.23***	.07	.34***	.20***	-.15
% Hispanics (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
% U.S. citizens (ct)01*	.01	.00	.01*	.00	.01*	.01*	.00
Residential stability:								
Owns home06	.24***	.04	.03	.01	.04	.04	.12
Decades in community02	.04	.01	.00	.01	.02	.00	.00
% living in county 5+ years (ct)	-.01**	.00	-.00*	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
% renters (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Economic conditions:								
Household income >\$30,00012**	.13**	.05	.07	.03	.06	.15***	.07
Employed (ref.)								
Unemployed	-.11	-.18*	.01	-.09	-.08	-.01	-.12	-.18
Stays home	-.04	-.01	-.08	-.04	-.02	-.07	-.04	-.03
Education05***	.07***	.05***	.07***	.04***	.07***	.08***	.03
Economic satisfaction09**	.12***	.12***	.11***	.12***	.13***	.10**	.15***

TABLE A6 (Continued)

	Generalized	Neighbors	In-Group	Out-Group	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Cooperation
% families in poverty (ct)	-.01*	.00	.00	.00	-.01*	.00	.00	.00
Gini coefficient (ct)	-.23	.05	.44	.25	.00	.53	.34	.16
Median household income (ct)	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Additional controls:								
Age	.00**	.01***	.00	.00	.00**	.00*	.00	.01**
Female	-.09*	.01	.01	-.01	-.04	.04	.01	.04
Interviewed in Spanish	-.19***	-.21***	-.27***	-.37***	-.30***	-.49***	-.40***	.03
South	-.07	-.01	-.06	-.09*	-.03	-.07	-.12*	.03
Constant	.41	1.77***	2.31***	1.98***	2.57***	1.71***	1.83***	3.90***
$\sigma_{(1)}$.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.11	.15
$\sigma_{(2)}$.00	.00	.04	.00	.00	.04	.00	.00
σ_{ϵ}	.86	.87	.74	.68	.78	.79	.79	.89
Log likelihood	-2,554.87	-2,537.99	-2,136.24	-1,726.68	-2,196.30	-2,203.62	-2,055.31	-1,399.90
N	2,023	1,985	1,913	1,668	1,884	1,862	1,724	1,062

NOTE.—Multilevel (varying-intercept) linear regressions predicting self-reported trust in ethnoracial groups. Respondents are nested in census tracts and community subsamples; $\sigma_{(1)}$ refers to the standard deviation between census tracts, and $\sigma_{(2)}$ refers to the standard deviation between community subsamples. Hispanic respondents, full sample; ct = census tract.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

TABLE A7
DETERMINANTS OF TRUST AMONG ASIANS

	Generalized	Neighbors	In-Group	Out-Group	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Cooperation
Heterogeneity (ct)30	-.12	.05	.12	.02	.19	.08	.43
Ethnoracial characteristics:								
U.S. citizen	-.18*	-.06	-.14*	-.01	-.11	-.05	.07	-.09
% Asians (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
% U.S. citizens (ct)	-.01	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Residential stability:								
Owns home23**	.37***	.06	-.04	-.02	-.11	.01	.11
Decades in community	-.06	.07	.06	.05	.06	.06	.03	.01
% living in county 5+ years (ct)	-.01*	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01
% renters (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Economic conditions:								
Household income >\$30,000	-.17	.12	-.04	.11	.09	.11	.10	.10
Employed (ref.)								
Unemployed	-.07	-.08	-.09	-.02	-.07	-.10	.10	.15
Stays home	-.20	.14	.07	-.02	.02	.01	-.02	.15
Education06*	.09***	.04*	.02	.01	.02	.01	.06*
Economic satisfaction08	.02	.10*	.07	.07	.12*	.02	.03

TABLE A7 (Continued)

	Generalized	Neighbors	In-Group	Out-Group	Whites	Blacks	Asians	Cooperation
% families in poverty (ct)	-.01	.00	.00	-.01	.00	-.01	-.01	-.02**
Gini coefficient (ct)	1.13	.63	.46	1.27	1.38	1.09	1.37	1.12
Median household income (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Additional controls:								
Age01**	.00	.00	.00	.01*	.00	.00	.00
Female	-.05	-.06	-.11	-.05	-.08	-.04	-.07	.23*
Interviewed in Spanish								
South02	-.03	-.03	-.01	.00	-.08	.00	.00
Constant	1.59	1.87**	2.40***	2.17***	2.62***	2.36***	1.54*	2.85*
$\sigma_{(1)}$00	.15	.00	.08	.00	.17	.17	.00
$\sigma_{(2)}$00	.19	.11	.00	.00	.04	.00	.27
σ_e93	.68	.65	.59	.62	.65	.69	.78
Log likelihood	-825.64	-646.84	-568.44	-483.26	-528.81	-573.07	-588.86	-341.70
N	613	605	569	532	563	558	547	283

NOTE.—Multilevel (varying-intercept) linear regressions predicting self-reported trust in ethnic groups. Respondents are nested in census tracts and community subsamples; $\sigma_{(1)}$ refers to the standard deviation between census tracts, and $\sigma_{(2)}$ refers to the standard deviation between community subsamples. Asian, non-Hispanic respondents, full sample; ct = census tract.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

TABLE A8
DETERMINANTS OF TRUST AMONG NONCITIZENS

	Generalized	Neighbors	In-Group	Out-Group	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians	Cooperation
Heterogeneity (ct)	-.07	-.19	.03	.13	.18	.01	.12	.00	-.06
Ethnoracial characteristics:									
White (ref)									
Black	-.24	-.16	-.23*	.05	-.01	-.06	-.08	-.03	.07
Hispanic	-.31**	-.44***	-.23**	-.27***	-.24**	-.44***	-.04	-.35***	.09
Asian	-.07	-.11	-.05	-.08	-.03	-.08	-.22**	.02	.13
Other	-.30**	-.10	.00	.08	.04	.05	.07	-.03	.16
% whites (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
% U.S. citizens (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	-.01
Residential stability:									
Owens home07	.21***	.04	.02	-.06	.06	.06	.07	.07
Decades in community	-.02	.01	.00	-.01	.01	.00	-.01	-.02	-.01
% living in county 5+ years (ct)	-.01**	.00	-.01*	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
% renters (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Economic conditions:									
Household income >\$30,00004	.12*	.07	.13**	.04	.09	.09	.16**	.05
Employed (ref.)									
Unemployed	-.09	.07	.07	.07	.06	.23*	.10	-.04	.06
Stays home	-.06	.02	-.09	-.08	-.06	-.10	-.10	-.05	-.08

TABLE A8 (Continued)

	Generalized	Neighbors	In-Group	Out-Group	Whites	Blacks	Hispanics	Asians	Cooperation
Education05***	.09***	.05***	.05***	.03*	.06***	.05***	.05***	.06**
Economic satisfaction13**	.08*	.14***	.10**	.13***	.14***	.10**	.09*	.20***
% families in poverty (ct)	-.01	-.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	-.01*
Gini coefficient (ct)	-.20	-.05	-.35	.55	.22	.28	.55	.03	-.67
Median household income (ct)00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00*	.00*	.00
Additional controls:									
Age00	.00	.00	.00	.01*	.00	.00	.00	.01
Female	-.13*	.06	.08	.04	.00	.06	.06	.04	.12
Interviewed in Spanish	-.15	.01	-.17*	-.28***	-.20**	-.38***	-.16*	-.34***	.17
South	-.03	.00	-.01	.00	.01	.03	-.05	.07	.03
Constant	1.74***	2.62***	3.13***	2.59***	2.83***	2.88***	2.57***	2.42***	5.02***
$\sigma_{(1)}$13	.00	.00	.07	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
$\sigma_{(2)}$00	.00	.07	.00	.00	.09	.07	.00	.00
$\sigma_{(6)}$82	.79	.70	.62	.70	.77	.72	.74	.79
Log likelihood	-1,481.40	-1,394.35	-1,133.48	-907.10	-1,181.52	-1,268.60	-1,216.51	-1,127.73	-718.38
N	1,200	1,175	1,057	951	1,106	1,097	1,110	1,010	607

NOTE.—Multilevel (varying-intercept) linear regressions predicting self-reported trust in ethnoracial groups. Respondents are nested in census tracts and community subsamples; $\sigma_{(1)}$ refers to the standard deviation between census tracts, and $\sigma_{(2)}$ refers to the standard deviation between community subsamples. Non-U.S. citizen respondents, full sample; ct = census tract.

* $P < .05$.
 ** $P < .01$.
 *** $P < .001$.

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