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## Beliefs about EU 2030 climate commitments across public, expert, and policy audiences

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## LETTER

Beliefs about EU 2030 climate commitments across public,  
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E-mail: [loic.berger@cnrs.fr](mailto:loic.berger@cnrs.fr) and [thibault.richard@external.hec.fr](mailto:thibault.richard@external.hec.fr)**Keywords:** probabilistic beliefs, emission reductions, climate policy, fit for 55Supplementary material for this article is available [online](#)

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**Abstract**

The European Union (EU) has adopted ambitious climate policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 55% by 2030. While technical, economic, and political feasibility have been widely analyzed, far less is known about a critical enabling factor: whether key societal actors perceive these targets as credible and achievable. In this study, we elicit probabilistic beliefs about future EU emission reductions from a sample of citizens designed to be representative across 12 EU member states and compare them with the expectations of climate policymakers and experts. Our findings reveal that all three groups anticipate substantial progress compared to current levels. At the same time, citizens are more skeptical about achieving the target and substantially more uncertain than elites, expecting, on average, a 43% reduction by 2030 compared to the EU's 55% reference. Moreover, we identify a notable misalignment: elites tend to systematically underestimate public skepticism. This gap underscores the need to improve policy communication, directly address citizens' concerns, and foster a shared understanding to enhance the perceived credibility and political sustainability of the EU's climate goals.

**1. Introduction**

In recent years, the European Union (EU) and many other countries have launched ambitious programs to drastically reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Fankhauser *et al* 2022). Central to the EU's strategy is the European Climate Law, which formalizes the goals of the European Green Deal: achieving climate neutrality by 2050 and at least a 55% reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, relative to 1990 levels. To operationalize these targets, the EU introduced the *Fit-for-55* package, a comprehensive set of legislative proposals designed to align EU policies

with the 2030 target and place the EU on a credible path toward long-term decarbonization. While the technical, economic, and political aspects of these frameworks have been widely studied, a key enabling condition remains underexplored: whether citizens and relevant elites perceive these policy goals as credible and achievable.

Public beliefs about a policy are politically consequential: they shape behavioral responses, influence support and compliance, and ultimately feed back into the policy's long-term implementation and political sustainability (Bicchieri 2005, Jacobs and Weaver 2015). In this sense, beliefs serve a dual role:

as a diagnostic tool, reflecting how people anticipate a policy's effects, and as a determinant of success, shaping whether individuals and groups are willing to adapt, comply with, and continue supporting the policy over time.

Beliefs about the expected impacts of a climate policy strategy may be shaped by a range of underlying factors. They can reflect individuals' knowledge or assumptions about climate policy and its anticipated effects (Dechezleprêtre *et al* 2025); concerns about the policy's effectiveness and feasibility (van Soest *et al* 2021, Döbbling-Hildebrandt *et al* 2024); and perceived technological, economic, or social barriers that may hinder its success (Brutschin *et al* 2021, Bertram *et al* 2024). When beliefs are elicited conditional on a given level of policy ambition, they also reflect concerns about policy credibility, namely expected compliance and whether the policy will be implemented, enforced, and sustained over time (Nemet *et al* 2017, Victor *et al* 2022). Understanding beliefs is thus essential not only for assessing perceptions of specific climate policies but also for evaluating their long-term political viability.

Despite their potential central role in shaping support, subjective beliefs about future climate outcomes have rarely been studied in detail. Most existing studies rely on qualitative estimates, asking respondents to agree or disagree with general statements such as whether a given policy is effective in reducing emissions or influencing behavior. Such responses provide limited insight into how individuals perceive quantitative policy goals, even though this is precisely how policymakers tend to communicate climate objectives to the public. Understanding how citizens interpret and internalize such targets is therefore essential. Moreover, qualitative measures offer no indication of the uncertainty underlying individuals' beliefs.

Unlike studies that focus solely on elite perceptions (Victor *et al* 2022, Wynes *et al* 2024), we incorporate the views of the general public, policymakers, and experts to provide a more comprehensive picture of how the EU's climate policy strategy is understood, anticipated, and evaluated across different populations. This elite–non–elite comparison allows us to assess whether beliefs align with the EU's stated climate objectives and whether there exist gaps between citizens and elites. We also elicited elites' second-order beliefs to evaluate whether those who design, advise on, and implement climate policies, have an accurate view of public expectations, and to quantify the gap between citizens' actual beliefs and elites' perceptions of those beliefs.

## 2. Methods

We examine *subjective beliefs* about future climate outcomes by eliciting respondents' probability distributions regarding the expected reduction in total

EU net greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, relative to 1990 levels. We developed and fielded a new belief-elicitation module in a broad sample of citizens, designed to be demographically representative across 12 EU member states ( $N = 2,620$ ), allowing us to estimate individual belief central expectations, uncertainty, and confidence. In parallel, we surveyed 76 climate policymakers and experts, eliciting both their own beliefs and their second-order beliefs about citizens' expectations. This dual-sample design enables a systematic comparison between citizen and expert beliefs, and allows us to identify misalignments between expectations and official climate targets, and between elites' perceptions and citizens' actual expectations.

### 2.1. Eliciting probabilistic beliefs

We asked participants to allocate probability mass across four non-overlapping intervals spanning the full range of possible emissions reduction levels. This elicitation technique enables the construction of an individual-level probability density function. We first provided respondents with the following contextual information:

*'The EU has developed a package of policies, called Fit-for-55, to enable the EU to reduce its net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels. (Note for context: By the year 2022, the EU net emissions had been reduced by 32.5% compared to their 1990 levels.)'*<sup>10</sup>

We then asked *'What do you think is the percent chance that the reduction in total greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990 levels will be'*, over four distinct outcome categories:

- (A) **2022 levels or less:** A reduction of **32.5% or less**—no further progress beyond what was achieved by 2022.
- (B) **Slight extra reduction:** A reduction of **more than 32.5% but no more than 45%**—some additional progress, but falling short of the EU's 2030 target.
- (C) **Moderate extra reduction:** A reduction of **more than 45% but less than 55%**—substantial improvement, but still missing the 2030 goal.
- (D) **European Climate Law target:** A reduction of **55% or more**—successfully reaching or surpassing the EU's official 2030 target.

As respondents entered their answers, the interface displayed a running 'Total' showing the

<sup>10</sup> This contextual note is based on data available at the time the survey was launched and draws from the European Commission (2023).

cumulative sum of their percent–chance responses. We first provided a brief introduction to interpreting numerical probabilities. Participants were instructed to base their allocations on their personal beliefs about the likelihood of each outcome. They were reminded that assigning 100% (or 0%) indicated complete certainty that an event would (or would not) occur, whereas distributing probabilities equally across all outcomes reflected total uncertainty. After allocating the probability mass, respondents reported their confidence in their answers, on a 5-point Likert scale. For second–order beliefs, elites were also asked to report what they believed citizens had answered, using the same module.

## 2.2. Data collection

We fielded the belief-elicitation module as part of the EU Horizon CAPABLE survey, a demographically representative online survey conducted across 13 EU member states (see Smith *et al* 2026). The module was randomly administered to a subset of respondents in each country. For proprietary reasons, we exclude data from the Czech Republic and analyze beliefs for 12 EU countries. Data were collected between June and August 2024, from  $N = 2,620$  validated respondents in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden, recruited through an online panel provided by Dynata. Further details on sampling, quality-control procedures, and the representativeness of the sample are provided in the supplementary material.

In parallel, we surveyed 76 political and scientific elites, either professionally involved in climate policymaking (officials from the EU, international institutions, or national governments) or in climate research. These elites typically have more in-depth knowledge of climate policy and more familiarity with policy design and implementation. We collected data between November 2024 and February 2025. Invitations were distributed via professional mailing lists, targeted outreach, and follow-up reminders using a purposive sampling strategy. This sample is not intended to be statistically representative of all climate policymakers or experts in Europe; instead, it provides an illustrative benchmark against which to compare public beliefs. The survey was conducted anonymously online.

Both study protocols were approved (ETH Zurich Ethics Committee EK 2024-N-141 and CNRS Research Center Lille Économie et Management) and pre-registered. While the belief-elicitation module was part of the CAPABLE CORE questionnaire, its design and purpose was not described in detail in the CAPABLE preregistration (<https://osf.io/9dmvh/>). However, the design of the belief-elicitation task, including the structure of the token allocation

task and the elicitation of probabilistic beliefs, was described in the preregistration of the stakeholder survey (<https://osf.io/5zgke/>). This preregistration outlines the research questions, task design, and data collection process. No specific hypotheses or analytical plans were preregistered for the belief-elicitation module in either document. The analyzes presented here were developed post-hoc to address the research questions outlined in the introduction.

## 2.3. Central expectations and degrees of uncertainty

To examine subjective beliefs, we summarize the individual distributions by two key metrics: the central expectation and degree of uncertainty. The central expectation reflects individual's estimate of the most likely emissions reduction by 2030. It is calculated as the weighted mean of responses from the belief allocation module. We assigned midpoint values to each outcome category, 27.5%, 38.75%, 50%, and 60% for categories A through D, respectively, assuming beliefs are uniformly distributed within each interval. This non-parametric approach estimates the expected reduction, assuming beliefs fall within a defined range from 22.5% to 65%. In the supplementary material, we test the robustness of this metric by applying alternative approaches and show that they yield similar results.

Belief uncertainty is quantified using an entropy-based index that summarizes how respondents spread their probability mass across the four categories. The index ranges from 0 (complete certainty, with all probability mass assigned to a single category) to 1 (maximum uncertainty, with probability mass uniformly distributed across all four categories), providing a standardized measure that enables meaningful comparisons across individuals. If a respondent splits their belief equally between two of the four categories, the normalized entropy index is 0.5.

## 2.4. The determinants of subjective beliefs

We examine the determinants of beliefs by regressing individuals' central expectations and uncertainty levels on a broad set of demographic and attitudinal predictors. All continuous variables are standardized as  $Z$ -scores, allowing coefficients to be interpreted as the effect of a one-standard-deviation increase in the predictor. The dependent variables are scaled to 0–100, so the estimated coefficients represent percentage-point changes. The initial pool of explanatory variables included three categories: (1) Antecedent variables comprised policy-specific knowledge, institutional trust, climate-related attitudes, and value orientations (see Stern *et al* 1995). (2) Sociodemographic controls included age groups, education, income, gender, living area, and political orientation. (3) We also included country fixed effects

to account for unobserved national differences. To improve model parsimony and retain only robust predictors, we applied backward elimination, sequentially removing the variable with the highest  $p$ -value until all remaining predictors were statistically significant at the 1% level.

### 2.5. Beliefs and policy support

As optimism may encourage endorsement, climate beliefs may be correlated with policy support. To examine this relationship, we pooled citizens' support over five climate policies, which correspond to key elements of the EU's *Fit-for-55* package, including the emissions trading system, the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, and transport sector regulations. Each respondent rated their support for each policy on a 7-point Likert scale, from 'Strongly Opposed' to 'Strongly in Favor.' We measure overall support by averaging respondents' evaluations of the five policies. This composite indicator is justified by the strong internal consistency of attitudes across the policies (Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.785$ ). The resulting measure ranges from  $-3$  (strong opposition) to  $3$  (strong support). We then analyze how these support scores vary across terciles of individual beliefs' central expectation about 2030 EU emissions reductions (categorized as 'low', 'medium', and 'high').

## 3. Results

### 3.1. Subjective beliefs about EU emissions reduction by 2030

We begin by examining subjective beliefs about future EU emissions reductions across different respondent groups. Figure 1(a) presents the historical trajectory of EU greenhouse gas emissions alongside official targets. Superimposed are illustrative probability distributions for expected 2030 emissions, shown for a representative respondent from each of the three groups: citizens, experts, and policymakers. These curves are derived by fitting normal distributions to the average probabilistic beliefs within each group.

A first important observation is that central expectations are relatively aligned across groups: all three generally expect substantial emissions reductions by 2030, but do not anticipate that the EU's 55% target will be fully achieved. The average central estimate among citizens is a 43% reduction, representing a significant improvement over current levels but still falling short of the official 55% target (see figure 1(a)). Similarly, experts and policymakers foresee 46% and 50% reductions, respectively, indicating a shared view that substantial progress is likely, even if the target is unlikely to be fully met.

Within this broad alignment, we find significant and substantively meaningful differences in belief levels and uncertainty. Compared to experts and policymakers, the general public is more pessimistic

and substantially more uncertain about emissions reductions by 2030. Average expectations among policymakers exceed those of citizens by 1.08 standard deviations (0.46 standard deviations for experts). Re-expressed in terms of 'additional effort' needed to reach the target, citizens expect the EU to deliver about 44% of the remaining necessary reductions, compared with 60% for experts and 77% for policymakers. Yet even elites remain cautious: experts assign only a 14% probability to fully meeting the Climate Law target, while policymakers are somewhat more optimistic at 29% (difference,  $p = 0.010$ , two-sided  $t$ -test).



Figures 1(b) and (c) display the distributions of individual central expectations and uncertainty across groups. Climate experts and policymakers report significantly higher expected emission reductions than citizens ( $p < 0.001$  for both; two-sided  $t$ -test). At the same time, citizens exhibit greater uncertainty, with a mean entropy index of 0.71 compared to 0.54 for policymakers ( $p = 0.002$ , two-sided  $t$ -test) and 0.64 for experts ( $p = 0.060$ , two-sided  $t$ -test). Lastly, confidence follows a similar pattern: policymakers and experts report higher confidence (averages of 3.1 and 2.8, respectively) than citizens (2.5), with statistically significant differences ( $p = 0.001$  for policymakers and  $p = 0.05$  for experts, two-sided  $t$ -tests).


### 3.2. Country heterogeneity

While figures 1(b) and (c) reveal substantial heterogeneity in individual beliefs about 2030 emissions reductions, further analysis suggests that country-level differences do not primarily drive this variation. Figures 2(a) and (b) show that both central expectations and belief uncertainty are remarkably consistent across EU member states. In particular, there is a shared expectation that emissions will decline relative to today, while the average belief about 2030 emissions reductions falls short of the official EU target in every country. Belief uncertainty remains high across the Union, except in France, where it is slightly lower. These findings suggest that public skepticism about fully meeting EU climate goals is not confined to specific national contexts but reflects a broader, cross-border phenomenon. This uniformity is notable given the significant variation in other national-level indicators, such as trust in the European Parliament, climate worry, and policy support.

### 3.3. The determinants of beliefs and the relationship with policy support

We then examine potential drivers of beliefs about future EU emissions. Our analysis shows that standard predictors of climate beliefs, such as demographic and attitudinal variables (Hornsey *et al* 2016), have limited explanatory power for citizens' beliefs





**Figure 3.** Determinants and impacts of beliefs about EU greenhouse gas emission reductions by 2030. (a), Estimated marginal effects of antecedent and socio-demographic variables on central expectation and belief uncertainty. The plot displays the OLS coefficients from regressing the individual belief central expectation and uncertainty. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The figure shows results for significant variables only. Non-significant variables, as well as all country dummies, are excluded. Star signs indicate significance levels: \*\*\*:  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*:  $p < 0.01$ . (b), Average support for the Fit-for-55 policies across terciles of beliefs' central expectations. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

about expected emissions reductions and their related uncertainty. As shown in figure 3(a), sociodemographic variables and political ideology are consistently excluded when a backward selection algorithm is applied to regression models with either the central expectation or belief uncertainty as the dependent variable. As anticipated from the previous section, country-level differences also appear to play a minimal role. These findings suggest that relative skepticism toward EU climate policy goals is broadly shared across sociodemographic groups and political orientations. However, variation in belief uncertainty appears to be partially shaped by individual characteristics: younger respondents tend to express higher levels of uncertainty, while those with higher levels of education report more certainty.


Figure 3(b) illustrates how average support for core EU climate policies varies across citizen groups with different beliefs. We find that individuals in the most pessimistic belief group do not, on average, support (or oppose) the *Fit-for-55* policies (average score of 0.01) whereas support reaches an average score of 0.52 among those in the more optimistic group. The difference, although modest on a Likert scale, is non-negligible given the low degree of heterogeneity observed and represents 0.42 standard deviations. Consistently, when we regress the level of support on the average expectation, its coefficient is strongly significant, even after controlling for the characteristics used in the regressions in figure 3(a) ( $p < 0.001$ ). The same pattern emerges using an alternative measure of climate policy support (see supplementary material).

### 3.4. The role of second-order beliefs

Figure 4 shows that political and scientific elites correctly recognize that the public holds more pessimistic views than they do. However, they systematically underestimate the extent of this skepticism. Specifically, elites slightly overestimate the public's central expectation of emissions reductions (44.6% vs 42.5%,  $p < 0.001$ , two-sided  $t$ -test). This misalignment is particularly pronounced for the most pessimistic outcome (no reduction beyond 2022 levels), where the public assigns a higher probability than elite estimates by 12.12 percentage points ( $p < 0.001$ , two-sided  $t$ -test). Smaller but statistically significant gaps also appear for small and moderate reduction scenarios (−5.69 and −6.29 percentage points;  $p = 0.006$  and  $p = 0.001$ , respectively).

## 4. Discussion

Beliefs about future emissions may be shaped by factors such as limited knowledge, concerns about policy effectiveness, and political or social feasibility. When expectations are elicited conditional on a given level of policy ambition, beliefs about expected compliance may be interpreted as a measure of policy credibility. The objective of this paper is to document subjective beliefs among elites and non-elites about future EU greenhouse gas emissions, conditional on the current climate policy framework that entered into force in 2021. These beliefs should not be interpreted as probabilities over exogenous states



of the world, such as the likelihood of a natural disaster. Instead, they concern outcomes that depend on political decisions, implementation, and societal responses. While a single individual's belief has a negligible direct impact on policy, aggregated societal beliefs can shape expectations about a policy's durability, enforcement, and political support, which, in turn, affect the probability that the policy will be maintained. In this sense, the probabilities we elicit are better understood as beliefs about an equilibrium outcome of the policy and political process, rather than as subjective uncertainty over fixed states of nature (Angeletos *et al* 2018).

#### 4.1. Relative skepticism about achieving the climate targets

A first important message of our results is that citizens, experts, and policymakers do not hold entirely distinct belief systems. Their central expectations for 2030 emissions reductions are relatively close: all three groups anticipate substantial progress compared to current levels and, on average, do not expect outcomes that fall dramatically short of current ambitions. This points to a non-trivial, shared sense of credibility of the 2030 target, even though it is not seen as fully attainable. Within this broad alignment, however, we uncover systematic differences in both the level and spread of the beliefs. Citizens are somewhat more pessimistic and substantially more uncertain than elites, while experts and policymakers

expect larger reductions, closer to the 55% target. Yet, they still attach relatively low probabilities (around 14% and 29%, respectively) to fully meeting it.

Taken together, these patterns suggest that the EU's climate policy, although legally binding, has not yet been perceived as entirely credible by the public or key institutional elites. If policy credibility depends not only on design but also on the political and institutional context, then the strong association we document between trust in EU institutions and more optimistic expectations about emissions reductions suggests that questions of institutional performance and political legitimacy are central to policy credibility. Our findings are therefore relevant not only for understanding support for additional measures, but also for the emerging literature on when and how governments adjust or roll back climate goals that come to be seen as impractical.

#### 4.2. Targets vs actual greenhouse gas emissions trends in the EU

According to the latest European Environment Agency report (EEA 2024), net greenhouse gas emissions in the EU fell to an estimated 37% below 1990 levels in 2023, marking a substantial improvement from 2022. This sharp year-on-year decline represents a significant step toward the EU's legally binding target of a 55% reduction by 2030. Yet projections suggest that current policies alone will only achieve a 43% reduction by 2030, underscoring the need

for additional efforts. This figure closely aligns with citizens' average beliefs, whose central expectations also converge around a 43% reduction, indicating that citizens' beliefs are broadly consistent with model-based projections under current policies, absent further tightening of EU climate policy. When including planned but not yet implemented measures reported in Member States' 2023–2024 updates, projected reductions improve to 49%, closely matching policymakers' central expectations. While these additional measures narrow the gap to the 55% target, they remain insufficient. Achieving full compliance will require the effective implementation of these measures and the continued rollout of the EU's *Fit-for-55* package. Because many of these policies are being mainly discussed out of the public eye, they may not yet be fully incorporated into citizens' subjective beliefs.

#### 4.3. Perception gap and the role of communication

Our results regarding second-order beliefs point to a *false consensus effect* (Ross *et al* 1977): while elites involved in climate policy are aware that public views differ from their own, they systematically underestimate the depth of that divergence. This is consistent with the existence of an 'egocentric bias' in the formation of second-order beliefs, as already documented in the general population (Leviston *et al* 2013, Mildenerger and Tingley 2019). In our context, elites tend to overestimate how common their own opinions are and to perceive citizens as more confident and optimistic about policy outcomes than they actually are.

When policymakers underestimate public skepticism, policy communication fails to address concerns about credibility and implementation, and this misalignment can inadvertently exacerbate doubts and undermine the perceived credibility of climate policies. Closing this perception gap is therefore essential not only for improving the effectiveness of policy communication, but also for diagnosing whether limited policy credibility primarily reflects information gaps, low trust in institutions, concerns about implementation capacity, or other factors. The shift in anti-climate rhetoric in public and political discourse, away from outright denial to criticizing proposed policies and solutions, may also contribute to these dynamics (Roper *et al* 2016, Lamb *et al* 2020, Painter *et al* 2023, Shue 2023).

#### 4.4. Challenges, limitations, and future research

Estimating aggregate EU-wide emissions in 2030 is challenging even for experts; it requires integrating information about policy design, implementation, technological change, and macroeconomic conditions. The high level of uncertainty observed among

citizens in our data (entropy index = 0.71) is consistent with these informational and cognitive constraints. This implies that subjective probabilities over such outcomes should be interpreted with caution: they do not provide precise forecasts of future emissions, but rather indicate whether people expect the EU to fall substantially short of, roughly meet, or exceed its stated targets, and how confident they are in these expectations. The differences in uncertainty across groups, suggest that these beliefs reflect both informational limits and broader views about political feasibility and implementation. At the same time, the very existence of this uncertainty is substantively informative. It helps explain why some individuals remain ambivalent or undecided about climate policy, and it points to a potential margin for interventions aimed at clarifying not only policy goals but also the mechanisms through which policies are expected to deliver emissions reductions.

The comparison between citizens and elites should also be interpreted with caution: while the general public sample is designed to be demographically representative across 12 EU countries, the smaller elite sample is purposive and not representative of all policymakers or experts. Our goal is therefore not to estimate population-level beliefs among policymakers, but to provide indicative evidence on how beliefs differ between citizens and professionals involved in climate policy, and on whether experts' and policymakers' second-order beliefs align with actual public expectations.

Future work could combine belief elicitation with experimental or longitudinal designs to better identify the mechanisms behind belief formation, such as information, motivated reasoning, and perceptions of political feasibility, and to evaluate which policy and communication strategies are most effective in narrowing perception gaps while preserving democratic legitimacy.

## 5. Conclusion

Our study shows that citizens, experts, and policymakers share a broadly similar view that EU emissions will continue to fall, even though they disagree on how close the EU will come to its 2030 target. This shared core of relative optimism provides a foundation for more credible and ambitious climate policy. At the same time, the significant belief and perception gaps we document highlight where policy design, communication, and institutional performance need to improve. By taking these beliefs seriously, as signals of both support and concern, policymakers can strengthen the credibility and durability of EU climate commitments and, ultimately, increase the chances that ambitious targets translate into real, sustained emissions reductions.

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## Data availability statement


Data and replication materials are available at <https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/HTJ CZ>. All codes are direct implementations of standard methods and techniques described in detail in Methods and executed via R scripts.

## Conflict of interest

The authors declare no competing interests.

## Author contributions

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Conceptualization (equal), Data curation (equal), Formal analysis (equal), Funding acquisition (equal), Investigation (equal), Methodology (equal), Project administration (equal), Resources (equal), Software (equal), Supervision (equal), Validation (equal), Visualization (equal), Writing – original draft (lead), Writing – review & editing (lead)

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Data curation (lead), Formal analysis (equal), Investigation (lead), Methodology (equal), Resources (lead), Software (lead), Validation (equal), Visualization (lead), Writing – original draft (equal), Writing – review & editing (equal)

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