In Medio Stat Virtus?
Effective Communication and Preferences for Redistribution in Hard Times[*]

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Abstract

This paper evaluates the effects of statistical information on allocation preferences of scarce public resources. We refer to scarce resources in connection with the COVID-19 emergency: allocation of the first round of vaccine and the allocation of financial resources provided by the Italian government to fight the economic emergency triggered by the pandemic. Randomly allocating the information through an online experiment, we show that treated respondents tend to prioritize the group targeted by the information and are more likely to do so if respondents are "in the middle" in terms of age, political preferences, distribution preferences and education.

JEL Classification: D70, D80, D83.

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1 Introduction

The communication literature studies the effects of two types of information on agents' decisions: statistical and narrative information. The former is objective information based on statistics on the topic, while the latter is a personal account of one's own experience on the topic.[1] There is still much controversy regarding what type of information is more persuasive (for a systematic review, see Allen and Preiss (1997); Winterbottom et al. (2008)). Moreover, most of this research has been carried out in the fields of healthcare and consumers' decisions (e.g., Morman (2000); Dickson (1982)) and with student populations. The role of statistical information on shaping individual decisions in a more general context has been essentially disregarded.[2]

In this paper, we investigate how individuals react to the provision of statistical information when confronted with a public interest issue: the choice regarding distribution of a scarce resource during a crisis. We focus on the decision of how to allocate a scarce resource in 4 situations highly salient in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic: the health emergency, the labor market emergency, the housing emergency, and the economic emergency. Accordingly, the resource to be allocated, through a prioritization mechanism, is the vaccine (health), a layoff ban (labor market), an eviction ban (housing), and the allocation of non-repayable funds (the economy). We focus on Italy, which adopted a layoff ban, an eviction ban, and an allocation of non-repayable funds to firms at the beginning of March 2020.

We design an online experiment through which we expose the treated group to more statistical information than the control group. Such additional information clearly identifies the population subgroup suffering the most in each emergency scenario, and thus it identifies the preferred option under each allocation decision. Specifically, the additional statistical information highlights the relevance of a specific characteristic called "discriminating condition", which makes individuals more vulnerable in each emergency scenario. Of our 4 hypothetical situations, 3 of them recall a pre-existing health condition, while in one case the discriminating condition is related to being a small firm. The idea is to evaluate how statistical information identifying who is most in need with regards to an intervention, impacts the actual allocation choices of the information recipients. In other words, our treatment conveys information in the form of the "need principle". Rather than affecting the utility individuals get from the act of redistributing, this information matters to shape preferences for allocation

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[1]For evidence on how individual preferences and decisions turn out to be affected by narrative information, see e.g. Fagerlin et al. (2005); Ubel et al. (2001).

[2]Two notable exceptions are Kuziemko et al. (2015); Cruces et al. (2013a).

which ultimately reveal individuals' preferences for redistribution (Mengel and Weidenholzer, 2022). Hence, on the one hand, our paper builds on previous works that measure redistribution through allocation preferences where respondents had to think in terms of the allocation of government budget between different spending categories (see for example Alesina et al. (2018); Lergetporer et al. (2018); Roth et al. (2022); Karadja et al. (2017); Cruces et al. (2013b).[3] On the other hand, we also contribute to the study of the response of people to the fact that allocation should reflect what individuals or groups need (Cunningham and Hadley, 2004; Konow, 2003; Devereux, 2002; Prasch and Sheth, 1999). The idea that the "need principle" could serve as basis of allocations has been studied mainly in sociology and with respect to the covering of basic needs such as the provision of care to all (Cunningham and Hadley, 2004; Devereux, 2002), while the few works in political sciences have looked at welfare state policies (e.g., Rehm (2016)).

To better understand the use of statistical information, among the social categories to be prioritized, respondents are confronted with two groups that have the discriminating condition but differ under a second dimension. We consider employment/unemployment status in the case of prioritizing allocation of the vaccine; gender and age for the extension of the layoff ban; family situations for the extension of the eviction ban; and whether a firm has (or has not) received any not re-payable funds from the beginning of the pandemic in the case of the use of economic relief packages. The consideration of these "second conditions" allows us to investigate how the respondent, conditional on being exposed to the treatment, prioritizes the given statistical information according to a set of different characteristics. Overall, the provision of statistical information turns out to increase respondents' propensity to prioritize the categories with the relevant discriminating condition (with the only exception of the eviction ban) but the effect is not equal across emergencies and ranges between a -1.4% observed with respect to the health emergency and a -4.8% observed in the case of the assignment of non-repayable funds. The effect differ also across types of vulnerable groups: unemployed with pre-conditions are prioritized at the expenses of the employed with pre-conditions when vaccines are at stake; labor market protection is primarily ensured to

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[3]Specifically, they study how beliefs on societal and private benefits of government spending change in response to the information provided during the experiment, also exploring the role of prior beliefs about the specific government spending. Other studies look at preferences for social redistribution policies. Fong (2001) finds that extra information about policy-recipients affects preferences towards redistributive welfare programs and increases the amount individuals are willing to donate. By contrast, (Fong and Oberholzer-Gee, 2011) find that a third of the respondents were willing to pay for additional information that they used not to contribute to recipients who were not among their preferred recipients. Fong and Luttmer (2009) analyzed whether racial factors affect the likelihood of helping victims of the Hurricane Katrina. On average, being more connected to victims' identity through their race or ethnicity increased the amount given.

women with pre-conditions and individuals older than 55 with pre-conditions, while men with pre-conditions are unaffected; non-repayable funds are awarded to all small businesses.

When it comes to the determinants of the effect of information, the credibility of the information provided (e.g., Baesler (1997); Kopfman et al. (1998); Parrott et al. (2005)), its vividness (e.g., Kopfman et al. (2001); Slater (1996)), its relevance with the topic of interest (e.g., Slater (1996); Baesler (1997)) and individuals' prior attitudes on the given topic have been found to be the most relevant explicative variables (e.g., Harte (1976); Slater (1996)). In this perspective, the different level of responsiveness to our treatment highlights the importance of pre-existing priors on the topic at stake. Rooted priors could result from inner values or ideals of respondents, from their own current and/or past experience with the emergencies, as well as from the information they possessed on each emergency topic. Regardless of their source, these priors can make respondents insensitive to the provided statistical information. Hence, it becomes crucial to understand which (if any) personal traits might make individuals having weaker or stronger priors, that is, making individuals more or less responsive to statistical evidence. In particular, we consider four dimensions that have been proven to play a role in affecting belief change and update: political affiliation, redistribution attitude, age, and the education level of the respondent (see Section 4). These dimensions are important because they also affect individual responses to emergency situations such as the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, right-leaning individuals tend to support fewer restrictions on public activity during the pandemic (e.g., Pew Research Center) and to underestimate the risk of being infected (e.g., Mellacher (2023)). In general, age, education and political affiliation all turned out to influence perceived risk and prevention behaviors (e.g., Barbieri and Bonini (2021); Grossman et al. (2020); Kiviniemi et al. (2022); Hsiehchen et al. (2020); Pasion et al. (2020); Kim and Crimmins (2020); Ciancio et al. (2020); Tomczyk et al. (2020)). Specifically, we divide each dimension into three levels or categories (e.g. left, center, and right; high, medium, and low education). We show that those who display greater sensitivity to information are those in the middle of the four dimensions, such that one could say "in medio stat virtus" (i.e. virtue lies in the middle). Respondents who are centrists, in the middle age group, with a medium level of education and without clear redistribution attitudes are those responsive to the provision of statistical information and, consequently, prioritize the groups with the relevant discriminating condition. At the same time, treated respondents in the extreme categories based on political affiliation, level of education and redistribution attitude tend to assign a lower priority to vulnerable groups. The age dimension seems instead to play a minor role.

The rationalization of these findings may come from a decision problem similar to a turnout decision problem: for turnout decisions, those who are indifferent between voting and not voting are those for whom the cost of voting roughly equals the benefit of voting, and the information provided before an election affects the benefit of voting enough to trigger participation. For a given cost of voting, those who are sensitive to campaign information are those who are neither sure their candidate is bad (very low benefit) nor those who are sure their preferred candidate is outstanding (very high benefit), but rather those in the middle.[4]

We can employ the same kind of intuition to explain our findings. For each individual there is a prior belief about the allocation of a scarce resource. Denote by s_i^0 the prior believed benefit of the allocation for a designated category by individual i before the statistical information is provided by the treatment. Denote by c_i the perceived opportunity cost of this allocation to a disadvantaged group for individual i. Whatever is the targeted category around which the policy maker wants to raise consensus disclosing statistical information, there is always heterogeneity both in terms of the believed benefit of such a prioritization and opportunity cost. However, for each of our dimensions of heterogeneity it is clear that the "middle belief" type can be easily identified through the pre-treatment questions, confirming that extreme beliefs are disproportionately held by respondents who belong to one of the two extremes on each dimension. Suppose for simplicity that each individual has a binary choice, between allocating the scarce resource to the category highlighted by the information or to her preferred choice in the absence of extra information. Let s_i^1 denote the updated believed benefit for the targeted category post information. We say that the treatment *has effect* if $s_i^0 < c_i$ but $s_i^1 > c_i$. This implies that information might have more impact on people placed in the middle of each dimension of heterogeneity on s_i^0.[5]

The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we provide detailed information on the design of the experiment and the treatment. In section 3, we provide some descriptive statistics, explain our empirical strategy and discuss our baseline results and related robustness checks.

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[4]When looking into heterogeneous effects of mobilization campaigns using voters' attributes, Niven (2001) finds that the effect of face-to-face contact on mobilization is stronger among occasional voters. For the US, Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009) find that individuals that are indifferent between voting and not voting are more likely to be affected by the get-out-to-vote campaign, especially in high-salience elections. Similarly, Kendall et al. (2015) consider voters' response to ideology and valence messages on the incumbent for election in an Italian municipality, finding that centrist voters are more prone to update their beliefs than voters with other characteristics. Barton et al. (2014) highlight that the effect of canvassing on voter support is largest among voters lacking any partisan affiliation, even though they do not find a significant effect on mobilization.

[5]This argument is clear if the distribution of opportunity costs is independent from the distribution of believed benefits of the targeted category. We allow for the possibility, of course, that some of these respondents have high c_i due to pressing other personal concerns (i.e. economic concerns), and hence it is an empirical question whether indeed in medio stat virtus.

The analysis of heterogeneous responsiveness is presented in section 4 and 5 concludes.

2 The Survey

2.1 Participants and General Procedure

We rely on a unique survey conducted in March 2021, after 12 months of the COVID-19 first outbreak in Italy. The survey, translated into English and available in Appendix B, was managed by Demetra opinioni.net Srl, a market survey company. After a pilot run from February 22nd to March 1st, the questionnaire was administered online from March 2nd to March 26th through email invitations. Respondents could participate via computer-assisted web interviews (CAWIs). On average, it took 12 minutes to complete the survey, which targeted both genders in an age range of 20-70 and included a total of 54 questions: 49 pre-treatment and 5 post-treatment.[6] Overall, the final sample includes 6,044 respondents and is representative of the actual population by gender and region (21 administrative units). Table 2 shows that main socioeconomic characteristics are balanced in the treated and the control groups, while Table A2 shows the balance of the distribution of respondents across regions of residence.

We then check the representativeness of our sample. In Table A3, we compare our data with administrative data from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). The results show that our sample is representative of the Italian population by gender, age groups, and region of residence. Our respondents are slightly more educated than the average population, yet this outcome is expected since our sample was recruited on-line, a feature that, *per se*, requires individuals to be able to access technology, justifying the higher share of college educated. Further, in Table A4, we run some checks to confirm the external validity of our sample with respect to the political dimension. In our survey we asked about the political color of the vote expressed in the (last) 2018 national election. We therefore use data from the Italian National Election Studies (ITANES, see http://www.itanes.org/), an association that promotes research on voting behavior in Italy since the 1990s. The 2018 survey includes questions in line with the ones asked in our survey: votes to the main parties, respondents' political self-categorization, and attitudes and perceptions on immigration. As displayed in Table A4, the distribution of the replies to these questions in our sample is very much consistent with the replies to the questions in the 2018 ITANES sample, with the only

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[6]We include a social desirability question which counts as an aggregate question, consisting of 13 yes-or-no items. See Section 2.2 for an explanation of the index.

difference at the extremes of the political spectrum where the 2018 ITANES sample has less respondents.[7]

2.2 The treatment

The survey included two versions of the same questionnaire, and both versions provided four pieces of information on four topics related to the distribution of a scarce resource concerning the health emergency, the labor market emergency, the housing emergency, and the more general economic emergency. The resources to be prioritized were the vaccine against SARS-Cov-2, the extension of the layoff ban, introduced in Italy in March 2020 and extended to July 2021 (for some sectors to October 2021), the extension of the eviction ban introduced in March 2020 and extended to the end of June 2021, and the allocation of non-repayable funds.

In March 2020, the Italian government issued the Cura Italia Decree that included, among other economic and social measures, a ban on mass and individual dismissals for economic reasons, an eviction ban on both residential and non-residential estates, and the access to non-repayable funds for firms, under certain conditions.[8] The decree was initially implemented for 60 days, extended several times during that year (May, August, and December 2020) and was supposed to end in March 31st. At the time of our survey, there was in fact a lot of uncertainty on whether the Italian Government would have extended these support policies after March 2021. The decree was eventually extended until the summer of 2021 and, for few special cases, until the end of the year. In spring 2021, the debate over the four emergencies was quite lively. Figure A1 provides some qualitative evidence, collected through Google Trends for research related to "Funds to firms" (*Aiuti alle imprese, Decreto ristori, Decreto Ristori bis*), "Eviction ban" (*Blocco sfratti; Blocco degli sfratti*), "Layoff ban" (*Divieto di licenziamento; Cassa integrazione; Sospensione dei licenziamenti; Licenziamenti bloccati*), and vaccines (*Vaccini COVID; Vaccini Anti COVID*), from February 23rd, 2020 to December 31st, 2021.[9] We consider the reported interest in the topics as a proxy for the

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[7]This difference may be due to the different time periods of the two surveys and the fact that, over the last years, political views have become more polarized.

[8]Small firms with less than 5 millions in revenues in the previous fiscal year, meeting at least one of the three conditions: 1.a decrease in revenues for the month of April 2020 equal to at least to 2/3 of the revenues in the same month of the previous year; 2.active since January 2019; 3. headquartered in a municipality that was already in a state of emergency before the pandemic.

[9]As far as the layoff ban was concerned, firms could use the *Cassa Integrazione*, a short time work program that subsidizes a partial or full-time hours reductions, by replacing approximately 80% of earnings forgone by workers due to hours not worked (Giupponi and Landais, 2023).

intensity of the debate which then was quite high during the period March-June 2020. There is only one exception: the trend for COVID-19 vaccine. The distribution of the vaccine in the country started on December 31st 2020 and immediately faced supply problems. While 56% of the UK population and 33% of the US population received the first dose of the vaccine by the end of March 2021, it was equal to 12.5% for the adult Italian population. At the same time, the attention on the eviction ban was quite high in the first part of 2021, as it was for subsidies to firms, and the layoff ban.[10]

First, following the pre-treatment questions, four different screens were shown to both the treated and the control group. Each screen provided the same basic objective information on one of the emergency situation of our interest. However, the treated group had an extra piece of objective information highlighting the population group most vulnerable in each emergency scenario. For instance, in the case of the economic emergency, both treated and controls were informed about the impact of the pandemic on the national economy. In particular, all respondents became aware that, following the first wave of the pandemic, 45% of Italian firms shut down. Then, the treated were also informed that the firms that suffered the most from the economic consequences of the pandemic were those with fewer than 50 employees. Hence, according to this extra information, small businesses (i.e., firms with fewer than 50 employees) should become the preferred choice for the allocation of non-repayable funds as these are the most vulnerable during the economic emergency and, thus, the most potentially in need of the new non-repayable funds from the government. The extra piece of statistical information provided to the treated group has been framed negatively (i.e., stressing the population group more at risk) to increase its truthfulness. In fact, framing effects have been observed in judgments of truth so that statements including statistical information are substantially more likely to be judged true if framed negatively (e.g., Hilbig (2009, 2012)).

Second, respondents were asked who they would prioritize in the distribution of the scarce resource related to the given emergency by ranking from the most prioritized (first) to the least (sixth) 6 potential groups of receivers. In the case of the economic emergency, for example, respondents were asked to rank, from the 1st to the 6th, the groups of receivers to whom they would assign new non-repayable funds choosing from the following: firms with

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[10]There are no available trends on the debate on TV. However, the Pavia Observatory on Media Analysis and Research, an independent research center on media analysis, published on January 15th a report (Visibilitá dei temi economici nei telegiornali del Prime Time) on the visibility of the economic issues on TV news of the main Italian television channels. Although the data only refer to the period January-October 2020, they mimic quite well the trends in research on Google which then turn out to be a good proxy for the perception of the relevance of the public debate (see, Figure A2).

fewer than 50 employees, firms with fewer than 50 employees that did not previously receive such funds, firms with 50 to 250 employees, firms with 50 to 250 employees that did not previously receive such funds, firms with more than 250 employees, or firms with more than 250 employees that did not previously receive such funds. The group ranked 1st represents the group that should have received the resource first, while being ranked 6th means being the last group entitled to the resource according to a given respondent.

The treated might rank higher the individuals characterized by the primary discriminating condition recalled by the treatment systematically, or they might have some inner preferences and react differently depending on a secondary condition. Hence, among the groups to rank, there are two groups displaying the primary condition but differing on a secondary characteristic (Table 1). Going back to the example of the administration of non-repayable funds, 2 groups include businesses with fewer than 50 employees (i.e., the primary condition) but differ from one another based on whether they already previously benefited from this economic support (i.e., the secondary condition).

Table 1: **Model**

	Health Emergency	Labor Market Emergency	Housing Emergency	Economic Emergency
Primary cond.	Having a pre-condition	Having a pre-condition	Cohabiting minor children or children with pre-conditions	Small business
Secondary cond.	Being unemployed or employed	Being or not a man Being older than 55	Being or not single	Having or not received funds in the past

Notes: *Primary cond.* coincides with the discriminating characteristic that identifies, according to our treatment, the most vulnerable groups (i.e., the preferred choice) of the Italian population for each given emergency scenario. *Secondary cond.* coincides with the characteristic on which the groups having the primary condition in our survey differ.

Given the nature of the survey, we might be concerned that respondents might want to please the surveyors and that the treatment effect (if any) might be due to the so-called social desirability bias (aka a demand effect). Following Dhar et al. (2018), we included a Marlowe-Crowne social desirability module, based on a 13-item validated version index (Reynolds, 1982). This index is designed with the purpose of measuring a person's concern for social approval (Dhar et al., 2018) and is based on questions asking the respondent whether he or she has certain too-good-to-be-true personality traits (such as being always ready to admit one's own faults or always being kind even with problematic people). If respondents with a high social desirability index were driving the effect that we estimate, our identification would be undermined. Respondents would be making use of the statistical information provided just because they have somehow anticipated that this is what is expected from them: in

this case the treatment simply made the socially desirable responses more salient to them, without changing their believes.

The underlying idea of the treatment is to make respondents aware through statistical information about the most vulnerable groups in the society during an emergency and to see how they react to this information. However, a reaction could result from different mechanisms. Respondents could follow the "need principle" because they regard it as fair or equitable or because the treatment elicits an altruistic or compassionate behavior.[11] Compassion per se does not threat our identification strategy but, depending on the extent to which it occurs, it could affect the interpretation of the results. No issue arises if, once respondents are made aware about the population group more at risk under a given emergency, they prioritize more such a group for the provision of the related scarce resource because they feel more compassion towards them. In fact, this would mean that the statistical information was effective in driving the choices of respondents as desired. Differently, the use of statistical information to affect allocation preferences would be problematic if it induces treated respondents to always prioritize that population group. In our context, this would mean that treated respondents would give higher priority to those individuals with the primary discriminating condition regardless of the scarce resource and emergency scenario at stake. For this reason, the very last question of the survey concerns the choice of the student groups to prioritize for the provision of in-presence schooling. No statistical information on the vulnerable group was provided to both treated and control groups. In fact, none of the 4 screens shown to respondents contained a reference to the education emergency, which was particularly severe in Italy. All types of schools were closed starting the first week of March 2020 to re-open mid September, but they were later shut down again in some regions, while in others only classes up to the 7th grade were allowed to take place in person. We asked to prioritize the type of student (with pre-condition, with unemployed or employed parents) who should go back to face-to-face teaching. Since suffering from a pre-condition is recalled as an essential element of the discriminating status in 3 of our 4 scenarios, we moved from the implicit assumption that if our treatment triggered a *generalized* compassion effect, it would have made respondents more prone to prioritize the distribution of any scarce resource to individuals with pre-conditions. Hence, treated respondents should prioritize students

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[11]To date, there are a number of procedures used in psychology and sociology to measure one's altruism such as, for instance, the altruism scale (Sawyer, 1966; Lee et al., 2003). In experimental economics, an option is represented by the dictator game, a modified version of which has been developed specifically for surveys (i.e., the All-or-Nothing dictator game in Bekkers (2007)). However, there is no clear-cut experimental design to elicit altruism since the challenge would be to disentangle altruism from other feelings connected to it such as, among others, compassion, sorrow or commiseration.

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with pre-conditions even if our treatment did not include any reference to the education emergency.

3   Empirical strategy and baseline results

We define the outcomes of interest in a two-step way. Moving from the treatment, we first exploit the primary discriminating condition and then focus on the secondary condition. Following Table 1, we construct our primary outcomes averaging the actual ranking given to each group with the primary discriminating condition.[12]

Since, according to the treatment, the most vulnerable firms to the economic emergency caused by the pandemic are those employing 50 or fewer workers, the related main outcome coincides with the average between the ranking position given to firms with fewer than 50 employees and firms with fewer than 50 employees that did not previously receive any non-repayable fund from the government. For example, if a respondent places firms with fewer than 50 employees in the third place and firms with fewer than 50 employees that never received a non-repayable fund in the first place, then the average would be equal to 2.

As a second step, we look at the actual ranking position of each group with the primary discriminating condition on its own. These secondary outcomes range between 1 (most preferred category) and 6 (least preferred category). If the treatment is effective and people are actually influenced by statistical information, the treated group, compared to the control group, would be expected to give a higher placement to all groups identifiable as the most vulnerable based on the primary discriminating condition (i.e., place them at the top ranking positions). However, the statistical information might be used selectively to prioritize only certain types of individuals with the primary condition, with no consequence on the rest of the available options. If this is the case, statistical information would be prone to individual preferences.

Figure 1 plots our main outcomes under each type of emergency per treated and control groups, with a confidence interval of 95%. The graphs show that groups that have the primary condition recalled by the treatment are more likely to be placed at the top ranking positions, even though the differences between treated and control groups are not always

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[12]With respect to the question on in-presence schooling, the main outcome is represented by the average between the ranking position given to primary school children with a disability and high school children with a disability (i.e., pre-conditions). Since our treatment did not include any reference to the education emergency, this outcome is based on the fact that suffering from a pre-condition is recalled as an essential element of the discriminating status in 3 of our 4 scenarios.

statistically significant. There is no significant difference both in the allocation of vaccine against COVID-19 and the extension of the eviction ban. By contrast, these differences are significant when the extension of the layoffs ban and the assignment of non-repayable funds are at stake.

Figure 2 repeats the same exercise looking at each single group that have the primary condition recalled by the treatment. It is apparent that there are no differences between treated and control groups in the vaccine priority given to either employed or unemployed individuals with pre-conditions (Panels (a) and (b)) and to extend the eviction ban to singles or couples with cohabiting minors or minors with pre-conditions. In contrast, the average effect observed in Figure 1 with respect to the extension of the layoffs ban to employed individuals with pre-conditions is likely to be driven by employed women and individuals older than 55. Similarly, the difference between treated and control groups with regard to the ranking given to small firms appears to be driven by small firms that did not receive any non-repayable funds in the past. Finally, Figure 3 shows no treatment effect in prioritizing access to schools.

We estimate the effect of conveying information on vulnerable groups when allocating a scarce resource using the model in Equation 1. For each respondent i living in region r, we use the different definitions of outcomes as stated above and control for regional fixed effects τ_r, which can capture time invariant characteristics of the resident population, such as its trust and altruism, but also the difference in the salience of the four emergency dimensions we analyze, as summarized by Figure A3 which plots the regional distribution of the intensity of the COVID-19 death rate, the unemployment rate, the percentage of families in poverty, and the percentage of small firms. We also control for three sets of variables as listed in Table 3. The idea is to control, in addition to the usual socio-economic characteristics, also for those characteristics that could make respondents feel closer to one of the suggested categories to be prioritized, such as having suffered economic distress and having lost a job, but also of having been directly affected by the SARS-Cov-2 virus.

$$Outcomes_{ir} = \delta Treatment_i + Controls1_i'\sigma + Controls2_i'\gamma + Controls3_i'\beta + \tau_r + \epsilon_{ir} \tag{1}$$

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3.1 Baseline results

Assigning a smaller ranking number to a specific group means placing such a group higher in the ranking and giving it a higher priority in the distribution of the scarce resource at stake. Assigning a rank of 1 means placing a group at the top of the ranking. Then, the results in Table 4 show that our treatment has the expected effect of increasing the propensity of the treated to place the categories with the relevant primary condition towards the top of their references. However, the effect is not statistically significant for the choices on the eviction ban. The effect varies from -0.037 points for the vaccine (-1.4% of the mean outcome in the control group), to -0.141 points for the non-repayable funds (-4.8%).

Overall, we find slightly stronger responses to statistical information than most information provision experiments in social sciences.[13] For instance, focusing on the most recent ones, both Alesina et al. (2018) and Kuziemko et al. (2015) find essentially no average impact of their information treatments on the policy preferences of participants. Similarly, Boeri et al. (2023) report a null effect of their information treatment on respondents' attitude, but for a 2.6% increase in the respondents' acceptance of migrants; Galasso et al. (2020) find that informational campaign using videos led to 3.3% reduction in the support of populist measures (i.e., cutting the MPs). This stronger effect is justifiable by the fact that our information provision was in fact straightforward, objective and easily internalized by participants if compared to the information treatments in such experiments (e.g., Alesina et al. (2018); Boeri et al. (2023)).

Moreover, these findings suggest that even if statistical information matters in shaping respondents' decisions, it does not have the same impact across all emergencies. This different level of responsiveness can be reasonably attributed to pre-existing priors of respondents on each emergency. In this perspective, the nature of the primary discriminating conditions could play a role in creating a belief since this could be also formed on respondent's experience or information. For instance, the extra statistical information provided for the health emergency highlighted that *"the age being equal, an individual with previous chronic diseases who get infected by COVID-19 has a 3 times greater chance of dying than an infected individual without chronic diseases"*. However, a respondent could still think that protection should be given first to teenagers because of all the psychological/emotional implications of

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[13]The magnitude of our results is not directly comparable with the works examining the persuasiveness of statistical vs. narrative information existing in healthcare and consumers' decisions. This is due to the fact that these works are aimed at comparing the effects of the two types of information and rely mainly on statistical analysis and/or analysis of covariance (e.g., ANCOVA), rather than on regression analysis (see, for instance, the literature review by Winterbottom et al. (2008) or Zebregs et al. (2014)).

keeping them isolated. Such a belief could come from information available to respondents or from their experience with teenagers. In this respect, we check whether some characteristics of the respondents could drive their responses by making them more likely to internalize the statistical information. We re-run our baseline models including an interaction term between the treatment and a potentially relevant characteristic of respondents. Since a primary discriminating condition is being an individual with pre-conditions, we look at the potential impact of (i) having a pre-condition or a relative with pre-condition (panel A – Table A5), (ii) having a pre-condition or a relative with pre-condition or self-assessing your own health as poor or very poor, and (iii) having been worried about your own health since the beginning of the pandemic (panel C- Table A5). As shown by Table A5, none of these factors turns out to play any influence with respect to respondents' choices about the provision of the vaccine, the extension of the layoff and the eviction ban, or on the provision of in-presence schooling. With respect to the extension of the layoff ban and the assignment of non-repayable funds we also look at job related factors. We considered different characteristic as working in the private sector, being worried about losing your own job due to COVID-19 and/or being worried about your partner losing the job, being unemployed, and working in a Northern region. As apparent from Tables A6 and A7, these factors (to some extent) seem to exert an influence on respondents' choices but not in a statistically significant way.

In any case, respondents can be expected to already have had their own opinion on how to prioritize each scarce resource. Then, such pre-existing belief and its strength can have determined if, and to what extent, respondents reacted to the provided statistical information. In particular, it is not surprising that statistical information results to be less effective with respect to the COVID-19 vaccination and the eviction ban. Eviction and its regulation is a well-debated and controversial topic in the Italian context and, by the time of the survey, the COVID-19 vaccine had also become a familiar and contentious subject for Italians. In both cases, statistics and information were largely available. This means that our treatment might not have add much to the information already possessed by respondents. By contrast, non-repayable funds and the layoff ban were two public measures never implemented before in the country. There was no much previous experience with such interventions and their impact. Respondents might have had less information or a less strong positions on how these measures should have worked. Hence, they might have been more sensitive to the provided statistical information.

Regarding the impact of the treatment on different groups that have the primary condition but differ on the secondary (Table 5), results show that the treated individuals reward

only certain groups. Treated respondents are more likely than the control respondents to prioritize only certain vulnerable groups. Specifically for vaccines, unemployed with disability report a 0.066 points (i.e., 2%) higher than average ranking position (i.e., smaller ranking number), a result that is mechanically compensated by a 0.066 points (i.e., 2.2%) lower ranking position (i.e., greater ranking number) for employed with pre-conditions (columns 1 and 2). Women with pre-conditions and people older than 55 with pre-conditions are favored by treated respondents as they are, respectively, assigned a 0.096 and a 0.102 points (i.e., 3.2% and 3.5%) lower ranking position (i.e., greater ranking number) when considering labor market protection (columns 3, 4 and 5). When looking at provision of non-repayable funds, treated individuals give higher priority to all small businesses, regardless of whether they previously received such support, but to a different extent. Small businesses that were previously supported report a 0.127 lower ranking position (i.e., 3.9%), while those who never got non-repayable funds get a 0.154 lower ranking position (i.e., 6%). Again, no statistically significant effect is observed with respect to the eviction ban regardless of the type of secondary condition. Moreover, among the groups considered for labor market protection, the provision of statistical information does not change the decisions of the treated respondents with respect to men with pre-conditions. Lastly, the provision of statistical information centered around individuals with pre-conditions does not increase the likelihood of prioritizing these individuals with respect to any type of emergency as shown by the absence of a statistically significant effect on in-presence schooling with respect to both the baseline line results (Table 4, Column(5)) and those for the single groups with the primary condition (Table 5, Columns (10) and (11)). These findings point out that, conditional on the primary discriminating condition, treated respondents reward differently the vulnerable groups based on their secondary discriminating conditions. Specifically, respondents seem to prioritize more those subgroups that are even more at disadvantage. Hence, they prefer to give priority to unemployed with pre-conditions over employed with pre-conditions for the COVID-19 vaccination. Similarly, when the layoff ban is at stake, respondents support more women and people older than 55 compared to men, thus two categories that are known to be more vulnerable on the labor market. In deciding the assignment of non-repayable funds, respondents recognize the small firms as the main type of firms in need but prioritize more those that did not previously receive such support.

3.2 Robustness Checks

We run several robustness checks. First, we check if our results are driven by the level of social desirability as measured by the Marlowe-Crowne index, constructed with the 13 questions asked in the survey. The index measures the extent to which a person wants to be perceived in a socially desirable way by the surveyor. A higher index score reflects a higher propensity to give socially desirable answers, viceversa for a lower index score. Our concern is that the treatment simply made more salient what is a socially desirable ranking without changing respondents' views. If the treatment caused respondents to prioritize the most vulnerable group of the population across all emergencies, even without changing their deep believes, this could also be *per se* a result of the intervention. Yet, if the estimates simply reflected what the respondents think should be said, irrespective of the statistical information provided, and therefore of the treatment, this should be a concern for the reliability of our estimates. We therefore investigate if this effect drives our estimates by estimating the heterogeneous effects based on this dimension. Tables A9 and A10 report results for our main outcomes and the above-median social desirability score interacted with the treatment dummy.[14] In line with our expectations, results show that individuals with higher social desirability score are more likely to prioritize the most fragile groups of the population, across all emergencies, with the exception of non-repayable fund. Yet what matters is that this effect is not different between treated and control groups. The implications are reassuring as there are no reasons to think that the effect of our treatment is driven by respondents with a higher propensity to give socially desirable answers in the treated group.[15].

Second, we make sure that our results are not driven by respondents who spent very little time going through the treatment. Specifically, Tables A11 - A12 show the results when controlling for the time spent by respondents to answer the treatment question relate to each specific outcome (i.e. response time). In Tables A13 - A14, we instead control for the time spent reading the treatment screen with the statistical information specific to each outcome (i.e., information exposure). Finally, Tables A15 - A16 report the results when controlling for the overall time given by the sum of the response time and the information exposure. Our results are confirmed in all specifications.

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[14]The above-median social desirability is a dummy equal to 1 if the social desirability index is above the sample median.

[15]We also check the possibility that individuals in the treatment and control group behave differently with respect to the social desirability questions. Specifically, we check if individuals average time spent on these questions in each arm and run a simple t-test of their difference. Results show that the two averages are not statistically different (*diff.*=0.69 and *s.e.*=2.89). We report this in Figure A4 in the Appendix.

Third, we test our results to the inclusion of the survey completion date to control for the potential exposure to particular news or events. The robustness of our results is again confirmed as shown in Tables A17 and A18.

4   Heterogeneities

To dig deeper into the drivers of the average effect and understand the characteristics of respondents who are more responsive to the information given during the experiment, we examine the role of four individual dimensions proven to play a role in affecting changes and updates of beliefs. Specifically, we run a heterogeneity analysis focusing on respondents' political affiliation, prior attitudes, education, and age. Since we are interested in identifying how respondents' ranking along the spectrum of each dimension matters for our treatment, we divide each of them into three subcategories (two extreme and one intermediate), rather than simply contrasting two opposite categories. We interact the treatment dummy with dummies for each category, with the middle one acting as the reference omitted category as estimating equation 1. In Table 6 we show the balance test for the used sub-groups. Results reassuringly show that control and treated groups are balanced also along these dimensions.

Overall, individuals in the middle categories of each dimension are expected to be more likely affected by our treatment, and thus to be those who actually internalize the statistical information we provide. The first individual dimension of interest is the strength of one's political belief[16] which can distort the process of belief updating especially when relevant political issues are at stake. When characterized by rooted political ideology, individuals tend to discredit or refuse unambiguous evidence questioning their prior beliefs (Su, 2022; Kahan et al., 2011) on the basis of which they instead interpret ambiguous evidence (Fryer et al., 2019; Conover and Feldman, 1989). To identify the political affiliation of respondents, we use several questions in our survey. We rely on the self-reported affiliation of respondents to a left-right spectrum. In addition, we complement this self-reported information using the information, firstly, on their voting party in the 2018 political elections, and secondly on their answers to two crucial issues in the Italian political debate: immigration policies and public vs private health systems.[17] As a result, "Leftist" identifies those respondents who

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[16]We expect individuals expressing more extreme ideological preferences regarding relevant political issues, such as the ones presented to respondents, to be characterized by stronger political beliefs.

[17]We do not solely rely on the self-reported political affiliation of respondents due to the multiple potential shortcomings of this measurement. Political ideology is a multifaceted concept that cannot be entirely captured by self-identification on a one-dimensional left-right scale (e.g., Jacoby (2009); Jost et al. (2009); Layman and Carsey (2002); Jennings (1992); Conover and Feldman (1984)).

self-reported to be on the (extreme) left, voted for a left-wing party and are at the same time against anti-immigration policies and in favor of public health service. On the opposite side of the political spectrum, we identify the "Rightist" category including all respondents who self-reported to be on the (extreme) right, voted for a right-wing party, are against more immigration and in favor of private healthcare. Consistently, all respondents falling outside these extreme categories have been classified as "Centrist", the reference category.

Both highly and poorly educated people have been observed to be less prone to question their own beliefs/convictions for different reasons. A low level of education is generally associated to a low ability to benefit from extra information. For example, the medical literature provides extensive evidence on the general poor self-management of treatments for chronic-illnesses of low educated patients due to their weak ability in processing the needed information to ensure proper care (Goldman and Smith, 2002). Additionally, in our sample, education is linked to financial difficulties, with individuals at the low end having more problems. It has been shown that limited resources can act as a load to cognitive function (Mani et al., 2013), and financial constraints have been linked to lower attention levels and scarcity-induced cognitive load (Shah et al., 2012, 2018). Highly educated individuals have an advantage in internalizing information, but they tend to have arguments to defend deep-rooted positions, being more confident in their beliefs regardless of their actual knowledge on the given issue (Dummond and Fischhoff, 2017). When characterized by strong beliefs, highly educated individuals are also more likely to ignore evidence on other points of view (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). Decision-making abilities have also proven to play a role in beliefs updating with individuals characterized by stronger cognitively abilities (i.e., reflective thinking)[18] being more prone to a biased processing of new information to support their prior beliefs (Kahan et al., 2012; Kahan, 2013; Taber et al., 2009; Taber and Lodge, 2006). To take into account this dimension, we rely on the respondent's self-reported educational level using high school diploma as a discriminant for the middle category.

If an individual has a strong prior attitude towards redistribution, this may outweigh the statistical information provided when making a decision on the use of a scarce resource as asked to respondents in our experiment. To capture this aspect, we then combine the information on respondents' self-reported religiosity and their level of prosocial values as proxied by their support for immigration and public health policies. Religious belief is generally associated with altruism, giving, and the promotion of helping the needy (Ben-Nun Bloom et al., 2015; Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007; Randolph-Seng and Nielsen, 2007). However, given the

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[18]Reflective thinking is strongly and robustly correlated with diverse measures of cognitive aptitude (Toplak et al., 2011) as well as with measures of latent general mental ability (Blacksmith et al., 2019).

multiple dimensions of religious belief, this properly captures redistribution attitudes when combined with strong prosocial orientations (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019).[19] For this reason, we also considered the support respondents expressed with respect to immigration policies and public healthcare given the strong positive relationship between prosocial values and attitudes towards immigrants and social benefits/income inequality (Nezlek, 2022).[20] As a result, respondents were identified as having a strong redistribution attitude if they self-declared to be religious and a practitioner or religious and non-practitioner and in favor of more immigration and public healthcare. Conversely, a weak redistribution attitude was assigned to those individuals who self-reported as being non-religious or were incapable of defining themselves and displayed no prosocial values.

Change in beliefs can also be affected by age, with older individuals (i.e., over 65) being less likely to update their beliefs after receiving new pieces of information, as well as less likely to vary their beliefs when confronted with a debunk (Swire et al., 2017). Moreover, existing evidence also shows age differences in inter-temporal choices, with middle aged adults proving to be more patient relative to younger and older adults, hinting to the existence of age-related time preferences that again could make individuals in the two opposite extreme age groups less prone to update their convictions (Richter and Mata, 2018). Hence, we use the age of respondents to distinguish them in "Young" when younger than 26 and "Old" when older then 59, while the middle category includes individuals in the 26-59 age group.

Belief malleability can be also reasonably expected to depend on the level of information available to individuals as less informed individuals can end up being more responsive to new information. Hence, the fours individual dimensions considered could also imply for certain groups, especially the middle ones, a lower/worse information set. For instance, looking at political affiliation, centrists could be the ones who being less politically radicalized are the less informed compared to the extreme groups, so more reactive to the treatment.

As shown in Table 7, the results are in line with our expectations.[21] Respondents belonging to the middle categories turn out to be the ones affected by the treatment; that is,

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[19]Religious beliefs can favor conservative identification by linking the cause of inequalities to specific assumptions leading to a higher acceptance of structural inequalities and the identification of the needy with specific groups in the society (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2019). For instance, Muslims and Christian Protestants strongly highlight value achievement and hard work and are more inclined to accept poverty being a consequence of individual failure (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Abu-Saad, 1998).

[20]There are no clear-cut findings on the relationship between religiosity and redistribution as preferences for redistribution among religious individuals may be linked to the partisan affiliation, while this ambiguity does not seem to be present with respect to pro-immigration policies (e.g., Savage (2020); Stegmueller (2013)).

[21]Heterogeneities results are also robust to all robustness checks based on the time spent by respondent doing the survey (Tables A19 - A24), as well as to the inclusion of the completion date (Tables A25 and A26).

they are those who used the statistical information provided in our treatment by decreasing the ranking of vulnerable individuals (i.e., higher priority by placing them at the top of their list). Respondents who are centrists, belong to the middle age group, have a medium level of education and no clear redistribution attitude are those who give a lower average ranking position to the groups with the relevant primary condition. The response of the extreme categories to the treatment generally moves in the opposite direction to that of the middle categories (i.e., lower priority by placing vulnerable individuals at the bottom of their list). However, this response is not always statistically significant. In particular, we do not observe any differential effect for individuals in the middle age group for the primary conditions. This might be due to the fact that the different dimensions considered do not necessarily always imply a pre-existing strong individual position on any topic. Hence, the provision of statistical information is effective in affecting the decisions of middles categories but it might not lead to a differential effect between the middle category and the extremes if the latter do not have an actual rooted belief to protect. With respect to the age dimension, for instance, younger and older individuals in our sample might not have had a clear-cut preference on the groups to prioritize under the different emergencies not being age necessarily a strong predictor of respondents' beliefs when our four emergencies are at stake.

As for the magnitude of these differences, focusing on the statistically significant interactions, centrists give a 5.3% higher priority to the most vulnerable group (i.e., individuals with pre-conditions) than leftists for the provision of the COVID-19 vaccine. This is quite similar to what occurs between respondents with middle and strong redistributive attitudes (a 5.7% difference). Respondents in with no clear redistributive attitude give a 4.2% higher priority compared to respondents with strong redistributive attitude and the poorly educated respondents, while the smallest difference is reported between averagely and poorly educated respondents (2.9%). Looking at the extension of the layoff ban, the differences range between 7.1% (between the averagely and the highly educated) and 4.3% (between the averagely and the poorly educated), while for the eviction ban, the differences are very close to each other amounting to bit less or more than 7%. Finally, we observe centrist giving a 3.3% higher priority to small firms than rightists when non-repayable funds are at stake.

Some heterogeneous effects are also found when using each specific group as in Table 8. The results show that the effect on unemployed with pre-conditions is mainly driven by individuals found in the middle of the political, education and age distribution. The non-significant effect estimated in Table 5 for men with pre-conditions becomes significant and relevant for different political affiliations, and it shows that centrists are more likely

to increase the priority with respect to the layoff ban to men with pre-conditions (other individual dimensions do not matter). Similarly, the results for women with pre-condition (layoff ban) and singles with kids (eviction ban) show that individuals in the middle of the education distribution are more likely to increase the ranking for these groups (no effects are found for the other dimensions). In term of differences size, the most striking ones are registered between centrists and leftists for the provision of the vaccine to unemployed with pre-conditions (with centrists giving a 11.9% higher priority), between people in the middle age group and old respondents for the provision of non-repayable funds to small firms previously supported, and between respondents with middle vs. weak redistributive attitudes for the extension of the layoff ban to individual older than 55 with pre-conditions. By contrast, the smallest differences are observed between centrists and rightists for the extension to the layoff ban to men with pre-conditions (i.e., 5.1%). The only negligible difference is that between respondents in the middle age group and young respondents with respect to the provision of the vaccine to employed with pre-conditions (i.e., 0.8%).

An important implication can be drawn from these findings: the best target for the provision of statistical information are individuals who are not placed at the extremes of the spectrum under any of the dimensions considered. These individuals do not simply make use of the objective information provided; they also use it with a more generalized approach, that is, without letting their potential individual preferences for allocation interfere with their decision.

5   Conclusion

This paper displays novel and strong support for the usefulness of providing people with statistical information. More specifically, citizens' preferences for redistribution to categories in need can be affected by statistical information, and especially so when they do not belong to extreme segments of the population along any of the most important dimensions of heterogeneity that are usually considered.

In our context, if the provision of statistical information has always benefited the most vulnerable groups; these are not all equally prioritized by treated respondents who, therefore, seems to anyway follow some inner preferences which might be linked to the perceived importance of the emergency at stake and/or of the type of subgroups among all vulnerable individuals. Middles categories always react to the treatment by adapting their decisions to the information provided. In particular, when looking at the characteristics making respon-

dents more responsive to statistical information, centrists, in the middle age groups, with no clear redistribution attitudes and with a medium level of education turn out to place vulnerable groups at the top of their list. By contrast, the response of extreme categories when statistically significant, move in the opposite direction assigning less priority to vulnerable groups. Still, there is not always a differential effects with the middle categories of respondents indicating that respondents belonging to the extreme categories might not always have rooted pre-existing beliefs on all the emergencies considered.

In addition to constituting "good news" for the positive analysis of the effectiveness of information campaigns, the results of this paper may also lead to normative considerations regarding targeting strategies of communication. In a nutshell, "forget about extreme categories", target centrists on all dimensions.

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Tables and Figures

Figure 1: **Priorities per emergency**

(a) Vaccines

(b) Layoff ban

(c) Eviction ban

(d) Non-repayable funds

Notes: Each panel reports the average ranking for treated and control given to individuals with pre-conditions/less than 50 workers by type of emergency (vaccines, layoff ban, eviction ban and non-repayable funds). *Vaccine* identifies the allocation of the vaccine against SARS-Cov-2, *lay-off ban* and *eviction ban* refers to the extension of the layoff ban and of the eviction ban, both introduced in Italy in March 2020. Finally, *non-repayable funds* looks at the assignment of non-repayable funds to firms. Confidence intervals at 95%.

Figure 2: **Priorities per item and specific groups**

(a) Employed

(b) Unemployed

(c) Employed men

(d) Employed women

(e) Employed older than 55

(f) Couples

(g) Singles

(h) Received funds

(i) No funds received

Notes: Each panel reports the average ranking for treated and control given to individuals with pre-conditions/less than 50 workers by type of emergency: vaccines (Panels (a) and (b)), layoff ban (Panels (c)-(e)), eviction ban (Panels (f)-(g)) and non-repayable funds (Panels (h) and (i)). *Vaccine* identifies the allocation of the vaccine against SARS-Cov-2, *lay-off ban* and *eviction ban* refers to the extension of the layoff ban and of the eviction ban, both introduced in Italy in March 2020. Finally, *non-repayable funds* looks at the assignment of non-repayable funds to firms. Confidence intervals at 95%.

Figure 3: **Placebo Test: Priority in attending school in person**

(a) Primary school students with disability (b) High school students with disability

Notes: For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Confidence intervals at 95%.

Table 2: **Balance Tests**

	Control	Treated	Difference p-value
Acquaintance positive/dead COVID-19	0.52	0.54	0.09
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Age	45.61	45.27	0.34
	(13.65)	(13.54)	
Above_55	0.29	0.28	0.38
	(0.45)	(0.45)	
Below_35	0.27	0.28	0.45
	(0.44)	(0.45)	
Between_35_45	0.44	0.44	0.91
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
College	0.32	0.33	0.48
	(0.47)	(0.47)	
Disability	0.17	0.17	0.59
	(0.38)	(0.37)	
Employed at Feb2020	0.59	0.60	0.70
	(0.49)	(0.49)	
Fear partner loses the job	0.07	0.08	0.37
	(0.26)	(0.27)	
Fear to lose the job	0.12	0.13	0.08
	(0.32)	(0.34)	
Female	0.52	0.51	0.41
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Financial distress	0.23	0.23	0.79
	(0.42)	(0.42)	
Healthcare worker	0.06	0.06	0.65
	(0.24)	(0.24)	
High School	0.43	0.45	0.36
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Married	0.49	0.48	0.77
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Kids	0.59	0.59	0.95
	(0.49)	(0.49)	
Leftist	0.17	0.17	0.18
	(0.37)	(0.38)	
Partner: remote work	0.09	0.09	0.97
	(0.29)	(0.29)	
Positive	0.07	0.08	0.32
	(0.26)	(0.27)	
Public sector	0.22	0.22	0.69
	(0.41)	(0.42)	
Religious	0.66	0.66	0.83
	(0.47)	(0.47)	
Remote work	0.20	0.21	0.23
	(0.40)	(0.41)	
School-age children	0.33	0.34	0.54
	(0.47)	(0.47)	
Unemployed	0.14	0.14	0.92
	(0.35)	(0.35)	
Vaccine	0.85	0.85	0.99
	(0.36)	(0.36)	
Vocational school	0.11	0.11	0.70
	(0.31)	(0.31)	
Obs	3,026	3,018	6,044

Notes: For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.

Table 3: **Controls**

Controls 1	Controls 2	Controls 3
Age (3 groups)	Acquaintance positive/dead COVID-19	Fear partner loses the job
College	Disability	Fear to lose the job
Female	Employed at Feb2020	Financial distress
High school	Positive	Healthcare worker
Leftist	Unemployed	Partner: Remote work
Married	Vaccine	Remote work
Kids		Public sector
Religious		
School-aged children		
Vocational school		

Notes: For a detailed explanation of the variables see Table A1.

Table 4: **Baseline Results**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	Non repayable funds	School
Treated	-0.037**	-0.066**	-0.010	-0.141***	0.018
	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	2.704	3.045	2.476	2.928	1.616
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The *primary discriminating condition* is being an individual with a pre-condition for the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine, the extension of the layoff ban and the provision of in-presence schooling. For the extension of the eviction ban, this condition is to cohabit with minor children or children with pre-conditions, while for the priority in the allocation of non repayable funds, it is being a firm with fewer than 50 employees. Then, the outcome is computed as the average position given to each group with the primary discriminating condition. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table 5: **Baseline results - Single groups**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Employed with pre-cond.	Unemployed with pre-cond.	Men with pre-cond.	Women with pre-cond.	Over 55 with pre-cond.	Couple with kids	Single with kids	<50 with funds	<50 empl. no funds	Elementary with pre-cond.	High school with pre-cond.
Treated	0.066*	-0.066*	-0.001	-0.096**	-0.102***	0.024	-0.044	-0.127***	-0.154***	0.023	0.013
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.036)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.358	3.034	3.211	3.043	2.881	2.063	2.889	3.298	2.558	1.881	1.350
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The outcome coincides with the actual position given by respondents to each specific group. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table 6: **Balance Tests by Subgroups**

	Control	Treated	Difference p-value
Level of Education			
Poorly educated	0.30	0.28	0.19
	(0.46)	(0.45)	
Medium educated	0.20	0.20	0.72
	(0.40)	(0.40)	
Highly education	0.50	0.52	0.14
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Age			
Young	0.08	0.08	0.62
	(0.27)	(0.28)	
Intermediate age	0.76	0.77	0.39
	(0.43)	(0.42)	
Old	0.16	0.14	0.16
	(0.36)	(0.35)	
Redistribution Attitude			
Strong attitude	0.30	0.32	0.05*
	(0.46)	(0.47)	
Medium attitude	0.06	0.06	0.45
	(0.24)	(0.23)	
Weak attitude	0.64	0.62	0.13
	(0.48)	(0.48)	
Political Affiliation			
Leftist	0.17	0.18	0.18
	(0.37)	(0.38)	
Centrist	0.15	0.15	0.72
	(0.36)	(0.35)	
Rightist	0.68	0.67	0.42
	(0.47)	(0.47)	
Observations	3,026	3,018	6,044

Notes: For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.

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Table 7: **Heterogeneity results**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	Non repayable funds	School
PANEL A: Political Affiliation					
Treated	-0.100***	-0.223***	-0.117	-0.230***	0.069
	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.068)	(0.047)	(0.050)
Treated*Leftist	0.104*	0.187**	0.113	-0.016	-0.019
	(0.052)	(0.076)	(0.102)	(0.066)	(0.072)
Treated*Rightist	0.067	0.184***	0.129**	0.096*	-0.070
	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.051)
PANEL B: Redistribution Attitude					
Treated	-0.157**	-0.148*	-0.181*	-0.217*	-0.070
	(0.061)	(0.074)	(0.091)	(0.107)	(0.053)
Treated*Strong attitude	0.155**	0.037	0.181**	0.135	0.109**
	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.133)	(0.051)
Treated*Weak attitude	0.113*	0.109	0.179*	0.049	0.084
	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.092)	(0.120)	(0.072)
PANEL C: Age					
Treated	-0.048**	-0.74**	-0.018	-0.129***	0.021
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Treated*Young	0.033	0.055	0.025	0.033	0.030
	(0.056)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.102)	(0.060)
Treated*Old	0.046	0.006	0.030	-0.111	-0.046
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.035)	(0.078)	(0.056)
PANEL D: Level of Education					
Treated	-0.087**	-0.163***	-0.142***	-0.172***	0.003
	(0.036)	(0.056)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.046)
Treated*Poorly educated	0.079**	0.128*	0.177***	0.049	0.022
	(0.029)	(0.071)	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.057)
Treated*Highly educated	0.050	0.113**	0.159***	0.030	0.014
	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.078)	(0.040)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	2.704	3.045	2.476	2.928	1.616
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The *primary discriminating condition* is being an individual with a pre-condition for the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine, the extension of the layoff ban and the provision of in-presence schooling. For the extension of the eviction ban, this condition is to cohabit with minor children or children with pre-conditions, while for the priority in the allocation of non repayable funds, it is being a firm with fewer than 50 employees. Then, the outcome is computed as the average position given to each group with the primary discriminating condition. *Leftist* indicates a leftist or extreme leftist respondent, while *Right* indicates a rightist or extreme rightist respondent. *Strong attitude* identifies respondents who self-declared as religious and have strong prosocial values, while *Weak attitude* identities respondents who self-declared as non religious and weak prosocial values. Respondents younger than 26 are classified as *Young*, while those older than 59 as *old*. *Poorly educated* indicates respondents with a vocational diploma or lower, while *Highly educated* indicates respondents with a college degree or higher. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. We do not control for the age groups when performing the age heterogeneity analysis. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table 8: **Heterogeneity results - Single groups**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Employed with pre-cond.	Unemployed with pre-cond.	Men with pre-cond.	Women with pre-cond.	Over 55 with pre-cond.	Couple with kids	Single with kids	<50 with funds	<50 empl. no funds	Elementary with pre-cond.	High school with pre-cond
PANEL A: Political Affiliation											
Treated	0.152**	-0.175***	-0.180*	-0.227**	-0.262***	-0.084	-0.150	-0.107	-0.300***	0.012	0.125
	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.104)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.068)	(0.091)
Treated*Leftist	-0.188*	0.211***	0.284**	0.163	0.114	0.135	0.092	-0.143	0.112	0.039	-0.077
	(0.093)	(0.053)	(0.114)	(0.127)	(0.086)	(0.111)	(0.116)	(0.141)	(0.102)	(0.077)	(0.122)
Treated*Rightist	-0.080	0.107	0.191*	0.152	0.208*	0.126	0.133	0.007	0.186*	0.005	-0.146
	(0.076)	(0.089)	(0.110)	(0.100)	(0.108)	(0.076)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.103)	(0.053)	(0.096)
PANEL B: Redistribution Attitude											
Treated	0.172	-0.227	-0.016	-0.126	-0.302**	-0.050	-0.313*	-0.216	-0.218	-0.126	-0.015
	(0.136)	(0.164)	(0.140)	(0.167)	(0.107)	(0.130)	(0.149)	(0.210)	(0.197)	(0.099)	(0.156)
Treated*Strong attitude	-0.135	0.174	0.020	-0.031	0.123	0.011	0.351**	0.108	0.161	0.0219*	-0.001
	(0.191)	(0.164)	(0.124)	(0.153)	(0.107)	(0.127)	(0.167)	(0.238)	(0.239)	(0.116)	(0.153)
Treated*Weak attitude	-0.100	0.170	0.015	0.061	0.251**	0.107	0.247	0.015	0.024	0.124	0.044
	(0.140)	(0.183)	(0.137)	(0.170)	(0.111)	(0.070)	(0.154)	(0.217)	(0.199)	(0.093)	(0.173)
PANEL C: Age											
Treated	0.101**	-0.089*	-0.008	-0.103**	-0.111***	-0.014	-0.022	-0.105*	-0.152***	0.008	0.034
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.048)
Treated*Young	-0.180*	0.161*	0.176	0.017	-0.028	0.188*	-0.138	0.191	-0.125	0.024	0.036
	(0.100)	(0.091)	(0.141)	(0.105)	(0.136)	(0.105)	(0.141)	(0.163)	(0.122)	(0.042)	(0.108)
Treated*Old	-0.129*	0.041	-0.059	0.020	0.057	0.144**	-0.083	-0.245*	0.022	0.077	-0.168
	(0.074)	(0.104)	(0.059)	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.065)	(0.079)	(0.138)	(0.087)	(0.058)	(0.098)
PANEL D: Level of Education											
Treated	0.056	-0.211***	-0.068	-0.304***	-0.117	-0.093	-0.192***	-0.181*	-0.163**	0.022	-0.016
	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.072)	(0.112)	(0.078)	(0.045)	(0.088)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.067)
Treated*Poorly educated	0.019	0.106	0.004	0.279***	0.103	0.154	0.199***	0.030	0.068	-0.038	0.081
	(0.100)	(0.089)	(0.101)	(0.083)	(0.183)	(0.091)	(0.063)	(0.079)	(0.110)	(0.074)	(0.071)
Treated*Highly educated	0.012	0.220***	0.130	0.243***	-0.035	0.144*	0.174***	0.088	-0.028	0.020	0.008
	(0.095)	(0.062)	(0.090)	(0.069)	(0.118)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.070)	(0.100)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.358	3.034	3.211	3.043	2.881	2.063	2.889	3.298	2.558	1.350	1.881
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The outcome coincides with the actual position given by respondents to each specific group. *Leftist* indicates a leftist or extreme leftist respondent, while *Right* indicates a rightist or extreme rightist respondent. *Strong attitude* identifies respondents who self-declared as religious and have strong prosocial values, while *Weak attitude* identities respondents who self-declared as non religious and weak prosocial values. Respondents younger than 26 are classified as *Young*, while those older than 59 as *old*. *Poorly educated* indicates respondents with a high school diploma or lower, while *Highly educated* indicates respondents with a college degree or higher. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. We do not control for the age groups when performing the age heterogeneity analysis. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

A   Appendix

Table A1: **Variables definition**

Variable	Definition
Above_55	Dummy=1 if respondent older than 55 and 0 otherwise
Below_35	Dummy=1 if respondent younger than 35 and 0 otherwise
Betwee_35_45	Dummy=1 if respondent's age is between 35 and 45 and 0 otherwise
Acquaintance positive/dead COVID-19	Dummy=1 if respondent has any acquaintance or relative who tested positive or died from COVID-19 and 0 otherwise
College	Dummy=1 if respondent has college (and above) degree and 0 otherwise
Disability	Dummy=1 if respondent or any member of her family has a disability and 0 otherwise
Employed at Feb2020	Dummy=1 if respondent was employed during February 2020 and 0 otherwise
Fear partner loses the job	Dummy=1 if respondent is afraid that her partner could lose her job after COVID-19 and 0 otherwise
Fear to lose the job	Dummy=1 if respondent is afraid to lose her job after COVID-19 and 0 otherwise
Female	Dummy=1 if respondent is a woman and 0 otherwise
Financial distress	Dummy=1 if respondent suffered by any financial distress due to the COVID-19 pandemic and 0 otherwise
Healthcare worker	Dummy=1 if respondent is a healthcare worker and 0 otherwise
High school	Dummy=1 if respondent has high-school degree and 0 otherwise
Married	Dummy=1 if respondent is married and 0 otherwise
Kids	Dummy=1 if respondent has one child and 0 otherwise
Leftist	Dummy=1 if respondent self classified as leftist in the political spectrum and 0 otherwise
Partner: remote work	Dummy=1 if respondent's partner has worked remotely during COVID-19 0 otherwise
Positive	Dummy=1 if respondent was infected by COVID-19 and 0 otherwise
Public sector	Dummy=1 if respondent works in the public sector and 0 otherwise
Religious	Dummy=1 if respondent is religious and 0 otherwise
Remote work	Dummy=1 if respondent has worked remotely during COVID-19 0 otherwise
School-age children	Dummy=1 if respondent has at least one child younger than 18 and 0 otherwise
Unemployed	Dummy=1 if respondent is unemployed and 0 otherwise
Vaccine	Dummy=1 if respondent is vaccinated against COVID-19 or willing to vaccinate as soon as possible and 0 otherwise
Vocational school	Dummy=1 if respondent has a vocational diploma or lower and 0 otherwise

Notes: The survey was run in March 2021.

Table A2: **Balance tests: By geographical areas**

	Control	Treated	Difference p-value
Region==Piedmont	0.08	0.07	0.22
	(0.27)	(0.26)	
Region==Valle D'Aosta	0.00	0.00	0.41
	(0.05)	(0.04)	
Region==Lombardy	0.18	0.17	0.31
	(0.38)	(0.37)	
Region==Trentino Alto Adige	0.01	0.02	0.38
	(0.11)	(0.13)	
Region==Veneto	0.08	0.08	0.83
	(0.27)	(0.27)	
Region==Friuli Venezia Giulia	0.02	0.02	0.58
	(0.14)	(0.15)	
Region==Liguria	0.03	0.03	0.92
	(0.16)	(0.16)	
Region==Emilia Romagna	0.07	0.08	0.61
	(0.26)	(0.27)	
Region==Tuscany	0.06	0.06	0.64
	(0.23)	(0.24)	
Region==Umbria	0.01	0.01	0.99
	(0.11)	(0.11)	
Region==Marche	0.03	0.02	0.64
	(0.16)	(0.15)	
Region==Lazio	0.10	0.10	0.41
	(0.30)	(0.29)	
Region==Abruzzo	0.02	0.02	0.17
	(0.15)	(0.13)	
Region==Molise	0.00	0.01	0.22
	(0.07)	(0.08)	
Region==Campania	0.09	0.10	0.14
	(0.29)	(0.30)	
Region==Puglia	0.07	0.07	0.94
	(0.25)	(0.25)	
Region==Basilicata	0.01	0.01	0.99
	(0.10)	(0.10)	
Region==Calabria	0.03	0.03	0.89
	(0.17)	(0.17)	
Region==Sicily	0.07	0.08	0.29
	(0.26)	(0.27)	
Region==Sardinia	0.03	0.03	0.95
	(0.17)	(0.17)	
North	0.48	0.47	0.48
	(0.50)	(0.50)	
Center	0.20	0.19	0.59
	(0.40)	(0.39)	
South	0.33	0.34	0.23
	(0.47)	(0.47)	
Obs.	3,026	3,018	6,044

Notes: For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis.

Table A3: **Survey and Official statistics comparison (%)**

	Official Statistics (1)	Our Sample (2)
Region		
Piedmont	7.2	7.6
Valle d'Aosta	0.2	0.2
Lombardy	16.8	17.3
Trentino Alto Adige	1.8	1.5
Veneto	8.2	8.1
Friuli Venezia Giulia	2.0	2.1
Liguria	2.6	2.7
Emilia Romagna	7.5	7.6
Tuscany	6.2	5.7
Umbria	1.5	1.3
Marche	2.5	2.6
Lazio	9.7	9.9
Abruzzo	2.2	1.9
Molise	0.5	0.6
Campania	9.5	9.7
Puglia	6.6	6.8
Basilicata	0.9	1.1
Calabria	3.1	2.9
Sicily	8.2	7.6
Sardinia	2.7	2.9
Gender		
Female	51.18	51.19
Age		
Younger than 29	15	16
Age 29-59	64	66
Older than 59	20	18
Education		
Less than high school	36	12
High school	45	54
Above high school	19	32

Notes: Data from Official Statistics come from the Italian National Statistical Office (ISTAT) (www.dati.istat.it). *Less than high school* indicates respondents with a vocational diploma or lower, *High school* indicates high school or vocational school graduates, *Above high school* indicates respondents with a college degree or higher.

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Table A4: **Survey and 2018 ITANES comparison (%)**

	Official Satistics (1)	Our Sample (2)
Political voting in 2018		
Liberi Uguali	5.47	3.71
Democratic Party	14.89	16.68
Europea +	3.14	2.47
5 star Movement	31.47	27.02
Forza Italia	5.81	4.02
Lega Nord	11.92	14.91
Fratelli d'Italia	3.31	5.29
Unione di Centro	0.3	0.38
Italia Europa Insieme	0.43	0.18
Civica Popolare	0.17	0.2
Other party	3.49	3.09
Did not vote/Preferences not to respond	19.6	22.05
Self-categorization on the political spectrum		
Extreme left	3.1	12.0
Left	27.6	20.4
Center	46.8	42.8
Right	20.0	12.3
Extreme right	2.6	12.4
Immigration perception		
In favor of less immigration	50	55

Notes: 2018 Italian National Election Studies (ITANES) (http://www.itanes.org/). ITANES is an association that promotes research on voting behavior in Italy since the 1990s. They carry out sample surveys after both political and local elections.

Figure A1: **Google Trends Research**

(a) COVID-19 Vaccine

(b) Layoff ban

(c) Eviction ban

(d) Non repayable funds

Notes: The figures report trends for 4 groups of researches we run over the period February 23rd, 2020 to December 31st, 2021. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the researched term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. The researched terms were: $COVID\ Vaccine(1)$=Vaccini anti COVID; $COVID\ Vaccine(2)$=Vaccino COVID19; $Layoff\ ban(1)$=cassa integrazione; $Layoff\ ban(2)$=licenziamenti bloccati; $Layoff\ ban(3)$=divieto di licenziamento; $Layoff\ ban(4)$=licenziamenti sospesi; $Eviction\ ban(1)$=blocco sfratti ; $Eviction\ ban(2)$=blocco degli sfratti; $Subsidies(1)$=decreto ristori bis ; $Subsidies(2)$=decreto ristori; $Subsidies(3)$=aiuti alle imprese. The trends are at the weekly level.

Figure A2: **Pavia Observatory: News on the economic policies in 2020**

Notes: The graphs is taken by a report produced by the Pavia Observatory on media on January 2021 (Visibilità dei temi economici nei telegiornali del Prime Time) on the visibility on the economic issues on TV news of the main Italian television channels, from January to October 2020. The number refers to the number of news per TV Prime News.

Figure A3: **Regional Distribution**

Covid-19 death rate

	3.40 - 6.13
	6.21 - 10.96
	12.50 - 27.40
	29.54 - 56.40
	61.17 - 159.00

(a) COVID-19 death rate

Unemployment (2020)

	4.62 - 5.86
	6.02 - 7.68
	7.81 - 9.05
	9.53 - 13.47
	14.47 - 20.45

(b) Unemployment rate

% families living in poverty

	4.30 - 5.70
	5.90 - 6.70
	6.80 - 9.30
	12.00 - 17.90
	18.10 - 23.40

(c) % families in poverty

% small firms

	97.62 - 97.95
	98.00 - 98.49
	98.56 - 98.75
	98.78 - 98.80
	98.95 - 99.10

(d) % small firms

Notes: Average COVID-19 death rates by region are computed by the ISTAT together with the Istituto Superiore di Sanitá (ISS) on administrative data (Istat and Iss, 2020). Unemployment rates are taken from ISTAT and refer to the year 2020. *% families in poverty* is computed by ISTAT as the share of Italian families under the poverty threshold in 2020. *% small firms* coincides with the share of active firms with at the most 50 employees out of the total number of active firms according to the 2020 statistics released by ISTAT.

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Table A5: **Health Factors**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	School
PANEL A: Disability				
Treated	-0.048***	-0.069**	-0.007	0.012
	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Treated*Disability	0.066*	0.018	-0.016	0.033
	(0.035)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.069)
Treated+Disability	0.019	-0.051	-0.023	0.046
	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.055)
PANEL B: Disability broad				
Treated	-0.045**	-0.084**	-0.011	0.013
	(0.017)	(0.032)	(0.035)	(0.034)
Treated*Disability broad	0.034	0.077*	0.004	0.018
	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.065)	(0.068)
Treated+Disability broad	-0.011	-0.007	-0.007	0.032
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.049)	(0.051)
PANEL C: Fear about own health				
Treated	-0.085*	-0.119*	0.047	0.012
	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.035)	(0.040)
Treated*Fear	0.070	0.076	-0.082	0.007
	(0.055)	(0.071)	(0.049)	(0.032)
Treated+Fear	-0.015	-0.043	-0.034	0.020
	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.024)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	2.704	3.045	2.476	1.616
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: *Disability* is a dummy equal 1 if the respondent or any member of her family has a disability and 0 otherwise. *Disability broad* is a dummy equal 1 if the respondent or any member of her family has a disability or the respondent claimed too be in bad or very bad health and 0 otherwise. *Fear about own health* if the respondent claimed to have been afraid for her won health since the beginning of the pandemic. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Figure A4: **Average time spent on the Social Desirability Index**

(a) Average time spent on question

Notes: We report the average time spent by respondents on the social desirability index. Confidence intervals at 95%.

Table A6: **Job Related Factors (1)**

	(1)	(2)
	Layoff ban	Non-repayable funds
PANEL A: Fear to lose the job		
Treated	-0.061**	-0.137***
	(0.027)	(0.028)
Treated*Fear	-0.044	-0.029
	(0.054)	(0.074)
Treated+Fear	-0.104**	-0.166**
	(0.047)	(0.064)
PANEL B: Fear partner loses the job		
Treated	-0.071**	-0.145***
	(0.025)	(0.025)
Treated*Fear	0.062	0.060
	(0.090)	(0.134)
Treated+Fear	-0.009	-0.086
	(0.088)	(0.130)
PANEL C: Fear about own job and partner's job		
Treated	-0.060**	-0.139***
	(0.027)	(0.026)
Treated*Fear	-0.036	-0.008
	(0.046)	(0.090)
Treated+Fear	-0.096**	-0.147*
	(0.041)	(0.083)
Obs	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.045	2.928
Controls 1	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes

Notes: *Fear to lose the job* is a dummy equal one if the respondent claimed to be afraid about losing her job after COVID-19 and 0 otherwise. *Fear partner loses the job* is a dummy equal one if the respondent claimed to be afraid about her partner losing the job after COVID-19 and 0 otherwise. *Fear about own job and partner's job* is a dummy equal one if the respondent claimed to be afraid about losing her job or about her partner losing the job and 0 otherwise. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A7: **Job Related Factors (2)**

	(1)	(2)
	Layoff ban	Non-repayable funds
PANEL A: North		
Treated	-0.051	-0.136***
	(0.036)	(0.039)
Treated*North	-0.026	-0.006
	(0.050)	(0.051)
Treated+North	-0.077**	-0.142***
	(0.034)	(0.032)
Obs	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.045	2.928
Controls 1	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	No	No
PANEL B: Not employed		
Treated	-0.060	-0.129***
	(0.038)	(0.022)
Treated*Not employed	-0.025	-0.048
	(0.076)	(0.054)
Treated+Not employed	-0.085*	-0.177***
	(0.048)	(0.056)
PANEL C: Private sector		
Treated	-0.067	-0.144***
	(0.057)	(0.046)
Treated*Private sector	0.001	0.004
	(0.059)	(0.073)
Treated+Private sector	-0.066***	-0.139***
	(0.021)	(0.040)
Obs	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.045	2.928
Controls 1	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes

Notes: *North* is dummy equal 1 if the respondent works in a Northern region and 0 otherwise. *Not Employed* is a dummy equal 1 if the respondent is an autonomous worker, retired or not an employed worker. *Private* is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent work in the private sector and 0 otherwise. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A8: **Average time spent social desirability index and post-treatment questions**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Time on questions for:				
	Social Desirability Index	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	Non repayable
Treated	-0.646	1.11	0.029	0.996	-2.422
	(2.733)	(2.030)	(1.653)	(1.493)	(2.205)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	79.19	58.68	51.9	49.46	53.63
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Average time spent on the questions used to construct the social desirability index, to answer the vaccine, the layoff, eviction ban and non-repayable funds questions. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A9: **The social desirability gradient - baseline results**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	Non repayable funds	School
Treated	-0.042	-0.105**	-0.035	-0.150***	0.022
	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Above-median Social desirability	-0.082***	-0.121***	-0.111***	-0.065	0.008
	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.036)
Treated×Above-median Soc.Des.	0.004	0.059	0.038	0.011	-0.009
	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.051)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	2.704	3.045	2.476	2.928	1.616
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The *primary discriminating condition* is being an individual with a pre-condition for both the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine and the extension of the layoff ban. For the extension of the eviction ban, this condition is to cohabit with minor children or children with pre-conditions, while for the priority in the allocation of non repayable funds, it is being a firm with fewer than 50 employees. Then, the outcome is computed as the average position given to each group with the primary discriminating condition. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. Above-median social desirability is a dummy equal to 1 if the social desirability index is above the sample median. The index varies between 0 and 13 and corresponds to a Marlowe-Crowne index as proposed by Dhar et al. (2018). For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A10: **The social desirability gradient - single groups**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Employed with pre-cond.	Unemployed with pre-cond.	Men with pre-cond.	Women with pre-cond.	Over 55 with pre-cond.	Couple with kids	Single with kids	<50 with funds	<50 empl. no funds
Treated	0.048	-0.087	-0.027	-0.145	-0.142**	-0.017	-0.054	-0.164**	-0.136**
	(0.036)	(0.061)	(0.070)	(0.089)	(0.053)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.065)
Above-median Social desirability	0.062	-0.087	-0.114	-0.11	-0.138*	-0.164**	-0.058	-0.125*	-0.005
	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.079)	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.068)	(0.055)
Treated×Above-median Soc.Des.	0.035	0.03	0.043	0.075	0.059	0.065	0.012	0.059	-0.037
	(0.054)	(0.069)	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.067)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.069)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.358	3.034	3.211	3.043	2.881	2.063	2.889	3.298	2.558
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The outcome coincides with the actual position given by respondents to each specific group. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. Above-median social desirability is a dummy equal to 1 if the social desirability index is above the sample median. The index varies between 0 and 13 and corresponds to a Marlowe-Crowne index as proposed by Dhar et al. (2018). For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A11: **Baseline Results - Response time**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	Non repayable funds	School
Treated	-0.036**	-0.066**	-0.009	-0.142***	0.018
	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	2.704	3.045	2.476	2.928	1.616
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The *primary discriminating condition* is being an individual with a pre-condition for the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine, the extension of the layoff ban and the provision of in-presence schooling. For the extension of the eviction ban, this condition is to cohabit with minor children or children with pre-conditions, while for the priority in the allocation of non repayable funds, it is being a firm with fewer than 50 employees. Then, the outcome is computed as the average position given to each group with the primary discriminating condition. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A12: **Baseline results - Single groups - Response time**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Employed with pre-cond.	Unemployed with pre-cond.	Men with pre-cond.	Women with pre-cond.	Over 55 with pre-cond.	Couple with kids	Single with kids	<50 empl. with funds	<50 empl. no funds	Elementary with pre-cond.	High school with pre-cond.
Treated	0.066*	-0.066*	-0.001	-0.096**	-0.102***	0.024	-0.043	-0.127***	-0.157***	0.022	0.013
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.036)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.358	3.034	3.211	3.043	2.881	2.063	2.889	3.298	2.558	1.350	1.881
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The outcome coincides with the actual position given by respondents to each specific group. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A13: **Baseline Results - Information exposure**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	Non repayable funds
Treated	-0.033**	-0.063**	0.012	-0.137***
	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	2.704	3.045	2.476	2.928
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The *primary discriminating condition* is being an individual with a pre-condition for the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine, the extension of the layoff ban and the provision of in-presence schooling. For the extension of the eviction ban, this condition is to cohabit with minor children or children with pre-conditions, while for the priority in the allocation of non repayable funds, it is being a firm with fewer than 50 employees. Then, the outcome is computed as the average position given to each group with the primary discriminating condition. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A14: **Baseline results - Single groups - Information exposure**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Employed with pre-cond.	Unemployed with pre-cond.	Men with pre-cond.	Women with pre-cond.	Over 55 with pre-cond.	Couple with kids	Single with kids	<50 empl. with funds	<50 empl. no funds
Treated	0.066*	-0.063*	-0.002	-0.094**	-0.093***	0.017	0.007	-0.129***	-0.146***
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.358	3.034	3.211	3.043	2.881	2.063	2.889	3.298	2.558
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	

Notes: The outcome coincides with the actual position given by respondents to each specific group. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A15: **Baseline Results - Response time & Information exposure**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	Non repayable funds
Treated	-0.033**	-0.064**	-0.006	-0.139***
	(0.013)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.024)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	2.704	3.045	2.476	2.928
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The *primary discriminating condition* is being an individual with a pre-condition for the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine, the extension of the layoff ban and the provision of in-presence schooling. For the extension of the eviction ban, this condition is to cohabit with minor children or children with pre-conditions, while for the priority in the allocation of non repayable funds, it is being a firm with fewer than 50 employees. Then, the outcome is computed as the average position given to each group with the primary discriminating condition. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A16: **Baseline results - Single groups - Response time & Information exposure**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Employed with pre-cond.	Unemployed with pre-cond.	Men with pre-cond.	Women with pre-cond.	Over 55 with pre-cond.	Couple with kids	Single with kids	<50 empl. with funds	<50 empl. no funds
Treated	0.066*	-0.063*	-0.002	-0.095**	-0.095***	0.024	-0.035	-0.128***	-0.150***
	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.037)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.358	3.034	3.211	3.043	2.881	2.063	2.889	3.298	2.558
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	

Notes: The outcome coincides with the actual position given by respondents to each specific group. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A17: **Baseline Results - Completion Date**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	Non repayable funds
Treated	-0.037**	-0.066**	-0.010	-0.140***
	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.025)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	2.704	3.045	2.476	2.928
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The *primary discriminating condition* is being an individual with a pre-condition for the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine, the extension of the layoff ban and the provision of in-presence schooling. For the extension of the eviction ban, this condition is to cohabit with minor children or children with pre-conditions, while for the priority in the allocation of non repayable funds, it is being a firm with fewer than 50 employees. Then, the outcome is computed as the average position given to each group with the primary discriminating condition. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A18: **Baseline results - Single groups - Completion Date**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Employed with pre-cond.	Unemployed with pre-cond.	Men with pre-cond.	Women with pre-cond.	Over 55 with pre-cond.	Couple with kids	Single with kids	<50 empl. with funds	<50 empl. no funds
Treated	0.066*	-0.065*	-0.001	-0.095**	-0.102***	0.024	-0.044	-0.127***	-0.153***
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.358	3.034	3.211	3.043	2.881	2.063	2.889	3.298	2.558
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes Yes	Yes	

Notes: The outcome coincides with the actual position given by respondents to each specific group. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A19: **Heterogeneity results - Response time**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	Non repayable funds	School
PANEL A: Political Affiliation					
Treated	-0.098***	-0.223***	-0.114	-0.200***	0.068
	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.067)	(0.046)	(0.050)
Treated*Leftist	0.103*	0.184**	0.106	-0.020	-0.019
	(0.054)	(0.076)	(0.100)	(0.066)	(0.072)
Treated*Rightist	0.065	0.184***	0.127**	0.091*	-0.070
	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.050)
PANEL B: Redistribution Attitude					
Treated	-0.163**	-0.148*	-0.180*	-0.216*	-0.070
	(0.063)	(0.075)	(0.090)	(0.106)	(0.053)
Treated*Strong attitude	0.160**	0.036	0.181**	0.133	0.109**
	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.132)	(0.051)
Treated*Weak attitude	0.121*	0.109	0.177*	0.047	0.084
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.091)	(0.120)	(0.072)
PANEL C: Age					
Treated	-0.047**	-0.074**	-0.017	-0.130***	0.021
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Treated*Young	0.031	0.055	0.025	0.034	0.030
	(0.056)	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.102)	(0.060)
Treated*Old	0.045	0.004	0.028	-0.112	0.-0.046
	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.035)	(0.080)	(0.056)
PANEL D: Level of Education					
Treated	-0.084**	-0.164***	-0.144***	-0.172***	0.003
	(0.036)	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.058)	(0.046)
Treated*Poorly educated	0.076**	0.129*	0.179***	0.047	0.022
	(0.029)	(0.072)	(0.056)	(0.074)	(0.057)
Treated*Highly educated	0.048	0.115**	0.161***	0.030	0.014
	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.078)	(0.040)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	2.704	3.045	2.476	2.928	1.616
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The *primary discriminating condition* is being an individual with a pre-condition for the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine, the extension of the layoff ban and the provision of in-presence schooling. For the extension of the eviction ban, this condition is to cohabit with minor children or children with pre-conditions, while for the priority in the allocation of non repayable funds, it is being a firm with fewer than 50 employees. Then, the outcome is computed as the average position given to each group with the primary discriminating condition. *Leftist* indicates a leftist or extreme leftist respondent, while *Right* indicates a rightist or extreme rightist respondent. *Strong attitude* identifies respondents who self-declared as religious and have strong prosocial values, while *Weak attitude* identities respondents who self-declared as non religious and weak prosocial values. Respondents younger than 26 are classified as *Young*, while those older than 59 as *old*. *Poorly educated* indicates respondents with a vocational diploma or lower, while *Highly educated* indicates respondents with a college degree or higher. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. We do not control for the age groups when performing the age heterogeneity analysis. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A20: **Heterogeneity results - Single groups - Response time**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Employed with pre-cond.	Unemployed with pre-cond.	Men with pre-cond.	Women with pre-cond.	Over 55 with pre-cond.	Couple with kids	Single with kids	<50 empl. with funds	<50 empl. no funds	Elementary with pre-cond.	High school with pre-cond
PANEL A: Political Affiliation											
Treated	0.153**	-0.175***	-0.180*	-0.227**	-0.261***	-0.084	-0.143	-0.109	-0.291***	0.011	0.125
	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.104)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.068)	(0.091)
Treated*Leftist	-0.188*	0.210***	0.285**	0.162	0.105	0.135	0.077	-0.141	0.100	0.040	-0.078
	(0.093)	(0.053)	(0.113)	(0.128)	(0.086)	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.142)	(0.105)	(0.077)	(0.123)
Treated*Rightist	-0.080	0.106	0.191*	0.152	0.207*	0.126	0.128	0.009	0.173	0.006	-0.146
	(0.076)	(0.089)	(0.110)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.076)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.100)	(0.054)	(0.096)
PANEL B: Redistribution Attitude											
Treated	0.172	-0.230	-0.016	-0.126	-0.302**	-0.050	-0.310*	-0.216	-0.216	-0.126	-0.015
	(0.136)	(0.164)	(0.140)	(0.168)	(0.106)	(0.130)	(0.148)	(0.183)	(0.197)	(0.099)	(0.156)
Treated*Strong attitude	-0.135	0.277	0.021	-0.032	0.119	0.011	0.351*	0.109	0.156	0.219*	-0.001
	(0.192)	(0.163)	(0.124)	(0.154)	(0.106)	(0.127)	(0.168)	(0.194)	(0.240)	(0.116)	(0.153)
Treated*Weak attitude	-0.100	0.173	0.014	0.061	0.253**	0.110	0.245	0.085	0.010	0.124	0.044
	(0.141)	(0.184)	(0.137)	(0.170)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.152)	(0.218)	(0.199)	(0.093)	(0.173)
PANEL C: Age											
Treated	0.101**	-0.088*	-0.008	-0.103**	-0.110**	-0.014	-0.020	-0.104*	-0.155***	0.008	0.034
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.056)	(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.048)
Treated*Young	-0.180*	0.160*	0.176	0.017	-0.029	0.188*	-0.138	0.190	-0.121	0.023	0.037
	(0.100)	(0.091)	(0.142)	(0.105)	(0.137)	(0.105)	(0.140)	(0.163)	(0.122)	(0.042)	(0.107)
Treated*Old	-0.129*	0.041	-0.059	0.019	0.053	0.144**	-0.089	-0.145*	0.021	0.076	-0.168
	(0.074)	(0.104)	(0.059)	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.065)	(0.078)	(0.138)	(0.091)	(0.059)	(0.098)
PANEL D: Level of Education											
Treated	0.056	-0.210***	-0.067	-0.305***	-0.120	-0.093	-0.195***	-0.181*	-0.163**	0.022	-0.016
	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.079)	(0.072)	(0.114)	(0.078)	(0.046)	(0.088)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.066)
Treated*Poorly educated	0.019	0.105	0.003	0.279***	0.105	0.154	0.205***	0.032	0.063	-0.037	0.081
	(0.100)	(0.089)	(0.101)	(0.083)	(0.186)	(0.092)	(0.064)	(0.079)	(0.110)	(0.074)	(0.071)
Treated*Highly educated	0.012	0.219***	0.130	0.244***	-0.030	0.144*	0.179***	0.089	-0.030	0.020	0.008
	(0.095)	(0.062)	(0.090)	(0.069)	(0.120)	(0.070)	(0.060)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.070)	(0.100)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.358	3.034	3.211	3.043	2.881	2.063	2.889	3.298	2.558	1.350	1.881
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The outcome coincides with the actual position given by respondents to each specific group. *Leftist* indicates a leftist or extreme leftist respondent, while *Right* indicates a rightist or extreme rightist respondent. *Strong attitude* identifies respondents who self-declared as religious and have strong prosocial values, while *Weak attitude* identifies respondents who self-declared as non religious and weak prosocial values. Respondents younger than 26 are classified as *Young*, while those older than 59 as *old*. *Poorly educated* indicates respondents with a high school diploma or lower, while *Highly educated* indicates respondents with a college degree or higher. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. We do not control for the age groups when performing the age heterogeneity analysis. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

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Table A21: **Heterogeneity results - Information exposure**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	Non repayable funds
PANEL A: Political Affiliation				
Treated	-0.096***	-0.220***	-0.094	-0.200***
	(0.031)	(0.046)	(0.072)	(0.047)
Treated*Leftist	0.099*	0.187**	0.116	-0.016
	(0.054)	(0.076)	(0.102)	(0.066)
Treated*Rightist	0.067	0.184***	0.127**	0.096*
	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.049)
PANEL B: Redistribution Attitude				
Treated	-0.154**	-0.145*	-0.156*	-0.214*
	(0.060)	(0.074)	(0.090)	(0.106)
Treated*Strong attitude	0.154**	0.037	0.180**	0.134
	(0.070)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.133)
Treated*Weak attitude	0.115*	0.109	0.175*	0.050
	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.090)	(0.120)
PANEL C: Age				
Treated	-0.044**	-0.071**	0.003	-0.125***
	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.030)
Treated*Young	0.035	0.057	0.030	0.039
	(0.057)	(0.078)	(0.083)	(0.103)
Treated*Old	0.044	0.007	0.039	-0.112
	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.037)	(0.079)
PANEL D: Level of Education				
Treated	-0.082**	-0.158***	-0.116***	-0.168***
	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.058)
Treated*Poorly educated	0.076**	0.126*	0.166***	0.049
	(0.028)	(0.069)	(0.055)	(0.074)
Treated*Highly educated	0.050	0.111**	0.154***	0.030
	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.044)	(0.078)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	2.704	3.045	2.476	2.928
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The *primary discriminating condition* is being an individual with a pre-condition for the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine, the extension of the lay-off ban and the provision of in-presence schooling. For the extension of the eviction ban, this condition is to cohabit with minor children or children with pre-conditions, while for the priority in the allocation of non repayable funds, it is being a firm with fewer than 50 employees. Then, the outcome is computed as the average position given to each group with the primary discriminating condition. *Leftist* indicates a leftist or extreme leftist respondent, while *Right* indicates a rightist or extreme rightist respondent. *Strong attitude* identifies respondents who self-declared as religious and have strong prosocial values, while *Weak attitude* identities respondents who self-declared as non religious and weak prosocial values. Respondents younger than 26 are classified as *Young*, while those older than 59 as *old*. *Poorly educated* indicates respondents with a vocational diploma or lower, while *Highly educated* indicates respondents with a college degree or higher. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. We do not control for the age groups when performing the age heterogeneity analysis. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A22: **Heterogeneity results - Single groups - Information exposure**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Employed with pre-cond.	Unemployed with pre-cond.	Men with pre-cond.	Women with pre-cond.	Over 55 with pre-cond.	Couple with kids	Single with kids	<50 empl. with funds	<50 empl. no funds

PANEL A: Political Affiliation

Treated	0.153**	-0.171***	-0.181*	-0.226**	-0.253**	-0.092	-0.096	-0.109	-0.291***
	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.104)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.089)
Treated*Leftist	-0.188*	0.205***	0.284**	0.163	0.114	0.134	0.098	-0.143	0.111
	(0.094)	(0.053)	(0.114)	(0.127)	(0.086)	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.141)	(0.102)
Treated*Rightist	-0.080	0.108	0.191*	0.152	0.208*	0.126	0.128	0.007	0.186*
	(0.076)	(0.089)	(0.110)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.076)	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.102)

PANEL B: Redistribution Attitude

Treated	0.172	-0.224	-0.017	-0.125	-0.293**	-0.058	-0.254	-0.218	-0.210
	(0.136)	(0.165)	(0.140)	(0.166)	(0.106)	(0.131)	(0.149)	(0.210)	(0.196)
Treated*Strong attitude	-0.135	0.174	0.202	-0.031	0.122	0.011	0.350*	0.109	0.159
	(0.191)	(0.164)	(0.124)	(0.153)	(0.107)	(0.128)	(0.168)	(0.193)	(0.139)
Treated*Weak attitude	-0.100	0.171	0.014	0.061	0.352**	0.111	0.238	0.083	0.016
	(0.140)	(0.185)	(0.137)	(0.170)	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.151)	(0.218)	(0.200)

PANEL C: Age

Treated	0.101**	-0.085*	-0.009	-0.102**	-0.102**	-0.021	0.026	-0.106*	-0.145***
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.055)	(0.040)
Treated*Young	-0.180*	0.163*	0.175	0.018	-0.023	0.187*	-0.127	0.189	-0.110
	(0.100)	(0.092)	(0.141)	(0.104)	(0.138)	(0.104)	(0.138)	(0.164)	(0.121)
Treated*Old	-0.129*	0.039	-0.060	0.021	0.059	0.142**	-0.062	-0.245*	0.088
	(0.074)	(0.103)	(0.059)	(0.095)	(0.105)	(0.066)	(0.078)	(0.138)	(0.088)

PANEL D: Level of Education

Treated	0.056	-0.206***	-0.070	-0.302***	-0.102	-0.102	-0.129**	-0.183**	-0.154**
	(0.069)	(0.063)	(0.079)	(0.069)	(0.112)	(0.081)	(0.047)	(0.087)	(0.059)
Treated*Poorly educated	0.018	0.103	0.005	0.278***	0.094	0.158	0.175**	0.031	0.067
	(0.100)	(0.089)	(0.100)	(0.080)	(0.179)	(0.092)	(0.065)	(0.079)	(0.110)
Treated*Highly educated	0.012	0.220***	0.131	0.242***	-0.041	0.145*	0.164**	0.088	-0.028
	(0.095)	(0.060)	(0.090)	(0.067)	(0.116)	(0.070)	(0.058)	(0.092)	(0.093)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.358	3.034	3.211	3.043	2.881	2.063	2.889	3.298	2.558
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The outcome coincides with the actual position given by respondents to each specific group. *Leftist* indicates a leftist or extreme leftist respondent, while *Right* indicates a rightist or extreme rightist respondent. *Strong attitude* identifies respondents who self-declared as religious and have strong prosocial values, while *Weak attitude* identities respondents who self-declared as non religious and weak prosocial values. Respondents younger than 26 are classified as *Young*, while those older than 59 as *old*. *Poorly educated* indicates respondents with a high school diploma or lower, while *Highly educated* indicates respondents with a college degree or higher. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. We do not control for the age groups when performing the age heterogeneity analysis. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A23: **Heterogeneity results - Response time & Information exposure**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	Non repayable funds
PANEL A: Political Affiliation				
Treated	-0.094***	-0.220***	-0.109	-0.197***
	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.067)	(0.046)
Treated*Leftist	0.098*	0.184**	0.105	-0.021
	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.100)	(0.066)
Treated*Rightist	0.066	0.184***	0.126**	0.091*
	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.048)
PANEL B: Redistribution Attitude				
Treated	-0.160**	-0.146*	-0.176*	-0.214*
	(0.061)	(0.075)	(0.090)	(0.106)
Treated*Strong attitude	0.159**	0.036	0.181**	0.132
	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.132)
Treated*Weak attitude	0.122*	0.110	0.176*	0.048
	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.091)	(0.120)
PANEL C: Age				
Treated	-0.043**	-0.071**	-0.014	-0.127***
	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.030)
Treated*Young	0.033	0.056	0.026	0.040
	(0.056)	(0.078)	(0.084)	(0.102)
Treated*Old	0.043	0.005	0.029	-0.113
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.035)	(0.081)
PANEL D: Level of Education				
Treated	-0.080**	-0.160***	-0.140***	-0.169***
	(0.034)	(0.056)	(0.043)	(0.058)
Treated*Poorly educated	0.074**	0.127*	0.178***	0.046
	(0.029)	(0.071)	(0.056)	(0.074)
Treated*Highly educated	0.048	0.113**	0.161***	0.030
	(0.040)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.078)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	2.704	3.045	2.476	2.928
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The *primary discriminating condition* is being an individual with a pre-condition for the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine, the extension of the lay-off ban and the provision of in-presence schooling. For the extension of the eviction ban, this condition is to cohabit with minor children or children with pre-conditions, while for the priority in the allocation of non repayable funds, it is being a firm with fewer than 50 employees. Then, the outcome is computed as the average position given to each group with the primary discriminating condition. *Leftist* indicates a leftist or extreme leftist respondent, while *Right* indicates a rightist or extreme rightist respondent. *Strong attitude* identifies respondents who self-declared as religious and have strong prosocial values, while *Weak attitude* identities respondents who self-declared as non religious and weak prosocial values. Respondents younger than 26 are classified as *Young*, while those older than 59 as *old*. *Poorly educated* indicates respondents with a vocational diploma or lower, while *Highly educated* indicates respondents with a college degree or higher. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. We do not control for the age groups when performing the age heterogeneity analysis. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A24: **Heterogeneity results - Single groups - Response time & Information exposure**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Employed with pre-cond.	Unemployed with pre-cond.	Men with pre-cond.	Women with pre-cond.	Over 55 with pre-cond.	Couple with kids	Single with kids	<50 empl. with funds	<50 empl. no funds
PANEL A: Political Affiliation									
Treated	0.153**	-0.171***	-0.181*	-0.226**	-0.154**	-0.085	-0.134	-0.110	-0.284***
	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.104)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.087)
Treated*Leftist	-0.188*	0.206***	0.285**	0.162	0.105	0.136	0.075	-0.140	0.099
	(0.093)	(0.053)	(0.114)	(0.127)	(0.085)	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.142)	(0.105)
Treated*Rightist	-0.080	0.106	0.191*	0.152	0.208*	0.126	0.126	0.009	0.172*
	(0.076)	(0.090)	(0.110)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.076)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.099)
PANEL B: Redistribution Attitude									
Treated	0.172	-0.229	-0.017	-0.125	-0.296**	-0.050	-0.301*	-0.218	-0.210
	(0.136)	(0.165)	(0.140)	(0.168)	(0.106)	(0.131)	(0.147)	(0.211)	(0.197)
Treated*Strong attitude	-0.135	0.177	0.021	-0.032	0.118	0.011	0.351*	0.109	0.155
	(0.191)	(0.163)	(0.124)	(0.154)	(0.106)	(0.128)	(0.169)	(0.194)	(0.241)
Treated*Weak attitude	-0.100	0.176	0.014	0.061	0.254**	0.110	0.243	0.084	0.011
	(0.141)	(0.185)	(0.137)	(0.170)	(0.110)	(0.111)	(0.151)	(0.218)	(0.199)
PANEL C: Age									
Treated	0.101**	-0.085*	-0.008	-0.102**	-0.104**	-0.014	-0.013	-0.105*	-0.149***
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.056)	(0.040)
Treated*Young	-0.180*	0.161*	0.176	0.018	-0.025	0.188*	-0.136	0.188	-0.109
	(0.100)	(0.091)	(0.142)	(0.105)	(0.138)	(0.105)	(0.139)	(0.163)	(0.121)
Treated*Old	-0.129*	0.039	-0.059	0.020	0.054	0.144**	-0.087	-0.245*	0.019
	(0.074)	(0.104)	(0.059)	(0.095)	(0.106)	(0.065)	(0.078)	(0.138)	(0.091)
PANEL D: Level of Education									
Treated	0.056	-0.106***	-0.069	-0.302***	-0.109	-0.093	-0.187***	-0.183*	-0.156**
	(0.069)	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.071)	(0.113)	(0.078)	(0.043)	(0.088)	(0.060)
Treated*Poorly educated	0.018	0.103	0.004	0.278***	0.099	0.154	0.202***	0.032	0.061
	(0.100)	(0.089)	(0.101)	(0.082)	(0.183)	(0.091)	(0.065)	(0.079)	(0.110)
Treated*Highly educated	0.012	0.218***	0.130	0.243***	-0.034	0.143*	0.179***	0.089	-0.030
	(0.095)	(0.062)	(0.090)	(0.068)	(0.118)	(0.070)	(0.059)	(0.092)	(0.091)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.358	3.034	3.211	3.043	2.881	2.063	2.889	3.298	2.558
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The outcome coincides with the actual position given by respondents to each specific group. *Leftist* indicates a leftist or extreme leftist respondent, while *Right* indicates a rightist or extreme rightist respondent. *Strong attitude* identifies respondents who self-declared as religious and have strong prosocial values, while *Weak attitude* identities respondents who self-declared as non religious and weak prosocial values. Respondents younger than 26 are classified as *Young*, while those older than 59 as *old*. *Poorly educated* indicates respondents with a high school diploma or lower, while *Highly educated* indicates respondents with a college degree or higher. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. We do not control for the age groups when performing the age heterogeneity analysis. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A25: **Heterogeneity results - Completion Date**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Vaccine	Layoff Ban	Eviction Ban	Non repayable funds

PANEL A: Political Affiliation

Treated	-0.100***	-0.223***	-0.118	-0.202***
	(0.031)	(0.046)	(0.069)	(0.047)
Treated*Leftist	0.104*	0.186**	0.114	-0.017
	(0.052)	(0.076)	(0.102)	(0.066)
Treated*Rightist	0.067	0.183***	0.130**	0.096*
	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.050)

PANEL B: Redistribution Attitude

Treated	-0.157**	-0.149*	-0.181*	-0.219*
	(0.061)	(0.074)	(0.090)	(0.107)
Treated*Strong attitude	0.155**	0.039	0.180**	0.137
	(0.071)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.134)
Treated*Weak attitude	0.114*	0.109	0.178*	0.051
	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.092)	(0.121)

PANEL C: Age

Treated	-0.048**	-0.073**	-0.019	-0.128***
	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.031)
Treated*Young	0.033	0.055	0.025	0.033
	(0.056)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.102)
Treated*Old	0.045	0.005	0.031	-0.113
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.035)	(0.078)

PANEL D: Level of Education

Treated	-0.087**	-0.162***	-0.143***	-0.170***
	(0.036)	(0.057)	(0.043)	(0.059)
Treated*Poorly educated	0.079**	0.128*	0.178***	0.047
	(0.028)	(0.071)	(0.055)	(0.073)
Treated*Highly educated	0.050	0.112**	0.159***	0.029
	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.078)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	2.704	3.045	2.476	2.928
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The *primary discriminating condition* is being an individual with a pre-condition for the allocation of COVID-19 vaccine, the extension of the layoff ban and the provision of in-presence schooling. For the extension of the eviction ban, this condition is to cohabit with minor children or children with pre-conditions, while for the priority in the allocation of non repayable funds, it is being a firm with fewer than 50 employees. Then, the outcome is computed as the average position given to each group with the primary discriminating condition. *Leftist* indicates a leftist or extreme leftist respondent, while *Right* indicates a rightist or extreme rightist respondent. *Strong attitude* identifies respondents who self-declared as religious and have strong prosocial values, while *Weak attitude* identifies respondents who self-declared as non religious and weak prosocial values. Respondents younger than 26 are classified as *Young*, while those older than 59 as *old*. *Poorly educated* indicates respondents with a vocational diploma or lower, while *Highly educated* indicates respondents with a college degree or higher. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. We do not control for the age groups when performing the age heterogeneity analysis. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Table A26: **Heterogeneity results - Single groups - Response time & Information exposure**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	Employed with pre-cond.	Unemployed with pre-cond.	Men with pre-cond.	Women with pre-cond.	Over 55 with pre-cond.	Couple with kids	Single with kids	<50 empl. with funds	<50 empl. no funds
PANEL A: Political Affiliation									
Treated	0.154**	-0.173***	-0.179*	-0.225**	-0.263**	-0.085	-0.150	-0.107	-0.297***
	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.104)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Treated*Leftist	-0.189*	0.208***	0.283**	0.161	0.115	0.136	0.092	-0.143	0.109
	(0.093)	(0.054)	(0.114)	(0.127)	(0.086)	(0.110)	(0.117)	(0.141)	(0.101)
Treated*Rightist	-0.081	0.105	0.191*	0.151	0.208*	0.126	0.133	0.007	0.184*
	(0.077)	(0.089)	(0.110)	(0.101)	(0.107)	(0.076)	(0.091)	(0.085)	(0.103)
PANEL B: Redistribution Attitude									
Treated	0.170	-0.130	-0.017	-0.128	-0.301**	-0.049	-0.313**	-0.216	-0.221
	(0.135)	(0.166)	(0.140)	(0.169)	(0.108)	(0.130)	(0.149)	(0.210)	(0.197)
Treated*Strong attitude	-0.132	0.180	0.022	-0.027	0.121	0.008	0.351**	0.109	0.166
	(0.191)	(0.166)	(0.123)	(0.155)	(0.108)	(0.128)	(0.167)	(0.193)	(0.239)
Treated*Weak attitude	-0.098	0.173	0.016	0.063	0.250**	0.108	0.247	0.084	0.018
	(0.139)	(0.186)	(0.137)	(0.172)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.153)	(0.218)	(0.198)
PANEL C: Age									
Treated	0.101**	-0.087*	-0.007	-0.102**	-0.111**	-0.015	-0.022	-0.105*	-0.151***
	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.056)	(0.040)
Treated*Young	-0.180*	0.160*	0.176	0.017	-0.028	0.189*	-0.138	0.191	-0.125
	(0.100)	(0.088)	(0.141)	(0.104)	(0.136)	(0.104)	(0.141)	(0.164)	(0.121)
Treated*Old	-0.131*	0.037	-0.061	0.017	0.058	0.146**	-0.083	-0.246*	0.019
	(0.074)	(0.103)	(0.059)	(0.094)	(0.014)	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.138)	(0.087)
PANEL D: Level of Education									
Treated	0.058	-0.207***	-0.067	-0.301***	-0.118	-0.095	-0.192***	-0.181*	-0.159**
	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.080)	(0.073)	(0.113)	(0.079)	(0.046)	(0.088)	(0.060)
Treated*Poorly educated	0.017	0.102	0.002	0.276***	0.104	0.156	0.199***	0.030	0.064
	(0.100)	(0.089)	(0.100)	(0.084)	(0.183)	(0.091)	(0.063)	(0.079)	(0.110)
Treated*Highly educated	0.011	0.217***	0.130	0.241***	-0.034	0.145*	0.174***	0.088	-0.031
	(0.096)	(0.062)	(0.090)	(0.069)	(0.119)	(0.070)	(0.061)	(0.092)	(0.093)
Obs	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044	6,044
Mean	3.358	3.034	3.211	3.043	2.881	2.063	2.889	3.298	2.558
Controls 1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 2	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls 3	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Regional FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: The outcome coincides with the actual position given by respondents to each specific group. *Leftist* indicates a leftist or extreme leftist respondent, while *Right* indicates a rightist or extreme rightist respondent. *Strong attitude* identifies respondents who self-declared as religious and have strong prosocial values, while *Weak attitude* identities respondents who self-declared as non religious and weak prosocial values. Respondents younger than 26 are classified as *Young*, while those older than 59 as *old*. *Poorly educated* indicates respondents with a high school diploma or lower, while *Highly educated* indicates respondents with a college degree or higher. *Controls 1*, *Controls 2*, and *Controls 3* are listed in Table 3. For an explanation of the variables, see Table A1. We do not control for the age groups when performing the age heterogeneity analysis. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the regional level. Significant at 10% *; significant at 5% **; significant at 1% ***.

Appendix B: Survey Design

We design a survey targeting individuals in the age range 20-70 living in Italy which was implemented through the internet panel of *Demetra*, a specialized company in data collection and market research services. The survey was administered to 6,044 respondents between March 2nd and March 26th after running a soft pilot between February 22nd and March 1st.

The survey included 54 questions and was developed in Italian. It included 6 modules: (i) an introductory screen with a consent form that did not specify the topic of study to avoid attrition due to the survey topic; (ii) questions eliciting demographics and health status; (iii) a questionnaire to elicit social desirability; (iv) questions on working status before/after the pandemics and working conditions before/after lock-downs; (v) questions on political views; (vi) experimental treatment; and (vi) decision screens to measure allocation preferences. The average completion time was 12 minutes. As quality control, every respondent who completed the survey in less than 5 minutes was dropped and replaced by *Demetra*. Similarly, we checked the consistency of responses across questions. For example, for respondents reporting a child older than 17 years old, we checked if the age they declared to have was compatible with having a child older than 17 years old. If not, respondents were dropped and replaced by *Demetra*.

The second module ("Basics") queried participants on their basic characteristics including gender, age, citizenship, province of residence, province of birth, education, religiosity, children, self-assessed health, personal experience with COVID-19. Respondents were also asked to report whether they or one of their relatives suffered from any pre-condition.

The third module ("Social Desirability") coincided with the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability module designed to assess the respondent's concern for social approval (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). Following Dhar et al. (2018), we rely on a 13-item validated version of this module (Reynolds, 1982). Specifically, respondents were asked to agree or disagree with they having certain almost saintly personality traits some of which are too stringent to be met by most people (e.g., "I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own"). The sum of all the positive traits a respondent reported constitutes our social desirability score, thus a high score signals a stronger social desirability bias as respondents have a higher tendency to give answers that are socially desirable.

The fourth module ("Work") queried participants about their working status and occupation and those of their partners (if any) before and after the pandemics (i.e, before/after February 2020). Participants were also asked about their working conditions and those of their partners (if any) before and after lock-downs. Additional questions regarded their

concerns about being fired, their well-being and that of their family, whether they suffered financial problems due to the pandemic, and how often they suffered from stress, sleeping problems, panic attacks, anxiety and fear about bad events.

The fifth module ("Politics") elicited political preferences by asking participants to self-assess their political orientation (from extreme left to extreme right), to express their political view with respect to immigration policy, the privatization of the healthcare, and the influence of the EU on national politics. Respondents were also asked about their main source of information, what party they voted for at the last political election in 2018, and how much satisfied they were with the management of the COVID-19 emergency at the regional level.

After the fifth module, participants were randomly and evenly split into a control group and a treatment group, and stratified to match the respective adult population on three dimensions (i.e., gender, age and region of residence) within both controls and treated. In brief, the experimental treatment provided information on the following 4 specific phenomena in the country: COVID-19 infections, economic crisis, poverty and unemployment. It consisted of (i) basic statistics on the spread of the given phenomenon in the country or among the Italian population and (ii) information on the most exposed population group to such a phenomenon. Differently, the control group was provided only with the same basic statistics showed to the treated.

Finally, in the sixth module ("First stage module"), participants had to express their preferences about the allocation of four scarce resource each of which is linked to the phenomenon discussed in the previous module: vaccine against COVID-19, ban on layoffs, ban on evictions, governmental non-repayable grants. Specifically, respondents were asked to rank which of the six proposed groups should be prioritized in supplying each of these scarce resources. As a falsification test, we included also a last question regarding the types of students to which in presence schooling should be guaranteed. Since the experimental treatment did not provided any information about the types of students most negatively affected by online teaching, treated and controls should not behave differently with respect to this last quest

B1   Questionnaire
Module 1 - Introduction

This is a survey for academic research purposes carried out by a group of researchers

working at various Italian universities. This study is strictly anonymous and independent from any government and other public organization. The data collected will be used only for research purposes and the study is non-partisan.

The survey consists of a questionnaire that will take about 15 minutes to complete. For this study to be reliable, it is very important that you answer with complete sincerity and that you read each question carefully before answering.

You should know the following:

1. Whether or not to participate is up to you. Participation is completely voluntary. You can choose not to participate. You can agree to participate and subsequently change your mind. Your decision will not be used against you in any way. Your refusal to participate will not result in any consequences or any loss of benefits that you are otherwise entitled to receive. You can ask as many questions as you want before making a decision.

2. If you have any questions, doubts or complaints, you can contact Professor Anna Rosso at anna.rosso@unimi.it.

All personal data collected with this survey will be treated as strictly confidential, and will not be made available to any third party. Any data analysis or reports based on this study will protect your anonymity and will be strictly confidential.

Do you agree to participate in this survey?

- No, I don't agree to participate.

- Yes, I agree to participate.

Module 2 - Basics

1. Age

2. Province of birth

3. Citizenship

4. Province of residence

5. Marital status

- single

- in a relationship

- cohabitating

- married

- divorced

- widow/widower

6. Number of children

   - No children

   - 1

   - 2

   - 3 or more

7. (For those with children) Is at least one of your children older than 17? (Yes/No)

8. Education

   - primary school diploma

   - middle school diploma

   - vocational school diploma or equivalent

   - high school diploma or equivalent

   - bachelor or post-graduate diploma

9. In daily life, which of the following statements best describes you

   - I am a religious practicing person

   - I am a religious non-practicing person

   - I can't tell if I'm religious or not

   - I am not a religious person

10. In general, you would say that your health status is:

    - Excellent

- Very good

- Good

- Not very good

- Very bad

11. Someone in your family (including you) suffers from any pre-conditions? (Yes/No)

12. Did you get infected from COVID-19? (Yes/No)

13. With respect to COVID-19 vaccination you (choose one of the following):

    - you have already been vaccinated

    - you plan to get vaccinated as soon as possible

    - you do not plan to get vaccinated

14. Has anyone among your acquaintances or relatives tested positive or died from COVID-19? (Yes/No)

15. Are you a healthcare professional?

Module 3 - Social Desirability

16. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged (Agree/Disagree)

17. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way (Agree/Disagree)

18. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my ability (Agree/Disagree)

19. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I knew they were right (Agree/Disagree)

20. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener (Agree/Disagree)

21. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone (Agree/Disagree)

22. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake (Agree/Disagree)

23. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget (Agree/Disagree)

24. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable (Agree/Disagree)

25. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own (Agree/Disagree)

26. There have times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others (Agree/Disagree)

27. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me (Agree/Disagree)

28. I have deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings (Agree/Disagree)

Module 4 - Work

29. Your working condition before the pandemic (February 2020) was:

    - Employed with an open-ended contract
    - Employed with a fixed-term contract
    - Self-employed
    - Unemployed
    - Retired
    - Housewife
    - Receiving unemployment benefits
    - Other

30. Do / did you work mainly in the public administration or in the private sector?

    - Public administration
    - Private sector

31. Your current working condition is:

    - Employed with an open-ended contract
    - Employed with a fixed-term contract
    - Self-employed
    - Unemployed

- Retired
- Housewife
- Receiving unemployment benefits
- Other

32. (If not unemployed, retired, housewife) What is your occupation?

    - Manager
    - Clerk
    - Worker
    - Business owner
    - Craftsman
    - Self-employed
    - Working member of a cooperative
    - Family assistant
    - Other

33. (If married or co-habitating) The working condition of your partner before the pandemic (February 2020) was:

    - Employed with an open-ended contract
    - Employed with a fixed-term contract
    - Self-employed
    - Unemployed
    - Retired
    - Housewife
    - Receiving unemployment benefits
    - Other

34. (If married or co-habitating) The current working condition of your partner is:

    - Employed with an open-ended contract

- Employed with a fixed-term contract

- Self-employed

- Unemployed

- Retired

- Housewife

- Receiving unemployment benefits

- Other

35. (If working before the pandemic) How did you work during the various lock-downs?

    - Mainly remote working

    - Went regularly or with modified shifts to work

    - Remote working and face-to-face work

36. (If currently working): Are you afraid of being fired due to the COVID-19 crisis?

    - Yes

    - No

    - I do not know

37. (If married or co-habitating with a person currently working) How did your partner work during the various lock-downs?

    - Mainly remote working

    - Went regularly or with modified shifts to work

    - Remote working and face-to-face work

38. (If married or co-habitating with a person currently working): Is your partner afraid of being fired due to the COVID-19 crisis?

    - Yes

    - No

    - I do not know

39. Have you suffered from financial problems since the start of the COVID-19 crisis?

- A lot

- Quite a lot

- Moderately

- A little bit

- Not all

40. Since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis, how often have you experienced the following statuses: (always, very often, often, almost never, never)

   - Feeling depressed, hopeless

   - Feeling nervous or anxious

   - Having trouble sleeping or falling asleep

   - Being afraid that something very bad might happen

   - Having a panic attack (sudden feeling of fear or panic)

41. Since the beginning of the pandemic, have you ever been worried about: (always, very often, often, almost never, never)

   - your health

   - the health of relatives and friends

   - (if married, co-habitating or in a relationship): your relationship with your partner

   - your relationship with your family of origin

   - stress at the workplace

   - financial problems

   - not having anyone to talk to

   - (if with children): the well-being of your children

Module 4 - Politics

42. What did you vote for in the last political elections of 2018?

   - Forza Italia

- Lega Nord

- Fratelli d'Italia

- UDC

- PD

- +Europa

- Civica Popolare

- Italia Europa Insieme

- M5S

- Liberi Uguali

- Other

- I didn't vote

- I prefer not to answer

43. Do you agree that immigration to your country should be minimized?

    - I strongly agree

    - I agree

    - I am indifferent

    - I disagree

    - I strongly disagree

44. (If strongly agreeing or agreeing to the previous questions) Your concern for immigration is mainly based on

    - Economic considerations (e.g., risk of losing your job)

    - Cultural considerations

    - None of the above

45. Do you agree that the European Union should play a more important role than the current one? (e.g. make more decisions, intervene more directly)

    - I strongly agree

    - I agree

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- I am indifferent

- I disagree

- I strongly disagree

46. Do you agree with a possible increase in the privatization of public healthcare?

    - I strongly agree

    - I agree

    - I am indifferent

    - I disagree

    - I strongly disagree

47. What is your main source of information?

    - TV News

    - Social network

    - Newspapers (online and printed)

    - Blog of experts (i.e. scientists, politicians, journalists)

    - Friends

    - Other

48. How satisfied are you with the regional government's response to the COVID-19 emergency?

    - Very satisfied

    - Satisfied

    - Indifferent

    - Unsatisfied

    - Very unsatisfied

49. How would you describe your political orientation?

    - Far left

    - Left

- Moderate

- Right

- Extreme right

Module 5 - Experimental treatment

SCREEN 1:

Control group : "According to the Italian National Institute of Health, since the beginning of the pandemic in Italy, the average age of patients who died due to COVID-19 is 81 years, while the average age among the infected patients is 62 years. Women who died after contracting COVID-19 are on average older than men (women 86 years - men 80 years)."

Treated group: "According to the Italian National Institute of Health, since the beginning of the pandemic in Italy, the average age of patients who died due to COVID-19 is 81 years, while the average age among the infected patients is 62 years. Women who died after contracting COVID-19 are on average older than men (women 86 years - men 80 years). The age being equal, an individual with previous chronic diseases who get infected by COVID-19 has a 3 times greater chance of dying than an infected individual without chronic diseases."

SCREEN 2:

Control group : "According to the latest estimates of the Italian Institute of Statistics, during the first phase of the health emergency (which ended on May 4, 2020), 45% of firm shut down. Over 70% of firms reported lower revenues in the 2-month period March-April 2020 compared to the same period in 2019."

Treated group : "According to the latest estimates of the Italian Institute of Statistics, during the first phase of the health emergency (which ended on May 4, 2020), 45% of firms shut down. Over 70% of firms reported lower revenues in the 2-month period March-April 2020 compared to the same period in 2019. The greatest contraction was registered among firms with 3-9 employees, followed by firms with 10-49 employees, which mainly declared zero revenues or a reduction of more than 50%."

SCREEN 3:

Control group : "According to the latest report on poverty in Italy, in 2019 the Italian Institute of Statistics estimates almost 1.7 million families in absolute poverty with an incidence of 6.4%."

Treated group : "According to the latest report on poverty in Italy, in 2019 the Italian Institute of Statistics estimates almost 1.7 million families in absolute poverty with an incidence of 6.4%. Poverty is more widespread among single-parent families (8.9%) and among families with cohabiting children, especially if minors (20.2% with three or more minor children)."

SCREEN 4:
Control group : "In Italy, 15% of the unemployed are re-integrated into the labor market within 3 months after their dismissal."

Treated group : "In Italy, 15% of the unemployed are re-integrated into the labor market within 3 months after their dismissal. This figure drops to 10% for the unemployed over 55 and women with children. Furthermore, for the same age, a person with pre-conditions is on average a 26% less likely to find a job than a person without pre-conditions."

Module 6 - First stage module

50. In your opinion, which of the following groups of individuals should be given priority for the administration of the COVID-19 vaccine? Order from highest priority (1) to lowest priority (6).

- Employed
- Employed with pre-conditions or chronic diseases
- Unemployed
- Unemployed with pre-conditions or with chronic diseases
- Retired
- Individuals up to 25 years old

51. In your opinion, for which of the following categories of workers is it more important to extend the ban on layoffs (currently in force till March 2021)? Order from the first (1) which should be protected the most to the last (6).

- Employed men

- Employed men with pre-conditions or chronic diseases

- Employed women

- Employed women with pre-conditions or chronic diseases

- Employed older than 55

- Employees with pre-conditions disabilities or chronic diseases older than 55

52. In your opinion, for which of the following groups of individuals is it more important to extend the ban on evictions (currently in force till June 30, 2021)? Order from the first (1) which should be protected the most to the last (6).

- Couples with dependent minors or people with pre-conditions

- Couples without dependent minors or people with pre-conditions

- Singles with dependent minors or people with pre-conditions

- Singles without dependent minors or people with pre-conditions

- Retired with pre-conditions

- Retired without pre-conditions

53. In your opinion, which of the following categories of firms should be given priority for the new assignment of governmental non-repayable grants? Order from highest priority (1) to lowest priority (6).

- Firms with fewer than 50 employees

- Firms with 50 to 250 employees

- Firms with more than 250 employees

- Firms with fewer than 50 employees that did not previously get these contributions

- Firms with 50 to 250 employees that did not previously get these contributions

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- Firms with more than 250 employees that did not previously get these contributions

54. In your opinion, which of the following categories of students should be guaranteed face-to-face teaching? Order from highest priority (1) to lowest priority (6).

- Elementary school students with pre-conditions
- High school students with pre-conditions
- Elementary school students of working parents
- High school students of working parents
- Primary school students of unemployed parents
- High school students of unemployed parents