We develop a model to understand the trade-offs faced by an elected representative in supporting an amnesty when a restrictive immigration policy is in place. We show that an amnesty is more desirable the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the smaller is the scal leakage to undocumented immigrants via the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on the voting behavior of U.S. Congressmen on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provides strong support for the predictions of our theoretical model.

What drives the legalization of immigrants? Evidence from IRCA

Casarico, Alessandra;Facchini, Giovanni;Frattini, Tommaso
2018

Abstract

We develop a model to understand the trade-offs faced by an elected representative in supporting an amnesty when a restrictive immigration policy is in place. We show that an amnesty is more desirable the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the smaller is the scal leakage to undocumented immigrants via the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on the voting behavior of U.S. Congressmen on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 provides strong support for the predictions of our theoretical model.
2018
2018
Casarico, Alessandra; Facchini, Giovanni; Frattini, Tommaso
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/4003868
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