We investigate the impact of legislative reforms in merger control legislation in nineteen industrial countries between 1987 and 2004. We find that strengthening merger control decreases the stock prices of non-financial firms, while increasing those of banks. Cross sectional regressions show that the discretion embedded in the supervisory control of bank mergers is a major determinant of the positive bank stock returns. One explanation is that merger control introduces "checks and balances" that mitigates the potential abuse and wasteful enforcement of supervisory control in the banking sector.

The economic impact of merger control legislation

Carletti, Elena;Ongena, Steven
2015

Abstract

We investigate the impact of legislative reforms in merger control legislation in nineteen industrial countries between 1987 and 2004. We find that strengthening merger control decreases the stock prices of non-financial firms, while increasing those of banks. Cross sectional regressions show that the discretion embedded in the supervisory control of bank mergers is a major determinant of the positive bank stock returns. One explanation is that merger control introduces "checks and balances" that mitigates the potential abuse and wasteful enforcement of supervisory control in the banking sector.
2015
2015
Carletti, Elena; Hartmann, Philipp; Ongena, Steven
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
IRLE-D-14-00106 Text.pdf

non disponibili

Tipologia: Documento in Pre-print (Pre-print document)
Licenza: NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 430.1 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
430.1 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/3987192
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 11
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 7
social impact