We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: there is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the “mixed” region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods.As in past experiments, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.

Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework

MORELLI, MASSIMO
2011

Abstract

We experimentally investigate a legislative bargaining model with both public and particularistic goods. Consistent with the qualitative implications of the model: there is near exclusive public good provision in the pure public good region, in the pure private good region minimum winning coalitions sharing private goods predominate, and in the “mixed” region proposers generally take some particularistic goods for themselves, allocating the remainder to public goods.As in past experiments, proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted, resulting in public good provision decreasing in the mixed region as its relative value increases, which is inconsistent with the theory.
2011
G. R., Fréchette; J. H., Kagel; Morelli, Massimo
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/3925318
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