This paper examines retail competition in a liberalized gas market.We show that TOP clauses limit the incentives to face-to-face competition and determine segmentation and monopoly pricing even when entry of new competitors occurs. The development of wholesale trade, instead, may induce generalized entry and retail competition. This equilibrium outcome is obtained if a compulsory wholesale market is introduced, even when firms are vertically integrated, or under vertical separation of wholesale and retail activites when firms can use only linear bilateral contracts.
Liberalizing the gas industry: Take-or-pay contracts, retail competition and wholesale trade
POLO, MICHELE;
2013
Abstract
This paper examines retail competition in a liberalized gas market.We show that TOP clauses limit the incentives to face-to-face competition and determine segmentation and monopoly pricing even when entry of new competitors occurs. The development of wholesale trade, instead, may induce generalized entry and retail competition. This equilibrium outcome is obtained if a compulsory wholesale market is introduced, even when firms are vertically integrated, or under vertical separation of wholesale and retail activites when firms can use only linear bilateral contracts.File in questo prodotto:
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