In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. We show that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist − one class fully concentrated and with control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights − removes the controlling creditor’s liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and the performance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entire business as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency of contractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.

Contractual resolutions of financial distress

Gennaioli, NIcola
;
Stefano Rossi
2013

Abstract

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. We show that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist − one class fully concentrated and with control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights − removes the controlling creditor’s liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and the performance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entire business as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency of contractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.
2013
2012
Gennaioli, Nicola; Rossi, Stefano
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/3769294
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