I build a model where potentially biased judges verify complex contractual contigencies. when judges are unbiased judicial state verification induces parties to write flexible contracts. When judges are biased, parties write noncontingent contracts to protect themselves against costly judicial errors.
Optimal contracts with enforcement risk
Gennaioli, Nicola
2013
Abstract
I build a model where potentially biased judges verify complex contractual contigencies. when judges are unbiased judicial state verification induces parties to write flexible contracts. When judges are biased, parties write noncontingent contracts to protect themselves against costly judicial errors.
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