This chapter investigates information aggregation when agents face mixed rewards based partly on ex-post realizations (as is typical of prediction markets) and partly on the most popular opinion (as in pure idea markets, or beauty contests). The informational properties of the consensus forecast are characterized when agents trade off the incentive to accurately predict fundamentals with the desire of meeting the most popular opinion.

Modeling idea markets: between beauty contests and prediction markets

OTTAVIANI, MARCO M.;
2011

Abstract

This chapter investigates information aggregation when agents face mixed rewards based partly on ex-post realizations (as is typical of prediction markets) and partly on the most popular opinion (as in pure idea markets, or beauty contests). The informational properties of the consensus forecast are characterized when agents trade off the incentive to accurately predict fundamentals with the desire of meeting the most popular opinion.
2011
9780415572866
Leighton Vaughan Williams
Prediction markets
I., Marinovic; Ottaviani, MARCO M.; P. N., Sorensen
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/3735087
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