We formulate a simple model of advice which can be useful to guide the regulation of the financial retail industry. An informed agent (financial adviser) transmits information to an otherwise uninformed principal (investor) with uncertain degree of strategic sophistication. Incentives for truthful information disclosure and information acquisition are studied. The role of explicit monetary transfers is analyzed.

The economics of advice

OTTAVIANI, MARCO M.
2000

Abstract

We formulate a simple model of advice which can be useful to guide the regulation of the financial retail industry. An informed agent (financial adviser) transmits information to an otherwise uninformed principal (investor) with uncertain degree of strategic sophistication. Incentives for truthful information disclosure and information acquisition are studied. The role of explicit monetary transfers is analyzed.
2000
Ottaviani, MARCO M.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/3735085
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