Use and abuse of intratextual argumentation in law

Our aim in this paper is to focus on the uses of intratextual argumentation, according to which the interpretation of a legal provision is justified if it is consistent or coherent with the content of other legal provisions in the same act or code. In particular, we consider the uses of intratextual argumentation which single out some subsystems within the same legal system, and we ask under what conditions the application of this canon is justified and thus acceptable in legal decision-making. We argue that there are basically two kinds of intratextual argumentation in law. First, judges resort to intratextual arguments which rest upon textual positive consistency or coherence: these arguments justify the constant interpretation of a term or expression within a legal document. Secondly, courts make use of intratextual arguments which rely on negative consistency or coherence: such arguments justify different interpretations of the same term or expression on the basis of its normative context.