We study auctions under restricted communication. Agents have valuations distributed over an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide necessary conditions for welfare as well as revenue maximizing auctions in the independent private values case when bidders report simultaneously. We also show that the seller who chooses how to allocate a fixed number of messages allocates them evenly over all agents.
Communication and Efficiency in Auctions
KOS, NENAD
2012
Abstract
We study auctions under restricted communication. Agents have valuations distributed over an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide necessary conditions for welfare as well as revenue maximizing auctions in the independent private values case when bidders report simultaneously. We also show that the seller who chooses how to allocate a fixed number of messages allocates them evenly over all agents.
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