We develop a two-period model to jointly analyze the female decisions of investing in education and of participating in the labor market. In the first period women, who are heterogeneous in talent, decide whether to invest in education, or remain unskilled and start working immediately. In the second period they have a kid and they make their participation decision: the skilled decide whether to enter or not the labor market; the unskilled whether to continue or drop out. Kids are costly, and the cost is divided among parents. This cost may be of a high or a low type, and the true type is revealed only after the child's birth. Female education decisions are thus taken under imperfect information on the cost of the kid. We solve the model backward and we characterize the participation and education decisions. We find that, due to the imperfect information, there are instances where women who have invested in education find it profitable not to work. We also find that imperfect information may be associated with a higher output than what would result in the case of perfect information, since in the former case high-ability women with a high cost kid may find it convenient to invest in education and work. We then study a tax-transfer scheme targeted on working women as a specific example of government's intervention to sustain both female decisions of investing in education and work. In the presence of this policy it's more likely that more women participate to the labor market when compared to the case where the government does not subsidize the child cost. Their expectation to participate may in turn induce them to invest in education. The policy also reduces the amount of unused human capital related to the presence of educated women who decide not to participate.

Female education and empèloyment: a waste of talent

CASARICO, ALESSANDRA;PROFETA, PAOLA ANTONIA
2009

Abstract

We develop a two-period model to jointly analyze the female decisions of investing in education and of participating in the labor market. In the first period women, who are heterogeneous in talent, decide whether to invest in education, or remain unskilled and start working immediately. In the second period they have a kid and they make their participation decision: the skilled decide whether to enter or not the labor market; the unskilled whether to continue or drop out. Kids are costly, and the cost is divided among parents. This cost may be of a high or a low type, and the true type is revealed only after the child's birth. Female education decisions are thus taken under imperfect information on the cost of the kid. We solve the model backward and we characterize the participation and education decisions. We find that, due to the imperfect information, there are instances where women who have invested in education find it profitable not to work. We also find that imperfect information may be associated with a higher output than what would result in the case of perfect information, since in the former case high-ability women with a high cost kid may find it convenient to invest in education and work. We then study a tax-transfer scheme targeted on working women as a specific example of government's intervention to sustain both female decisions of investing in education and work. In the presence of this policy it's more likely that more women participate to the labor market when compared to the case where the government does not subsidize the child cost. Their expectation to participate may in turn induce them to invest in education. The policy also reduces the amount of unused human capital related to the presence of educated women who decide not to participate.
2009
Casarico, Alessandra; Profeta, PAOLA ANTONIA
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/3718448
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