The objective of this paper is to assess to which extent gas market inefficiencies, such as weak competition, import dependence and lack of flexibility tools, affect operation and usage of storage services in Italy in the aftermath of the EU liberalization process. The analysis is supported by the empirical results of a Delphi survey that we have conducted to investigate storage service provision and regulation in Italy. We argue that the Italian storage sector is at a crossroads. The policy-driven phase of liberalization is ending and the market-driven phase has just begun. The former phase has granted fair access to storage, narrowed the likelihood of strategic behaviour by the incumbent and secured residential users against supply disruptions, but it has proved dynamically inefficient. Cost-reflective tariffs and low penalties for unbalances have both lowered incentives to expand the range of flexibility tools and penalized industrial customers demand. The market-driven phase has just started. The expected increase in working capacity and the entry of newcomers in the authorization process for new facilities are a progress towards the commercial use of storage. To this end, however, a further change in gas market design is needed: the creation of a well functioning spot market. © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Gas storage services and regulation in Italy: A Delphi analysis

BONACINA, MONICA;CRETI', ANNA;
2009

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to assess to which extent gas market inefficiencies, such as weak competition, import dependence and lack of flexibility tools, affect operation and usage of storage services in Italy in the aftermath of the EU liberalization process. The analysis is supported by the empirical results of a Delphi survey that we have conducted to investigate storage service provision and regulation in Italy. We argue that the Italian storage sector is at a crossroads. The policy-driven phase of liberalization is ending and the market-driven phase has just begun. The former phase has granted fair access to storage, narrowed the likelihood of strategic behaviour by the incumbent and secured residential users against supply disruptions, but it has proved dynamically inefficient. Cost-reflective tariffs and low penalties for unbalances have both lowered incentives to expand the range of flexibility tools and penalized industrial customers demand. The market-driven phase has just started. The expected increase in working capacity and the entry of newcomers in the authorization process for new facilities are a progress towards the commercial use of storage. To this end, however, a further change in gas market design is needed: the creation of a well functioning spot market. © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
2009
Bonacina, Monica; Creti', Anna; A., Sileo
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11565/2337791
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 8
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 7
social impact